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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines the relationship between deliberative democracy, the 
idea that public decisions should be made by discussion among free and equal citizens, 
and internal and external political efficacy. Internal political efficacy is the extent to 
which people feel they can competently participate in politics; external political efficacy 
is the extent to which people feel that government is responsive to their interests. Some 
scholars assert that deliberative democracy can increase perceptions of political efficacy; 
however, little empirical research has tested this proposition.  
To help fill that research gap, this study examines one deliberative process, the 
AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting as convened by United Agenda for Children 
(UAC), a coalition of public and private organizations who joined to ensure a positive 
future for all the children (from birth to age 21) of Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. 
The primary research question is: What impact does participation in the AmericaSpeaks 
21st Century Town Meeting have on participants’ sense of internal and external political 
efficacy? This study uses a quasi-experimental research design, with survey data 
collected at three points in time from two non-equivalent comparison groups (participants 
and non-participants). Multiple analyses are conducted, including various regression 
models, Heckman treatment effect models, and propensity score matching models.  
The study has three major findings. First, before the Town Meeting, participants 
have significantly lower perceptions of external political efficacy than non-participants. 
Second, participation in the Town Meeting increases participants’ perceptions of both 
internal and external political efficacy; however, only the increase in external political 
 ix
efficacy is statistically significant. Finally, the increase in external political efficacy 
persists over time. In sum, these results suggest that participation in this deliberative 
democracy process increases perceptions of political efficacy, and particularly 
perceptions of external political efficacy. The implications of these findings and 
directions for future research are discussed.  
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Our public men have, besides politics, their private affairs to attend to, and 
our ordinary citizens, though occupied with the pursuits of industry, are still 
fair judges of public matters; for, unlike any other nation, we regard the 
citizen who takes no part in these duties not as unambitious but as useless, 
and we are able to judge proposals even if we cannot originate them; instead 
of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of action, we think 
it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all (Thucydides II.40; 
quote from Elster, 1998: 1). 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
Deliberative democracy, also sometimes called discursive democracy, is the idea 
that public decisions should be made by discussion among free and equal citizens. More 
specifically, deliberative democracy seeks to infuse government decision making with 
reasoned discussion among, and the collective judgment of, citizens (Chambers, 2003; 
Cunningham, 2002; Elster, 1998; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). In contrast to the 
traditional economics-based theory of democracy, which uses voting as the central 
institution for identifying and aggregating preferences, deliberative democracy 
accentuates public deliberation as the source of legitimate lawmaking (Mansbridge, 1980; 
Young, 2000).  
The concept of deliberative democracy is as old as the birth of democracy in 
Athens (Elster, 1998; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). Although Athenian democracy 
came to an end in 322 B.C., the concept of deliberative democracy can be seen 
throughout the ages (for historical perspectives on deliberative democracy, see Elster, 
1998; Gastil and Keith, 2005; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). The concept has also 
taken on new meaning in Western nations, and especially in the United States, where a 
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growing number of scholars and theorists point to a “democratic deficit” and a 
“citizenship deficit” (e.g., Macedo et al., 2005; see also Elshtain, 1995; Frantzich, 2005; 
Putnam, 2000; Sandel, 1996; Skocpol and Fiorina, 1999). A democratic deficit refers to a 
situation where democratic organizations, institutions, and governments are seen as 
falling short of fulfilling the principles of democracy in their practices or operation 
(Chomsky, 2006; Durant, 1995). A citizenship deficit refers broadly to the erosion of 
civil society, and more specifically to an erosion of the skills and dispositions of 
citizenship among the general public (e.g., Macedo et. al, 2005). To many, these deficits 
are a troublesome signal of the weakening of American democracy. For example, 
Macedo and colleagues (2005: 1) assert that: 
American democracy is at risk. The risk comes not from some external 
threat but from disturbing internal trends: an erosion of the activities and 
capacities of citizenship. Americans have turned away from politics and 
the public sphere in larger numbers, leaving our civic life impoverished. 
Citizens participate in public affairs less frequently, with less knowledge 
and enthusiasm, in fewer venues, and less equally than is healthy for a 
vibrant democratic polity….Americans should be concerned about the 
current state of affairs. The risk is not to our national survival but to the 
health and legitimacy of our shared political order. 
 
Other scholars join in this lament, asserting that there has been a widespread 
withdrawal of Americans from a broad range of civic activities. They supply a battery of 
statistics showing declining civic engagement and waning political participation, activity, 
and knowledge (e.g., Frantzich, 2005; Putnam, 2000; Skocpol and Fiorina, 1999). For 
example: 
• American voter turnout rates have dropped about 25 percent since the 1960s, 
and now rank near the bottom among democratic nations.  
• Disadvantaged Americans participate less than the well-off, and political 
participation among the young has dropped sharply. 
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• The proportion of Americans who say that they “trust the federal government 
to do what is right” has dropped from about three-quarters in the early 1960s 
to less than one-third in 2000.  
• Since 1960, there has been a nearly 10-point increase in the percentage of 
people who feel that “people like me don’t have any say about what 
government does,” with over one-half of all respondents expressing cynicism.  
• Over two-thirds of the public do not expect government officials to be 
responsive to their political opinions and demands. 
• Only 38% of respondents to a September 1999 CBS news poll agreed that 
they feel their views are represented in the laws and bills passed by 
government.  
• Confidence in Congress dropped from over 40 percent in the early 1970s to 
less than 20 percent in the late 1990s. 
• Other political activities, such as writing letters to the editor, participating in 
rallies and demonstrations, and volunteering in campaigns, fell by about half 
between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s. 
 
Some scholars assert that deliberative democracy is a remedy for the democratic 
and citizenship ills of contemporary American society (e.g., Benhabib, 1992, 1996; 
Dryzek, 1990; Elster, 1998; Fung and Wright, 2003; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996; 
Habermas, 1989; Michelman, 1988). Advocates assert that deliberative democracy can 
ensure accountability and quality service delivery and produce improved policy outcomes 
while simultaneously reversing the trends of declining political participation and the 
erosion of civil society. The basic argument is that the nature and characteristics of 
deliberative democracy have both instrumental and intrinsic value. The instrumental 
value of deliberative democracy enables it to better deal with the problems of modern 
governance, while its intrinsic value enables it to produce better and more efficacious 
citizens.  
The focus of this study is on the intrinsic value of deliberative democracy – its 
potential to enhance the skills and dispositions of citizenship. Numerous scholars argue 
that deliberative processes have an ability to produce “better citizens” by increasing or 
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fostering their political sophistication, interest, participation, efficacy, trust, respect, 
empathy, and sociotropism or public spiritedness (Luskin and Fishkin, 2003; see also 
Benhabib, 1996; Cohen and Fung, 2004; Cohen and Rogers, 1995; Cooke, 2000; Elster, 
1998; Fearon, 1998; Fung, 2003, 2005; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 2004; Macedo, 
1999; Manin, 1987). As yet, however, there is a lack of systematic, empirical research 
confirming these and other potential benefits. This dissertation seeks to fill part of this 
research gap by focusing on the impacts of participation in a deliberative democracy 
process on perceptions of political efficacy.  
Political efficacy refers to the extent to which people feel they have an impact on, 
or exert some influence over, public affairs (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, 1954). There 
are two types of political efficacy: internal efficacy (the belief that one can understand 
and influence policy and politics) and external efficacy (the belief that the government 
will respond to one's demands) (Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990). Internal and external 
political efficacy are among the most frequently used measures of general political 
attitudes and are highly correlated with political participation and mobilization (Conway, 
2000; Finkel, 1985). Moreover, internal and external political efficacy are thought to be 
key indicators of the overall health of democratic systems (Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 
1990).  
To better understand the relationship between deliberative democracy and 
political efficacy, this study examines the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting as 
convened by United Agenda for Children (UAC), a coalition of citizens, civic leaders, 
corporations, public entities, and community agencies who joined to ensure a positive 
future for all of the children (from birth to age 21) of Mecklenburg County, North 
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Carolina (UAC, 2006). The primary research question is: What impact does participation 
in the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting have on participants’ sense of internal 
and external political efficacy? Subsidiary research questions include:  
1) Do participants and non-participants differ in terms of political efficacy 
before participation in the Town Meeting?  
2) Do participants have a higher sense of political efficacy after participation in 
the Town Meeting? If so, what variables affect perceptions of political 
efficacy?  
3) If participants have a higher sense of political efficacy after participation in 
the Town Meeting, do those effects last over time?   
 
Political efficacy is an important area of research since recent decades have seen 
its steady decline among Americans. This is problematic because political efficacy is a 
measure of citizenship that broadly signals regime support and legitimacy (Easton, 1965, 
1975; Miller 1974). In theory, deliberation should increase perceptions of political 
efficacy among participants (e.g., Luskin and Fishkin, 2003). In fact, political efficacy is 
the key citizenship characteristic that is to be developed by democratic participation 
(Mansbridge, 1995; Pateman, 1970). This potential “efficacy effect” is frequently touted 
as a rationale for engaging in deliberative processes and institutionalizing deliberative 
democracy in the regular practices of government. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
little research has been done on the relationship between deliberative democracy and 
perceptions of efficacy. This dissertation takes a first step in that direction. Exploring if 
and how deliberative participation contributes to perceptions of political efficacy will 
help with the development and refinement of both theory and practice. 
Although this study examines these effects with regard to a single process, the 
AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting, the research takes an important step toward 
the development of both theory and practice. As scholars begin to understand the impacts 
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and outcomes of singular deliberative democracy processes, such as the AmericaSpeaks 
21st Century Town Meeting, they can use that information to refine and build theory. In 
turn, such research efforts can be used to enhance the practice and design of deliberative 
democracy processes.  
This assertion is well illustrated by the substantive meaning of the answers to the 
subsidiary research questions. For example, the first question explores baseline 
differences in perceptions of political efficacy among participants and non-participants. 
Thus, the answer will shed light on the make-up of the engaged (and disengaged) 
citizenry. This is important in helping scholars to better understand the characteristics of 
those who are (and are not) civicly engaged. If differences between participants and non-
participants exist in terms of political efficacy, then this suggests that the deliberative 
democracy is less effective than presumed in engaging all segments of the citizenry. Such 
a result could be used to challenge the legitimacy of deliberative processes – why does 
government need to use processes that further engage the already efficacious among 
citizens? 
 The second question gets to the heart of the dissertation: whether and how 
participation in a deliberative process increases perceptions of internal and external 
political efficacy. As noted above, little research has explored the relationship between 
deliberative democracy and perceptions of political efficacy. Thus, the answers have the 
potential to make important contributions to both theory and practice. From a theoretical 
standpoint, it is important to understand the efficacy effect not only in terms of whether 
deliberation increases perceptions of political efficacy, but also in terms of how it 
increases those perceptions. In other words, it is important both to look for the efficacy 
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effect and to determine its contributing variables. In particular, it is important to assess 
the impact of deliberative features on perceptions of political efficacy.  
Additional theoretical importance comes from the third question. As far as I 
know, this is the first study to assess the long-term impacts of deliberative participation 
on perceptions of efficacy in a systematic, empirical manner.1 Just as it is important to 
know and understand whether deliberation increases political efficacy, it is important to 
know whether the efficacy effect has longevity. The value of deliberative democracy may 
be questioned if it produces only short-term gains in political efficacy. Moreover, it is 
possible that deliberative democracy processes might increase short term perceptions of 
political efficacy, but result in longer term decreases. This is especially likely if 
participants have a bad experience in the process.  
 From a practical perspective, the answers to the questions also inform the design 
of deliberative democracy processes. The first question tells us if the process is engaging 
all segments of the citizenry. To the extent that it is not, practitioners must think about the 
design of deliberative processes in terms of participant selection and recruitment. The 
second and third questions also inform us about the design choices and functional 
outcomes of deliberative processes. Specifically, the answers will shed light on how 
various aspects of deliberation contribute to perceptions of political efficacy, as well as 
the longevity or persistence of the efficacy effect. These answers may help practitioners 
and public managers to better design deliberative democracy processes to achieve the 
desired effects.  
                                                 
1 An exception is Luskin and Fishkin (2003). In this unpublished paper, Luskin and Fishkin compare three 
different Deliberative Polls®; however, they use few indicators of political efficacy, and those indicators 
vary from poll setting to poll setting. Thus, while the paper makes valuable contributions, it lacks rigorous 
methodology. 
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Finally, the overall research design of this study, as well as its specific questions 
and answers, has methodological importance. The study may help scholars better 
understand how to measure and think about political efficacy, particularly in a 
deliberative setting. Likewise, it may help scholars and practitioners better understand 
how to measure and think about deliberative democracy and its various practices and 
processes. Finally, the study may help researchers design more sophisticated studies with 
which to explore the potential intrinsic benefits of deliberative democracy, that is, its 
potential to impact perceptions of political efficacy and other skills and dispositions of 
citizenship.  
The time is ripe for research that seeks to understand and assess the various 
impacts and outcomes of deliberative processes, as the deliberative democracy movement 
is gaining momentum and shows no signs of waning in the near future. The field is 
rapidly growing, as evidenced by the proliferation of organizations, research institutions, 
and scholarly books and articles devoted to the subject. For example, the late 1990s and 
early 2000s saw the creation and development of numerous organizations and institutions 
that seek to understand and institutionalize various deliberative democracy processes and 
programs, such as the Deliberative Democracy Consortium, the National Coalition for 
Dialogue and Deliberation, the Co-Intelligence Institute, the National Issues Forums 
Institute, Public Agenda, Public Conversations Project, Study Circles Resource Center, 
Conversation Cafés, and AmericaSpeaks. Research institutions have emerged at 
universities and colleges across the country to study the theory and practice of 
deliberative democracy, such as The Center for Deliberative Democracy at Stanford 
University, The Democracy Collaborative at the University of Maryland, The Center for 
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Deliberative Polling at the University of Texas-Austin, and The Deliberative Democracy 
Project at the University of Oregon. In addition, the National Coalition for Dialogue and 
Deliberation lists over twenty deliberative democracy education programs at universities 
and colleges across the country (see: 
www.thataway.org/resources/explore/colleges.html). The amount of research published 
on the subject is also impressive, and demonstrable by rather unscientific, but telling 
search methods. For example, a quick search on www.amazon.com using the term 
“deliberative democracy” returns almost 400 books published in 2006 or 2007 alone. 
Moreover, the same search term on www.scholar.google.com returns over 23,000 
articles.   
The prospective impact of deliberative democracy on public administration 
increases as interest in deliberative democracy grows and as more groups and 
organizations seek to implement and institutionalize such processes in the regular 
practice of governance. There have already been calls for widespread governmental 
changes to institutionalize deliberation in national politics. For example, Ackerman and 
Fishkin (2004) propose Deliberation Day, a new national holiday for each presidential 
election year where citizens throughout the country would deliberate in public spaces 
about issues that divide the candidates. Similarly, Leib (2004) proposes an institutional 
design to embed the practice of deliberation in national government by integrating a 
"popular" branch of government into the existing federal structure.  
While these calls are unlikely to be heeded in the near future, it is clearly 
becoming increasingly important for the field of public administration to understand both 
the theory and practice(s) of deliberative democracy. From a theoretical standpoint, 
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current research on deliberative democracy spans the fields of public management, public 
policy, planning, political science, sociology, communications, and related disciplines. 
However, public administration is “the logical and natural home” for work as it relates to 
the research and practice of deliberative democracy since the “field has a broader and 
deeper understanding of the unique contexts, constraints, ethical obligations, and 
significance for the functioning of democracy” that is entailed by such work (Bingham 
and O’Leary, 2006: 166). From a practical perspective, integrating citizens into policy 
and decision-making processes is a major challenge for governance in the 21st century 
(see generally, O’Leary, Bingham and Gerard, 2006; see also Collaborative Democracy 
Network, 2005, 2006). As is evident from the history of citizen participation practices in 
the United States (and elsewhere), the brunt of responsibility for the creation, 
development, implementation, and management of such efforts falls squarely on the 
shoulders of public administrators. Likewise, it is the pejorative ‘bureaucracy’ and 
‘bureaucrats’ that are generally blamed for perceptions of failure in citizen participation 
efforts (e.g., Hummel and Stivers, 1998; King, Feltey, and Susel, 1998; King and Stivers, 
1998). To the extent that scholars and practitioners want to institutionalize deliberative 
democracy in the regular practices of government and governance, it behooves public 
administrators to understand, and care about, deliberative democracy processes and 
practices.   
 
 
ROADMAP FOR THE STUDY 
Chapter 2 serves as a primer on deliberative democracy and lays the foundation 
for this study. The chapter begins by defining deliberative democracy and comparing it to 
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representative democracy. It then discusses the reasons for the resurgent interest in 
deliberative democracy, asserting that the increased interest is prompted, in large part, by 
claims about the democratic and citizenship deficits in the United States (and in other 
Western democracies). The chapter then turns to an examination of the potential benefits 
and pitfalls of deliberative democracy, specifically discussing how various theorists and 
scholars believe that deliberative democracy can overcome (or contribute to) these 
deficits in American governance. Finally, the chapter briefly reviews the characteristics 
of deliberative democracy processes and provides some examples.  
Chapter 3 takes a theoretical approach to the study of deliberative democracy. 
This chapter begins with a general explanation of the claims about the educative effects 
of participation and how deliberative democracy is theorized to affect the skills and 
dispositions of citizenship. The chapter then provides a discussion specifically about the 
theoretical effects of participatory and deliberative democracy on political efficacy. Next, 
the chapter turns to an examination of the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting 
and discusses why the design of this deliberative process is expected to benefit citizens 
generally, and improve perceptions of political efficacy specifically. The chapter 
concludes with a review of empirical research on political efficacy and participation in a 
variety of settings.  
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the research approach and methodology used 
in the study. It begins by outlining the specific research questions and discussing the 
expected findings in general terms. From there, it articulates the specific hypotheses 
tested in the study. It also discusses the research design, subjects and procedures for data 
collection, survey instruments, and variable construction. The study uses a quasi-
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experimental, longitudinal research design and data from surveys collected at three times 
from two non-equivalent comparison groups. One group of subjects consists of 
“participants” in the 21st Century Town Meeting held in Charlotte, North Carolina. 
Participants were surveyed at three points in time: before the Town Meeting (Time 1), 
immediately after the Town Meeting (Time 2), and approximately 24 months after the 
Town Meeting (Time 3). The second group consists of “non-participants”, or citizens of 
the greater Charlotte area who did not register or attend the Town Meeting. Non-
participants were surveyed at two points in time: before the Town Meeting (Time 1) and 
approximately 24 months after the Town Meeting (Time 3). The chapter concludes with a 
review of the various analytic methods used to address the specific research questions, 
including various regression models, Heckman treatment effect models, and propensity 
score matching.  
Chapter 5 presents the results of the study. Its organization follows the order of 
the subsidiary research questions, and is thus divided into three parts. The first set of 
results explores differences in political efficacy between participants and non-
participants. The second set of results explores differences between participants before 
and immediately after the 21st Century Town Meeting. Specifically, these results compare 
the before and immediately after groups of participants on demographic characteristics 
and perceptions of internal and external political efficacy. In addition, this set of results 
examines the variables that impact perceptions of political efficacy, such as demographic 
characteristics, perceptions about the quality of deliberation, and perceptions about the 
potential impact of the Town Meeting. The final set of results assesses the persistence of 
perceptions of political efficacy. To determine the persistence of the efficacy effect, 
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several comparisons are made. First, participants at Time 3 (24 months after the Town 
Meeting) are compared to participants at Time 2 (immediately after the Town Meeting) 
and Time 1 (before the Town Meeting). Second, participants at Time 3 are compared to 
non-participants at Time 3. Finally, non-participants at Time 1 are compared to non-
participants at Time 3. 
The study has several major findings. First, before the Town Meeting, participants 
have significantly lower perceptions of both internal and external political efficacy than 
non-participants. Second, after the Town Meeting, participants experience an increase in 
both internal and external political efficacy; however, only the increase in external 
political efficacy is statistically significant. Moreover, the quality of deliberation has no 
impact on either internal or external political efficacy. The perceived potential impact of 
the Town Meeting is positively correlated with internal, but not external, political 
efficacy.  
Third, the results indicate that there are no significant changes in internal or 
external political efficacy among participants at Time 2 and Time 3. These results suggest 
that the efficacy effect persists over time. Moreover, there are no statistically significant 
changes in internal political efficacy among participants at Time 1 and Time 3, although 
the difference in external political efficacy in these time periods is statistically 
significant. Finally, the strength of the efficacy effect, at least with regard to external 
political efficacy, is evidenced by other results. There are no significant changes in non-
participants’ perceptions of internal or external political efficacy between Time 1 and 
Time 3. Moreover, unlike before the Town Meeting, there are no statistically significant 
differences in internal political efficacy between participants and non-participants at 
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Time 3; however, there are significant differences in external political efficacy between 
participants and non-participants 24 months after the Town Meeting. In addition, the 
efficacy gap is larger 24 months after the Town Meeting than it was before the Town 
Meeting. Because the comparison group experienced no changes in political efficacy over 
time, the strength of the findings regarding the effects of participation in the 21st Century 
Town Meeting on perceptions of external political efficacy increases.  
Chapter 6 examines these and other findings in detail, and discusses their 
implications for the theory and practice of deliberative democracy.  In addition, the final 
chapter discusses limitations to this research study, and makes several suggestions for 
future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: A PRIMER 
 
The “moral imperative” of democracy requires that “each individual 
should have the right to participate in making decisions that significantly 
and directly affect his life. In the absence of this right and its effective 
exercise, the political system cannot be considered democratic: without 
them, the system cannot respond to the real interests of the people” 
(Bachrach, 1975: 44). 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter serves as a primer on deliberative democracy, and as such, lays the 
foundation for the study. The chapter begins by defining deliberative democracy and 
comparing it to representative democracy. It then discusses reasons for the resurgent 
interest in deliberative democracy. Specifically, increased interest in deliberative 
democracy has been prompted, in large part, by claims about a democratic deficit and a 
citizenship deficit in the United States (and in other Western democracies). Many 
theorists and scholars believe that the instrumental and intrinsic value of deliberative 
democracy provide a potential remedy for these ills. The roots of, and evidence for, both 
of these deficits is discussed in the second section of the chapter, as are various criticisms 
of the deficit theses. The chapter then turns to an examination of the potential benefits 
and pitfalls of deliberative democracy, specifically discussing how various theorists and 
scholars believe that deliberative democracy can overcome (or contribute to) these 
deficits in American governance. Finally, the chapter briefly reviews the characteristics 
of deliberative democracy processes and provides some examples.  
 
 16
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
Broadly defined, deliberative democracy refers to infusing legitimate government 
decision making with reasoned discussion and the collective judgment of citizens; it 
connects participation in public decision making to the practice of deliberation (Cohen 
and Fung, 2004). Although definitions of deliberative democracy differ widely depending 
on the perspective of various scholars, there is some agreement on its core elements 
(Elster, 1998; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). For example, Elster (1998: 8) asserts:  
The notion includes collective decision making with the participation of 
all who will be affected by the decision or their representatives: this is the 
democratic part. Also … it includes decision making by means of 
arguments offered by and to participants who are committed to the values 
of rationality and impartiality: this is the deliberative part.  
 
Likewise, Gutmann and Thompson (2004: 3-7) assert that in its modern conception, 
deliberative democracy has four characteristics: (1) it requires reason-giving; 2) it must 
take place in public and be accessible to all citizens affected by decisions; 3) it seeks to 
produce a decision that is binding for some period of time; and 4) it is dynamic and keeps 
open the option for continuing dialogue. Combining these four characteristics, they 
define deliberative democracy as  
A form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their 
representatives), justify decisions in a process in which they give one 
another reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with 
the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on all 
citizens but open to challenge in the future (Gutmann and Thompson, 
2004: 3-7). 
 
In contemporary political theory, deliberative democracy stands in contrast to 
aggregative democracy. While both models of political theory share assumptions about 
the structuring of democratic institutions, they focus on different decision making 
processes (Young, 2000). The aggregative model, which forms the basis of representative 
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government, relies on the aggregation of individual preferences to arrive at public policy 
decisions, and uses voting and bargaining to determine how those individual preferences 
are cumulated (Mansbridge, 1980; Young, 2000). Because voting and bargaining 
encourage strategic behavior based on individualist and economic incentives (Barber, 
1984; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Riker, 1962, 1982) the aggregative model is also an 
adversarial model of democracy (Mansbridge, 1980; Miller, 2000). In this adversarial 
model, public policy (and other governmental) decisions are seen as a zero-sum game 
where majority rules (for a discussion, see Radcliff and Wingenbach, 2000).  
In contrast, deliberative democracy moves away from competitive pluralism by 
encouraging the distinctive rationality of “the forum” as opposed to the rationality of “the 
market” (Bohman, 1998). Deliberative democracy 
begins by turning away from liberal individualist or economic 
understandings of democracy and toward a view anchored in concepts of 
accountability and discussion …[It] focuses on the communicative 
processes of opinion and will-formation that precede voting. 
Accountability replaces consent as the conceptual core of legitimacy. A 
legitimate political order is one that could be justified to all those living 
under its laws. Thus, accountability is primarily understood in terms of 
“giving an account” of something, that is, publicly articulating, explaining, 
and most importantly justifying public policy (Chambers, 2003: 308).  
 
Whereas representative democracy assumes that the preferences of citizens are fixed, and 
focuses on the aggregation of citizens’ preferences through regular elections, deliberative 
democracy stresses the “public use of reason” during the public decision making process 
and the possibility of self-transformation through such public discussion activities 
(Cunningham, 2002).  
In other words, deliberative democracy emphasizes public reasoning and well-informed 
participation. Deliberative democrats argue that “political choice, to be legitimate, must 
 18
be the outcome of deliberation among free, equal, and rational agents” (Elster, 1998: 5, 
emphasis in original). Thus, the emphasis of deliberative democracy on “talk-centric” as 
opposed to “voting centric” approaches to political decision making helps to give public 
policy more legitimacy than under purely aggregative models (Chambers, 2003: 308).  
Deliberative theorists point to additional differences between the aggregative and 
deliberative models of democracy, particularly when viewed within the context of public 
policy. For example, theorists assert that deliberative democracy is (or can be) more 
effective than aggregative democracy in responding to citizen voices and incorporating 
citizen preferences into the policy process. This is largely a function of differences in 
participation and access in the two approaches. Deliberative processes provide for 
participation and access by numerous individuals and groups. If structured properly, then 
the issues that hinder participation and access in traditional policy making are, or in 
theory can be, overcome. This means that government interests, public interests, and 
private interests all have a clear entitlement to a place at the table. Another difference 
involves voice, deliberation, and engagement -- these qualities are largely absent from 
aggregative processes. Just as all interests can come to the table, they also have an equal 
opportunity to engage in dialogue, voice opinions and concerns, and participate in the 
creation and development of outcomes. As compared to traditional approaches then, 
deliberative approaches have a different focus on the nature of both the participants and 
their participation, as well as and how much voice they have and the quality of that voice.  
Finally, deliberative democracy processes build on the theory of principled 
negotiation (Fisher and Ury, 1981), which means that deliberation deemphasizes the 
aggregation of pre-established preferences (Button and Ryfe, 2005), and instead focuses 
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on the interests that underlie and form people’s preferences and positions (Innes and 
Booher, 2003). Unlike traditional aggregative processes, deliberative democracy is based 
on cooperation and coordination among diverse and often rival interests. Advocates 
believe that deliberative approaches “may ameliorate some of the defects associated with 
mass democracy: citizens can pool information and ideas, bring local knowledge to the 
table, establish greater levels of equality and political opportunity, and the like” (Leib, 
2004: 3). Thus, deliberative democracy, at least in theory, has many attractive elements 
that distinguish it from aggregative democracy:  
it fosters cooperation and mutual understanding rather than winning and 
losing (as adversarial democracy seems to); it purports to give all citizens 
a “voice” rather than just the most powerful or the most numerous (as 
tends to occur in majoritarian democracy); and it encourages citizens to 
make decisions based on “public reasons” that can be supported through 
deliberation rather than on individual prejudices that thrive in the privacy 
of the voting booth (Levinson, 2002). 
 
In short, deliberative democracy promotes processes by which politics 
ensues through an open and civil discussion of the issue(s) at stake with the aim 
of arriving at an agreed judgment. Indeed, the very notion of deliberative 
democracy “begins with the view that collective decision-making is to proceed 
deliberatively – by citizens advancing proposals and defending them with 
considerations that others, who are themselves free and equal, can acknowledge 
as reasons” (Cohen and Sabel, 1997: 327). It is important to note, however that 
“[a]lthough theorists of deliberative democracy vary as to how critical they are of 
existing representative institutions, deliberative democracy is not usually thought 
of as an alternative to representative democracy. It is rather an expansion of 
representative democracy” (Chambers, 2003: 308). In sum, deliberative 
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democracy stands in contrast to traditional aggregative and representative 
processes, where the counting of votes is the method for articulating, combining, 
and aggregating preferences and selecting outcomes. The “ambitious aim of a 
deliberative democracy … is to shift from bargaining, interest aggregation, and 
power to the common reason of equal citizens as a dominant force in democratic 
life” (Cohen and Fung, 2004: 24). 
Advocates provide two broad rationales for deliberative democracy. First, 
deliberative democracy is argued to have instrumental value; it has the potential to 
deal more effectively with the problems of modern governance. Second, 
deliberative democracy has intrinsic value; it can foster the development of better 
and more efficacious citizens. In theory, deliberative democracy constitutes a just 
and reasonable approach to collective decision making that can enhance the 
quality, legitimacy, and fairness of public decisions, while simultaneously 
educating citizens, allowing them to gain a better understanding of competing 
interests, fostering moral development, and orienting them toward the collective 
good (Bingham, Nabatchi, and O’Leary, 2005). These rationales, discussed in 
more detail below, have provided fertile soil in which the theory and practice of 
deliberative democracy have taken root. 
 
THE RESURGENCE OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
The concept of deliberative democracy has seen a resurgence in popularity in 
America (and across the world) in the past few decades. Its recent revival is prompted 
largely by claims that the conditions of modern reality are challenging the health of 
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democracy and exacerbating the need to reinvigorate the political and policy making 
systems with greater citizen participation (Elster, 1998; Gastil and Keith, 2005; Gutmann 
and Thompson, 2004; Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003). In particular, some scholars assert that 
we are facing both a democratic deficit in our institutions of government and a citizenship 
deficit among the general public. A democratic deficit refers to a situation where 
democratic organizations, institutions, and governments are seen as falling short of 
fulfilling the principles of democracy in their practices or operation (Chomsky, 2006; 
Durant, 1995). A citizenship deficit refers broadly to the erosion of civil society and civic 
engagement (Macedo, et al., 2005; Stolle and Hooghe, 2004). As discussed below, 
advocates assert that deliberative democracy has the potential to remedy these deficits. 
More specifically, the instrumental value of deliberative democracy provides it with the 
potential to alleviate the democratic deficit, while its intrinsic value provides it with the 
potential to alleviate the citizenship deficit.  
Not all scholars, however, support the claims about the democratic and citizenship 
deficits (e.g., Manza and Cook, 2002; Stimson, 1998, 2005; Stolle and Hooghe, 2004; 
Wittman, 1997). The critics make compelling arguments against the wide-spread 
existence of the democratic and citizenship deficits and challenge the assertion that 
deliberative democracy is a “cure-all” for any problems of governance or civil society 
that might exist. In general, these scholars are not proponents of participatory and 
deliberative democracy, and believe that such processes have the potential to produce or 
exacerbate problems with government (e.g., Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002; 
Huntington, 1975; Sunstein, 2003).   
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The following sections of the chapter explore these various arguments. First, the 
roots of the democratic and citizenship deficits are explored from the perspective of 
deliberative democrats and other scholars of democratic and political theory. Second, the 
democratic deficit and the citizenship deficit are discussed in detail. Various arguments 
for, and evidence of, the existence of each deficit are reviewed. Finally, this section of the 
chapter examines various criticisms of the deficit theses.  
 
The Roots of the Democratic and Citizenship Deficits  
Among scholars, some view the democratic and citizenship deficits as products of 
long-standing patterns in American public administration, while others assert that the 
deficits are a function of relatively recent changes in the structures and patterns of 
government and governance. Each of these perspectives is discussed below. Despite 
debate about the source of the deficits, most of these scholars would agree that new 
modes of deliberative participation, particularly with respect to policy making processes, 
are needed to alleviate the deficits. Specifically, advocates of deliberative democracy 
assert that the traditional mechanisms of political representation and aggregation are 
increasingly ill-suited to handling the policy problems of the modern world and 
ineffective in engendering the central ideals of democracy and democratic politics – 
fostering reasoned debate among an active and informed citizenry, increasing public 
dialogue to achieve consensus and allow for the justification of governmental actions, 
promoting individual liberty while maintaining accountability for collective decisions, 
and advancing egalitarian social justice and political equality (see generally, O’Leary, 
Bingham, and Gerard, 2006). 
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One perspective on the democratic and citizenship deficits begins with the 
assumption that they are the result of long-standing patterns in administrative structures 
and traditions. This perspective focuses on issues of public administration and 
management. A good starting point with which to explore this argument is an 
examination of two dominant frameworks in American public administration: 
bureaucratic ethos and democratic ethos (Pugh, 1991: 10-17). These frameworks differ in 
their content values, origins, and methodology (the systematic process by which the 
framework ensures its continuity and consistency). Specifically, “bureaucratic ethos is 
teleological, employs instrumental rationality, and is predicated on the values of 
capitalism and a market society. Democratic ethos in contrast, is deontological, is based 
on substantive rationality, and emanates from classical values of the state and higher law” 
(Pugh, 1991: 26). 
Among the content values of bureaucratic ethos are efficiency, efficacy, expertise, 
loyalty, and accountability. These positivist behavioral norms are evident in both the 
theory and practice of public administration (Hejka-Ekins, 1988; Pugh, 1991). 
Bureaucratic ethos finds its roots in several intellectual traditions, including the Weberian 
model of bureaucracy, with its application of rational principles (Weber, 1946); the 
Wilsonian concept of the politics administration dichotomy (Wilson, 1887); Taylor’s 
(1967) theory of scientific management, and the scholarly study of comparative 
administration and the application of rationalism to public administration (Goodnow, 
1900, 1903; Willoughby, 1937). Among the numerous social origins of bureaucratic 
ethos are the social Christianity movement, the progressive political movement, the 
scientific management movement, and the social science movement. Bureaucratic ethos 
 24
has also been widely embraced by the professional associations and educational 
institutions of public administration. The methodology of bureaucratic ethos is to assess 
content values against established rational goals and objectives using instrumentalism and 
utilitarianism as the criteria for action.  
Democratic ethos has a very different set content values, including regime values, 
citizenship, public interest, and social equity, among others (Pugh, 1991). These content 
values place the framework clearly within the realm of political theory, and therefore, 
also lead to its intellectual origins. Regime values are “the values of the American 
people” as manifest in the U.S. Constitution (Rohr, 1976: 399). The notions of 
citizenship, the ideal of a citizenry that is informed about government and active in its 
operation (Pugh, 1991: 15) and the public interest, or “what men would choose if they 
saw clearly, thought rationally, and acted disinterestedly and benevolently” (Lippman, 
1955: 42), are also entrenched in democratic ethos. Finally, the concept of social equity, 
particularly as embraced by Dwight Waldo (1948), John Rawls (1971), and H. George 
Fredrickson (1971, 1974, 1990), is important to democratic ethos. The social origins of 
democratic ethos can be traced to American political institutions, especially the courts, 
the rural populism and progressivism political movements, the urban reform movement, 
and the American civil rights movement. The framework also has strong professional 
roots in governmental research bureaus, educational institutions, and professional 
associations. Finally, the methodology of democratic ethos is deductive, dialectical, 
deontological, and grounded in history and political philosophy.  
Pugh (1991) asserts that the original political theory of American public 
administration embraced bureaucratic ethos, and that bureaucratic ethos continues to 
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dominate the field today in both theory and practice. Thus, he argues that although public 
administration claims to have rejected the politics-administration dichotomy replacing the 
emphasis on the word administration with an emphasis on the word public, the 
operational values of the field have remained bureaucratic (Pugh, 1991: 26). For 
example, although many scholars address normative questions in public administration 
(e.g., deLeon, 1992; Frederickson, 1991, 1996; Gawthrop, 1984, 1988; Hummel and 
Stivers, 1998; King and Stivers, 1998; Rohr, 1986; Ventriss, 1987; Wamsley, et al., 1990; 
Wamsley and Wolf, 1996), modern public administration has increasingly embraced and 
manifest the positivist and empirical values of efficiency and effectiveness (e.g., Behn, 
1995; Callahan and Holzer, 1994; Epstein et al., 2000; Kettl, 1998; Lynn, 1994; 
Osbourne and Gaebler, 1992; Poister and Streib, 1999; Teasley, 1999). The implications 
of this, Pugh (1991: 27) asserts, are far-reaching: “as long as the field’s assumptions are 
shaped by bureaucratic ethos the politics we speak of will not be democratic.”  
This last statement has significant implications for public administration. To the 
extent that public administration focuses on bureaucratic issues of managerialism, 
organization theory, and public agencies, it fails to adequately confront and understand 
the issues of public administration in a democracy (Kirlin, 1996; Ramos, 1981; Ventriss, 
1987, 1998; Wamsley, et al., 1990). 
One of the fundamental flaws in making public bureaucracy the 
starting point of public administration is that it easily supports the 
substitution of organizational concerns and measures of performance for 
those of a democratic polity, including the rule of law. Organizations may 
focus on effectiveness, efficiency, or economy. They may also focus on 
the impacts of organizations on their members or consumer satisfaction. 
But the ultimate value underpinning organization theory is organizational 
survival; any other values or constraints must be posed from an external 
framework, intellectual, political, or legal. 
 26
Democratic polities must focus on: the sustained capacity of the 
political system itself to make and act on collective choices, opportunities 
for effective citizenship and political leadership, ensuring a limited 
government, nurturing the civic infrastructure necessary for collective 
action without public authority, providing the institutional structures 
necessary for operations of the economy, and protecting individual 
freedoms and rights. These are very different issues than those seen at the 
organizational level (Kirlin, 1996: 418).  
 
An excellent articulation of this viewpoint is found in The New Science of 
Organizations: A Reconceptualization of the Wealth of Nations, by Alberto Guerreiro 
Ramos (1981). In this book, Ramos (1981: 81) contends that that American public 
administration (indeed all of contemporary social science) suffers from cognitive politics:  
Today the market tends to become the shaping force of society at large, 
and the peculiar type of organization which meets its requirements has 
assumed the character of a paradigm for organizing human existence at 
large. In such circumstances the market patterns of thinking and language 
tend to become equivalent to patterns of thinking and language at large. 
This is the environment of cognitive politics. Established organizational 
scholarship is uncritical or unaware of these circumstances, and thus is 
itself a manifestation of the success of cognitive politics. 
 
Others scholars seem to agree, at least in part, with this contention. For example, some 
assert that public administration “has been rolled … by classical liberal economic 
thought” such that rational voluntary action and exchange have become its guiding 
principles (Golembiewski, 1996: 139). Likewise, Fredrickson (1996) suggests that “the 
lingua franca of institutions…revenue, offices, supervisors, performance, outcomes” have 
become an assumed part of modern life and have eroded the norms and values of 
community, civil discourse, consensus, trust, and responsiveness. The result is that 
instrumental reason has replaced the search for democratic knowledge rooted in 
participation and the discourse of shared experiences (Hummel and Stivers, 1998: 29). 
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In short, Ramos (1981) asserts that the environment of American public 
administration is “predicated upon an instrumental rationality that is characteristic (and 
reflective) of the prevailing market system in society” -- this is problematic because the 
market is “deeply (and inherently) antipublic” (Ventriss and Candler, 2005: 353). 
Although the managerial values of efficiency, hierarchy, and competence are important in 
public administration, “they are not sufficient (and never can be) to sustain any 
substantive credibility or purpose to the role of public administration in shaping societal 
affairs” (Ventriss, 1998: 235). As long as the focus of public administration is on 
bureaucratic ethos, the argument goes, there will always be a democratic and a 
citizenship deficit. 
The second perspective asserts that the democratic and citizenship deficits are the 
product of relatively recent changes in government structures and governance patterns. 
While related to the above arguments, this perspective focuses more on issues involving 
public policy than on issues involving public administration and management. The 
argument begins with the assertion that pressures on the traditional boundaries of public 
administration have fundamentally changed the nature and structure of governance in the 
past several decades. As Kettl (2007: 17) notes, “we are now confronting a basic, serious, 
and troubling problem. The boundaries that served us so well in the past can no long [sic] 
solve either our administrative or political needs.” Since the 1960s, there have been more 
and more frequent challenges to 1) federalist boundaries, 2) sectoral boundaries, and 3) 
organizational boundaries. 
The nature of the American system, by virtue of its federalist construction, has 
required and will always require federal-state-local cooperation and collaboration. Early 
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in the nation’s history, the U.S. had a system of dual federalism, often referred to as layer 
cake federalism, wherein the federal and state governments each sought to carve out 
relatively autonomous spheres of influence and power. However, conceptions of 
American federalism and intergovernmental relations began to change in the 1960s as 
federal policy responsibilities were devolved to subnational governments for 
implementation (see for example, Hall and O’Toole, 2000, 2004; Pressman and 
Wildavsky, 1973). A new metaphor, marble cake federalism, emerged to describe this 
new situation where “federal-state-local collaboration [became] the characteristic mode 
of action” and most “governmental activity… involve[d] the influence, if not the formal 
administration, of all three planes of the federal system” (Grodzins, 1960: 266-67). More 
recently, the metaphor of picket fence federalism has been used to describe the situation 
where all three levels of government are heavily involved in almost all substantive areas 
of public policy. Under these conditions, notions about the traditional roles and 
responsibilities of the various levels of government were challenged. 
The devolution of policy responsibility to subnational governments also 
challenged the boundaries among the public, private, and non-profit sectors. As states and 
localities gained increased responsibility for policy implementation, including allocation 
decisions, service delivery, monitoring and enforcement, and other core administrative 
tasks, they too farmed out policy responsibilities to non-governmental organizations. 
Until recently, the “nonprofit sector has been viewed as standing apart from government, 
as a mediating institution that has helped forge a ‘civil society’ apart from government or 
the private market” (Milward, 1996: 36). Today, the role of the nonprofit sector in the 
policy process cannot be doubted. Furthermore, through privatization, government 
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responsibilities have been extended to private companies that exist outside of the 
traditionally defined public sector. American public administration, at the local, state, and 
federal levels, now functions within intergovernmental and intersectoral networks that 
face specific resource constraints; this situation is fundamentally changing the historic 
nature of public policy and administration (e.g., Kettl, 1988, 1996, 1998, 2007; Luke, 
1991; McGuire, 2007; Salamon 2002). Indeed, it is now “virtually impossible to identify 
any public program that a single government agency can manage on its own without 
relying on some partnership with other public agencies or private or non-profit 
organizations” (Kettl, 1996: 9).  
Finally, these changes have resulted in greater demands for accountability and 
better coordination among government agencies and other organizations engaged in the 
policy process. These expectations have forced public administrators to reexamine and 
refashion their organizational structures, processes, programs, policies, and goals. The 
results of this are challenges to organizational boundaries. “Just as the hierarchical 
organization emerged during the agricultural age and bureaucracy was the dominant form 
of organization during the industrial age, the nascent information age has given rise to 
permeable structures in which people can link across organizational functions and 
boundaries” (McGuire, 2007: 34).  
In short, as the requirements of public administration have become more complex, 
government has also come to rely more heavily on intergovernmental, nonprofit, and for-
profit partners to deliver public services. Thus, the United States has moved from the age 
of bureaucratic government to the age of network governance (Boyte, 2005; Castells, 
1996, 1997; 1998; Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003; Innes and Booher, 2003; Peters and Pierre, 
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1998; Sørensen, 2002) and collaborative governance (O’Leary, Bingham, and Gerard, 
2006). This shift to network and collaborative governance has implications for the 
development of a “multi-layered system of shared sovereignty” (Sørensen, 2002: 696), as 
well as for issues concerning representation and citizen participation in policy making 
(Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003). In this environment, it is not surprising that issues of 
democracy and the role of citizens are taking on renewed importance in American 
government and governance (Elster, 1998; Gastil and Keith, 2005; Gutmann and 
Thompson, 2004; Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003). These scholars assert that under these new 
conditions, we are witnessing the development of both a democratic deficit among 
institutions of government and a citizenship deficit among the general public (see for 
example, Benhabib, 1996; Cohen, 1989; Cooke, 2000; Durant, 1995; Elster, 1998; Fung, 
2003, 2005; Gastil and Levine, 2005; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004; Leib, 2004).    
In sum, there are two perspectives about the roots of the democratic and 
citizenship deficits in the United States. One perspective assumes that long-standing 
administrative structures and traditions have shaped the deficits. The other perspective 
assumes that changing structures of government and shifting patterns of governance have 
produced the deficits. These perspectives are not necessarily incompatible; in many ways, 
they are quite complementary. Both agree that important public policy decisions are 
increasingly being made in locations that are further removed from the democratic vote 
of the populace. Furthermore, they agree that processes are at work that make public 
opinion reactionary and incomplete, thereby reducing options for the formulation of 
smart policy. Thus, regardless of the source, both perspectives agree on the outcome: 
America now faces both a democratic deficit and a citizenship deficit and these deficits 
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are problematic for the stability of American government and governance and the 
political health of American citizens. To overcome these deficiencies, new modes of 
direct and deliberative participation in government decision making are needed. The 
concepts of the democratic deficit and the citizenship deficit are explored in detail below. 
 
The Democratic Deficit 
Although the term “democratic deficit” is generally used with regard to the 
political order of European Union (e.g., Mitchell, 2005; Moravscik, 2004), it has come to 
find applications within the United States (e.g., Aman, 2004; Chomsky, 2006; Durant, 
1995). A democratic deficit refers to a situation where democratic organizations, 
institutions, and governments are seen as falling short of fulfilling the principles of 
democracy in their practices or operation. It also refers to a substantial gap between 
public policy and public opinion (Chomsky, 2006). Some scholars have applied the idea 
of a democratic deficit to campaign contributions and the role of money in the American 
electoral process (for a discussion, see Levinson, 2006), others to the counting the votes 
in elections, and still others to the partisan gerrymandering of legislative districts 
(Aleinikoff and Issacharoff, 1993). Researchers have also looked for a democratic deficit 
with regard to how well citizens see their opinions and preferences reflected in political 
decisions and policy outcomes (e.g., Chomsky, 2006; for an extensive review of the 
empirical literature on this subject, see Manza and Cook, 2002).  
For theorists of deliberative democracy, the democratic deficit is far more 
profound than is illustrated in these examples. For them, the democratic deficit in the 
U.S. is inherent in the very nature of modern American governance processes, and 
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particularly public policy processes (e.g., deLeon, 1992; Durant, 1995; Gutmann and 
Thompson, 1996, 2004; Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003; Innes and Booher, 2003; Leib, 
2004). For example, Leib (2004: 4) asserts, “Our democracy suffers a legitimacy deficit: 
citizens are so remote from decision-making that the decisions rendered in their name 
cannot be fairly imputed to them and their authorship.” To understand this assertion, it is 
useful to look briefly at history and the founding of the American government.  
To the framers, the long-term stability of the political system was a primary 
concern (Rimmerman, 1993). Throughout the constitutional debates, there was 
widespread agreement about the dangers and failures of democracy as a political system. 
For example, in the Federalist No. 10 (1787), James Madison said: "...democracies have 
ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible 
with personal security, or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their 
lives as they have been violent in their deaths." John Adams, in an 1814 letter to John 
Taylor, wrote: "Remember, democracy never lasts long. It soon wastes, exhausts and 
murders itself. There never was a democracy yet that did not commit suicide" (Adams, 
1851: 484). Alexander Hamilton is perhaps among the best articulators of this issue. For 
example, at a 1788 ratifying convention in Poughkeepsie, New York, he said,  
It has been observed that a pure democracy, if it were practicable, would 
be the most perfect government. Experience has proved that no position is 
more false than this. The ancient democracies, in which the people 
themselves deliberated, never possessed one feature of good government. 
Their very character was tyranny: their figure deformity (Harding, 1909: 
116).  
 
Such arguments are summed up well by Elbridge Gerry, who noted that democracy is 
“the worst of all political evils” (Farrand, 1911: vol. 2, 647). In contrast, the virtues of 
republicanism were articulated widely among the framers. For example, Thomas 
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Jefferson, in a 1790 letter to William Hunter, stated: "The republican is the only form of 
government which is not eternally at open or secret war with the rights of mankind" 
(Foley, 190: 390). 
The framers of the new American government felt a strong need “to guard against 
what were thought to be the weaknesses of popular democracy” (Mathews, 1994: 51). 
Recognizing the potential for popular participation to destabilize the new nation, the 
framers instilled within the Constitution “institutional impediments to direct citizen 
participation in government” to protect the nation from “some surge of momentary 
popular passion” (Moe and Gilmour, 1995: 136). They adopted a system of majority rule, 
with shared powers and checks and balances among separate institutions, created 
federalism, and allowed for only limited participation by the citizenry in periodic 
elections. The result was the intentional structuring of the “American system to favor 
delay over rapid change, to diffuse power rather than concentrate it, to distrust executive 
action rather than strengthen it” (Kettl, 1998: 57). The representative political system in 
the United States was designed to limit participation in order to protect political and 
administrative processes from an over-active citizenry. Morone (1990) asserts that this 
formulation has produced dichotomous desires among the American people. On the one 
hand, Americans dread expansive governmental involvement in the private realm. On the 
other hand, they yearn for government to do something about social problems. Since the 
founding of the nation, this tension has forced an expansion of governmental checks and 
balances such that the dreads are quelled, but the yearnings remain unsatisfied. The result 
is a perpetual “democratic wish” among citizens (Morone, 1990). 
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In short, although the United States is often noted as the first liberal democracy, 
the Constitution, adopted in 1788, provided for a republican form of government 
maintained by the state and based on popular representation. To the framers, 
representatives were to play two key roles: 1) to “represent sectional and other interests in 
the national decisionmaking process by mediating competing claims” and 2) to “mediate 
and moderate the passions of the mob” (Rimmerman, 2001). However, modern theorists 
suggest that our representatives no longer represent us adequately (e.g., Hummel and 
Stivers, 1998), often because citizens do not interact directly with representatives, but 
rather through interest groups (e.g., Fredrickson, 1996). Although it is argued that 
citizens hold some power over the policy making process because elected officials must 
vie for their favor, 
That a candidate is elected does not necessarily mean that most citizens 
prefer all or even most of that official’s policies. Whether interests groups 
close the gap between citizens and government depends on whether such 
groups speak for their own members rather than their bureaucrats, whether 
those who need representation get it, and whether the balance of power 
among all these contenders improves or worsens defects in the entire 
system (Wildavsky, 1979: 252). 
 
Thus, we have a representative government where our representatives may no 
longer represent us; instead, representation reveals an “alienated mode of public life” 
(Hummel and Stivers, 1998: 32).  Leib (2004: 2-3) summarizes these problems well, and 
is worth quoting at length:    
Generally, voters select among candidates with a bundle of policy 
commitments that cannot be disentangled; federal lawmaking in 
accordance with Article I, section 7, of the United States Constitution 
leaves most bills losing steam prior to passage; the committee system is 
vulnerable to manipulation; divided government often renders legislatures 
impotent; and the policies that are enacted are often selected by lawmakers 
for less than kosher reasons (pork-barreling, rent-seeking, log-rolling, 
etc.). When voters take matters into their own hands through initiative or 
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referendum, they act out of ignorance or self-interest (rational or not), 
under the influence of mass media campaigns that are often aimed to 
misinform; and poor turnouts cast a further shadow of suspicion over 
electoral results (especially when the poor and minorities are 
underrepresented and undercounted). Unfortunately, many democratic 
theorists are willing to accept these losses because they imagine that our 
democracy is pretty good anyway; indeed, even voters who suffer the 
failures of democracy accept this trade-off, simply because to them it isn’t 
worth the effort to become more involved or informed. Or perhaps 
because they do not believe they could do any good. Yet it remains 
unclear how we can all stay sanguine about our version of democracy 
when its built-in limitations are so manifold and obvious. 
 
Echoing the argument of Leib (2004), one articulation of the democratic deficit 
finds “four interrelated and mutually reinforcing trends” each of which “distorts policy 
discourse” and undermines the stability of democracy (Durant, 1995: 26). First, a 
“policy-challenged, vocal, and increasingly impatient citizenry” has emerged with a 
growing desire for more popular participation and direct participation in the affairs of 
government (Durant, 1995: 27; see also Morone, 1990). Citizens are demanding more 
opportunities for participation because they believe that government is not addressing 
their concerns in ways that adequately reflect legitimacy and accountability. Some 
scholars argue that this failure of government is a sign that America has fallen into 
“anomic democracy,” a situation in which the fundamental principles of democracy have 
been broken down by government that is incompetent, unresponsive, out of control, and 
above the law (Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki, 1975).  
This is exacerbated by a second trend, which concerns the media and the tactics of 
news reporting. Specifically, some assert that media reporting tactics have shifted the 
frequency, substance, and tenor of content on government and governance (Durant, 1995; 
see also, Johnson and Tversky, 1983; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Stories tend to be 
more negative and emotionally charged, and issues are covered in such a way as to block 
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and distort cognitive processes (Durant, 1995; see also Crossen, 1994; Jamieson, 1992). 
“In the process, factoids get confused with facts, “affect” (or emotion) drives out 
“intellect” in evaluating news, and a confused public paradoxically presses further 
demands for redress upon a federal government it perceives as ineffectual” (Durant, 
1995: 28). The result is that citizens tend to overestimate (or underestimate) the severity 
of problems and issues and place more and conflicting demands on government.  
The third trend involves how “risk-averse, resource-dependent, and media-
conscious politicians” view and respond to these citizens concerns (Durant, 1995: 29). 
Elected officials prefer to communicate in soundbites and pass off responsibilities to the 
bureaucracy because they see “scant rewards in a trusteeship model of public service 
geared toward leavening public understanding, policy discourse, and civic debate” 
(Durant, 1995: 29).  
Thus, it’s not the complexity of public problems, the insatiable demands 
of citizens for government succor or protection, or principled 
disagreements over policy ends and means that plague our nation. Rather, 
it’s a lack of common sense, a surfeit of fuzzy-headed thinkers and greedy 
special interests, and a paucity of integrity and courage in our leaders 
(Durant, 1995: 27).  
 
The final trend reflects the content values of bureaucratic ethos. Specifically, it 
concerns a plebiscitary agenda, predicated on control and “the administrative orthodoxy 
of hierarchy, rules and regulations, and departmentalization by function” (Durant, 1995: 
29) that produces “a fragmented and parochial organization…wherein overly regulated 
sub-units are pitted against each other in a zero-sum conflict over resources, jurisdiction, 
and influence” (30). To many, government has become “a specialized enterprise 
increasingly devoted to the exercise of technical rules and procedures, whether or not 
these take care of real-life problems” (Hummel and Stivers, 1998: 29). The result of these 
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four trends is a democratic deficit in the processes of public policy, and a “policy 
implementation structure that is too hollow in capacity to nurture either policy goals, 
public approbation, or a truly deliberative democracy” (Durant, 1995: 30). As will be 
seen later in this chapter, not all scholars agree that a democratic deficit exists in the 
United States. In fact, some assert that many of the problems in the United States are the 
result of an excess of democracy (e.g., Huntington, 1975). Before reviewing these 
arguments, however, it is useful to first explore the citizenship deficit.  
 
The Citizenship Deficit 
Related to the democratic deficit, is what I am calling a “citizenship deficit.” This 
term has been used to describe the citizenship status of children and youth (e.g., Bhabha, 
2003; Roche, 1999), women (Conrad, 2003), and minorities and indigenous peoples 
(May, 1998); however, I have not found the term used to describe the phenomenon 
discussed here. My concept of the term citizenship deficit refers broadly to the erosion of 
civil society and civic engagement, and more specifically to an erosion of the skills and 
dispositions of citizenship among the general public (e.g., Macedo et. al, 2005; Stolle and 
Hooghe, 2004). The citizenship deficit is of particular importance in this study, as the 
research focus is on the intrinsic value of deliberative democracy, that it, its ability to 
produce better and more efficacious citizens. 
Some scholars locate the problem of the citizenship deficit in “the radical notion 
of individualism embraced by the framers” and its consequent effects on political 
socialization (Rimmerman, 2001: 16). Political socialization is the informal learning 
process by which individuals gain knowledge about political figures, processes, and 
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systems, and thus form their political beliefs and attitudes (Almond and Verba, 1963). 
According to Rimmerman (2001: 16), political socialization in the U.S. is guided by the 
notion of individualism: “the United States was born a political economy, stressing the 
right of individuals to pursue private property and their individualistic impulses in the 
private economic sphere.” He asserts that the basic elements and values of liberal 
democracy do not include “community” or “participation in politics” and thus, are 
inimical to the fundamental values associated with participatory democracy (see also 
Fredrickson, 1996; Golembiewski, 1996; Hummel and Stivers, 1998; Ramos, 1981; 
Ventriss, 1987, 1998). Moreover, “as people pursue ‘the American dream’ as personified 
by the acquisition of private property and other material pleasures, they fail to devote the 
time and energy to engaging in the kind of public politics required by advocates of the 
participatory democratic vision” (Rimmerman, 2001: 16). This, he asserts, is at the heart 
of the decline in the skills and dispositions of American citizenship, or what I call the 
citizenship deficit.  
The argument about the threat of the citizenship deficit to democracy rests on the 
hypothesis that as citizens withdraw support from government, the legitimacy of a 
democratic regime is called into question (e.g., Easton, 1965, 1975; Miller, 1974). This 
hypothesis represents a prevalent, heralded, and time-honored assumption in political 
thought -- that a well-ordered democracy requires citizens with the appropriate 
knowledge, skills, and traits of character (e.g., Galston, 1991, 2001). “Competent 
democratic citizens need not be policy experts, but there is a level of basic knowledge 
below which the ability to make a full range of reasoned civic judgments is impaired” 
(Galston, 2001: 218). The links between civic information and civic attributes have been 
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defined by recent scholarship (e.g., Kahne and Wertheimer, 2006; Kirlin, 2002, 2003a; 
2003b; Perry and Katula, 2001; Perry and Thompson, 2004) and are summarized well by 
Galston (2001: 223-24): 
1) Civic knowledge helps citizens understand their interests as individuals 
and as members of groups. 
2) Civic knowledge increases the consistency of views across issues and 
across time. 
3) Unless citizens possess a basic level of civic knowledge – especially 
concerning political institutions and processes – it is difficult for them to 
understand political events or to integrate new information into an existing 
framework. 
4) General civic knowledge can alter views on specific public issues. 
5) The more knowledge citizens have of civic affairs, the less likely they are 
to experience a generalized mistrust of, or alienation from, public life. 
6) Civic knowledge promotes support for democratic values. 
7) Civic knowledge promotes political participation.  
Thus, the assumption is that to the extent that civic knowledge and engagement are 
waning, the potential threat to the democratic order increases.  
Evidence of a citizenship deficit in the U.S. can be seen in the numerous statistics 
that purport to show a decline in civic engagement and social capital (e.g., Frantzich, 
2005; Putnam, 2000; Skocpol and Fiorina, 1999; Stolle and Hooghe, 2004). Indicators of 
this decline are varied and numerous, including voter turnout, political participation, 
activity, and knowledge, engagement in campaign activities such as working for political 
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parties, signing petitions, attending a political rallies or speeches, and running for office, 
trust in government, and associational memberships among others. Of particular 
importance in this study is the decline in Americans’ perceptions of internal and external 
political efficacy. A review of these indicators has led to a “growing sentiment among 
contemporary political scientists and political analysts that the foundations of citizenship 
and democracy in America are crumbling” (Dalton, 2006: 1). The next section explores 
various general indicators of the citizenship deficit, such as voter turnout, trust, and social 
capital. It is followed by a discussion specifically focused on political efficacy.  
 
General Indicators of Citizenship Deficit  
To some, voter turnout rates in presidential and off-year elections suggest a 
serious risk to the health of American democracy (Hudson, 1995: 112). Table 1 shows the 
U.S. population of voting age and the percent of the voting age population that turned out 
for presidential and statewide midterm elections from 1960-2004. Between 1966 and 
1988, the U.S. experienced a gradual decline in voter turnout for presidential elections. In 
1992, there was a slight increase in participation, but still only 55.1 percent of eligible 
voters turned out for the presidential election. Although this is a fairly substantial rate for 
American elections, it is still significantly lower that the turnout rate in other industrial 
democracies. In fact, the United States ranks next to last among industrial democracies in 
average voter turnout in recent elections (Miroff, Seidelman, and Swanstrom, 1995; 
Rimmerman, 2001). Moreover, Clinton’s 44 percent of the plurality vote in 1992 
translates into the support of only 24 percent of the American citizenry (Mathews, 1994). 
These trends have continued in recent years. In 1996, less than one-half (49 percent) of 
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eligible voters cast ballots in the presidential election (Rimmerman, 2001); this was the 
lowest voter turnout since the 1924 presidential election (Hudson, 1995). In 2000, Al 
Gore won the popular vote, but ‘lost’ the election to George W. Bush, when the U.S. 
Supreme Court stopped the counting of ballots in Florida with their ruling in Bush v. 
Gore. That decision resulted in Bush winning the electoral vote by a margin of 271-266 
(with 1 abstention). It also raised serious questions about Bush’s legitimacy as president 
and the meaning of the vote in America (Rimmerman, 2001).  
A close look at Table 1 reveals that voter turnout in statewide mid-term elections 
is higher during presidential election years than it is during off-years. In presidential 
election years, voting in statewide mid-term elections hit a high of 58.5 percent in 1960 
and low of 44.9 percent in 1988. It rebounded slightly to 50.8 percent in 1992, before 
falling and rising again to 51.4 percent in 2004. However, in off-year elections, voter 
turnout rates have sharply declined since the 1960s. In 1962, the U.S. experienced its 
highest off-year turnout rate at 45.4 percent. Since 1974, percentages have hovered in the 
30s. Less than one-third (32.9 percent) of eligible voters turned out to vote in 1998. To 
many scholars, “these figures reveal a detached and apathetic citizenry, one that displays 
a remarkable amount of civic indifference” (Rimmerman, 2001: 34)  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
The decline in voter turnout rates is not the only evidence suggesting a citizenship 
deficit among Americans. Electoral participation is decreasing not only because fewer 
Americans are voting, but also because fewer Americans are engaged in other political 
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activities (Putnam, 2000; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Wattenberg, 2002). There have 
been corresponding declines in the numbers of Americans working for political parties, 
signing petitions, attending a political rallies or speeches, and running for office (Putnam, 
2000). Putnam (2000: 35) notes,  
declining electoral participation is merely the most visible symptom of a 
broader disengagement from community life. Like a fever, electoral 
abstention is even more important as a sign of deeper trouble in the body 
politic than as a malady itself. It is not just from the voting booth that 
Americans are increasingly AWOL.  
 
There have also been declines in American’s trust in government. The American 
National Election Survey assesses trust in government with the question: "How much of 
the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right -- 
just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?" Figure 1 shows the 
cumulative responses of just about always or most of the time from 1964 to 2004. 
Evaluations of trust in government to do what is right just about always or most of the 
time ranged from a high of about 76 percent in 1964 to a low of about 21 percent in 1994. 
Since 1994, evaluations of trust in government have risen, reaching 56 percent in 2002; 
however, there was a sharp drop in 2004, with only 47 percent agreeing that they trusted 
government. Scholars using other data assess the average level of trust in government at 
about 24 percent from 1964 to 1994 (Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn, 2000). Moreover,  
Recent studies also indicate that over the past thirty-five years there has 
been a decline in Americans’ psychological engagement in politics and 
government. Citizens increasingly perceive that they cannot trust 
Washington government officials, and that their participation in any form 
of conventional politics is of little consequence; in short, they are 
exhibiting political alienation (Rimmerman, 2001: 3).  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
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In 1990-1991, the Harwood Group conducted a study for the Kettering 
Foundation to better understand what Americans think about their role as citizens in the 
political system (Harwood Group, 1991). Qualitative data from focus groups in ten cities 
across the U.S. indicated popular dissatisfaction with government and politics among 
citizens, a sense of powerlessness and exclusion from government decisions, and the 
feeling of being “pushed out” of political processes dominated by special interest groups 
and politicians (Harwood Group, 1991; Mathews, 1994; Rimmerman, 2001).  
To these Americans, a professional political class of incumbent 
politicians, powerful lobbyists, the media elite, and campaign managers all 
kept them from participating in the broader political system in a 
meaningful way. People in the study perceived that the system was 
dominated by money and that voting in elections simply would not make a 
difference because the overall system is closed to the average citizen 
(Mathews, 1994: 12; Rimmerman, 2001: 30).  
 
Moreover, although citizens reported having few opportunities for participation in 
debates or decisions about important public issues, they also indicated a desire for more 
meaningful opportunities for participation in the political system (Harwood Group, 1991; 
Rimmerman, 2001). In short, the results of the Harwood study provide support for 
arguments about a citizenship deficit, as well as for Mathews (1994: 32) claim that 
citizens think “the political arena today is too large and distant for individual actions to 
have an impact.”  
Additional evidence of the citizenship deficit is found in the literature on 
social capital. Robert Putnam (2000) warns that civic engagement is decreasing to 
dangerous levels in America. Citing evidence of decreasing voter turnout and 
declining membership in groups such as parent-teacher associations and bowling 
leagues, he asserts that people are in the U.S. are experiencing a general decline in 
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their ties to each other and to the political system. The result, Putnam claims, is a 
massive threat to the successful maintenance of American democracy. The theory 
behind this argument is that the “social ties and trust of social capital help 
maintain democracy by affecting both the quantity and quality of political 
participation by citizens” (Paxton, 2002: 259). Furthermore, a democracy is 
maintained and improved “when a country has a vigorous associational life” as 
“voluntary associations provide a training ground for new political leaders, help 
members practice compromise and learn tolerance, and stimulate individual 
participation in politics” – all of which contribute to a healthy democracy (Paxton, 
2002: 254). As Pateman (1970: 42) explains,  
[t]he existence of representative institutions at the national level is not 
sufficient for democracy; for maximum participation by all the people at 
that level socialisation, or ‘social training’, for democracy must take place 
in other spheres in order that the necessary individual attitudes and 
psychological qualities can be developed.  
 
The social significance of these claims is sharpened when one looks at data 
pertaining to youth and young adults. Research shows that young people are less civicly 
engaged than older age groups in terms of voting, party politics, membership in voluntary 
associations, and various forms of formal and informal interaction (e.g., Dalton, 2002). 
Other studies suggest that younger age cohorts are more distrustful and less engaged in 
civic activities (Rahn and Transue, 1998). However, as Galston (2001: 219) notes, 
If the only significant differences were cross-sectional, today’s heightened 
concern would be myopic. But there are also disturbing trends over time. 
If we compare generations rather than cohorts – that is, if we compare 
today’s young adults not with today’s older adults but with the young 
adults of the past – we find evidence of diminished civic attachment.  
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In other words, not only are youth and young adults less civicly engaged than older age 
groups, but they are also less likely to participate than the generation of their parents were 
20 or 30 years ago (Hooghe, 2004: 332). Indeed, recent research has produced, 
a remarkable consensus … that in most Western societies, the political 
orientations of younger age cohorts differ in fundamental ways from those 
embodied by their predecessors. Either with regard to political behavior, 
participation, attitudes or norms and values, current opinion research tends 
to show marked differences between generations. As a result, generational 
replacement is generally considered to be a key process driving social and 
political change with respect to attitudes toward political institutions 
(Hooghe, 2004: 331).  
 
 
Political Efficacy  
The indicator of citizenship that is most important for the purposes of this study is 
political efficacy; political efficacy is the major psychological quality and educative 
effect that deliberative participation is expected to produce and develop (Mansbridge, 
1995; Pateman, 1970). In the mid-twentieth century, researchers at the University of 
Michigan’s Survey Research Center developed the concept of political efficacy, defined 
as the “feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the 
political process, i.e., that it is worthwhile to perform one’s civic duties” (Campbell, 
Gurin, and Miller, 1954: 187). Since its development, political efficacy has become one 
of the most frequently used measures of general political attitudes. It is also thought to be 
a key indicator of the overall health of democratic systems (Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 
1990), as it has been linked to feelings of trust in political authorities (Balch, 1974), the 
concept of diffuse political support (Easton, 1965, 1975), and more generalized support 
for the political system (Iyengar, 1980). The assumption is that democratic legitimacy 
and stability are contingent upon citizen support for government; regime stability and 
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legitimacy suffer to the extent that citizens feel inefficacious (e.g., Easton, 1965, 1975; 
Miller, 1974). Regime stability is enhanced by “inducing citizens to believe that the 
government is responsive to their own needs and wishes” (Ginsberg, 1982: 182) or 
similarly, by “encouraging [citizens] to believe that they are ultimately controlling the 
government …and keeping them committed to the existing system” (Olsen, 1982: 6).  
The concept of political efficacy emerged directly from psychological theory, 
which suggests that self-referent thoughts and judgments of self-efficacy mediate the 
relationship between knowledge and action, affecting both motivation and behavior (e.g., 
Bandura, 1982, 1997). As the study of political efficacy developed, theory and research 
demonstrated that it was not a unidimensional construct, but rather consisted of at least 
two related, but distinguishable constructs: internal political efficacy and external 
political efficacy (Balch, 1974; Converse, 1972). Internal political efficacy refers to one’s 
feelings of personal competence “to understand and participate effectively in politics” 
(Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990: 290). It represents beliefs about the impact a person can 
have on politics and the political process as a result of their own skills and confidence. 
External political efficacy refers to one’s perceptions about the responsiveness of the 
political system, both governmental authorities and institutions, to citizen demands 
(Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990: 290). It is the belief that the political system is both 
receptive and responsive to the interests and actions of citizens.  
Internal and external political efficacy have been found to be key mediators 
between democracy and political participation (Pateman, 1970) and important predictors 
of political participation (Conway, 2000). Indeed, the idea that participation has 
individual-level effects is central to much democratic theory (Finkel, 1985; Mansbridge, 
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1980, 1995; Mill, 1865, 1965, 1997; Pateman, 1970). As Madsen (1978: 869) notes, “A 
fundamental presumption of democracy is that citizens will feel that collectively, and 
sometimes even individually, they can intervene in public life to affect the course of 
governance.” More specifically, internal political efficacy has been linked to civic 
participation (e.g., Almond and Verba, 1963, 1989; Conway, 2000; Pateman, 1970) and 
external political efficacy has been strongly linked to feelings of “system responsiveness” 
(Abramson and Aldrich, 1982), political trust (Balch, 1974; Craig, 1979), and diffuse 
political support (Iyengar, 1980; Wright, 1976).  
 Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, most Americans felt relatively efficacious 
and trusting toward government (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, 1976). This result was 
interpreted as evidence of American governmental stability and effectiveness in 
responding to popular concerns (Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990). However, during the 
late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, feelings of cynicism and powerlessness became 
widespread among citizens, and perceptions of political efficacy dropped.2 There was 
concern that these developments posed a threat to the established democratic order 
(Easton, 1965, 1975; Miller, 1974). Moreover, American National Election Survey 
(ANES) data show that external political efficacy dropped sharply again among citizens 
during the mid-1980s. Other survey research supports this finding, showing that people 
felt a decline in the effectiveness of their vote (Teixeira, 1992). Some studies have 
documented the strong relationship between feelings of external efficacy and electoral 
participation, arguing that the decline of feelings of governmental responsiveness in the 
American electorate accounts for some of the decline in voter turnout (Abramson and 
                                                 
2 It is interesting to note that the fall of political efficacy in the 1960s coincides with the rise of 
participatory democracy (see Chapter 3). 
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Aldrich, 1982; Shaffer, 1981). In fact, some scholars assert that as much as one-half of 
the decline in presidential turnouts between 1960 and 1980 may be attributed to the 
erosion of external political efficacy (Ambramson and Aldrich, 1982: 512). Although 
ANES data show that political efficacy rose during the late 1990s, there was another 
sharp fall in 2004, particularly among the disadvantaged and the young (Macedo et al., 
2005).  
Table 2 shows the percentage of respondents that agreed with various ANES 
questions about internal and external political efficacy. The questions ask how strongly 
one agrees with the following statements: 
1) Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person  
like me can't really understand what's going on (COMPLICATED, measures 
internal political efficacy);  
2) People like me don't have any say about what the government does (NO SAY, 
measures external political efficacy); and 
3) I don't think public officials care much what people like me think (NO CARE, 
measures external political efficacy).  
In terms of internal political efficacy, the percentage of respondents who agreed 
that “government is so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's 
going on” has ranged between 60 and 74 percent from 1966 to 2002. In 2000, 
respondents in agreement with the statement hit 73 percent, the highest rate since 1974. 
The results for external political efficacy are similar. In 1964, 29 percent of respondents 
agreed that “people like me don't have any say about what the government does.” This 
rose to an all time high of 56 percent in 1994, and was at 43 percent in 2004. Likewise, in 
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1964 only 36 percent of respondents agreed that “I don't think public officials care much 
what people like me think.” Again, the percentage in agreement with that statement rose 
to an all time high of 66 percent in 1994, and was at 50 percent in 2004. These long-term 
trends in political efficacy “suggest, perhaps simplistically, that most Americans no 
longer feel that their views are represented adequately in traditional political venues” 
(Dennis and Owens, 2001: 401-402). 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
In summary, numerous scholars assert that there has been a decline in civic 
engagement and social capital, as indicated by falling rates of voter turnout, political 
participation and engagement, trust in government, and associational membership (e.g., 
Frantzich, 2005; Putnam, 2000; Skocpol and Fiorina, 1999; Stolle and Hooghe, 2004). 
There have also been corresponding declines in citizens’ perceptions of internal and 
external political efficacy, two indicators that are thought to be fundamental to the 
stability of democratic regimes. Many scholars assert that this erosion of the skills and 
dispositions of citizenship has resulted in a citizenship deficit among the general public in 
the United States. Not all scholars, however, accept the democratic and citizenship deficit 
theses. It is to the compelling arguments of these critics that this chapter now turns. 
 
Deficits? What Deficits?  
Numerous arguments deny the existence of the democratic and citizenship 
deficits. In terms of the democratic deficit, two points of view are worth noting. First, 
some scholars assert that a historical review of governance in America demonstrates an 
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expansion of public access to the work of government. Second, some scholars assert that 
individual and aggregate policy decisions are generally responsive to public opinion. 
Both of these arguments are discussed below.  
First, many scholars takes issue with claims about restricted access to government 
processes. They suggest that the history of government legislation and other actions 
shows otherwise, that there is substantial evidence of an expansion of public access to 
governance processes. This can be seen in the history of voting laws (Keyssar, 2000) and 
other citizen participation efforts (see for example, Cooper, Bryer, and Meek, 2006; 
Rimmerman, 2001; Stewart, 1976; Thomas, 1995). Others suggest that a review of recent 
legislation demonstrates a proclivity for increasing the opportunities for citizen 
participation in the work of government. For example, performance management, as 
promoted by the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) and the National 
Performance Review (NPR), is argued to be an appropriate and productive tool for 
increasing citizen participation (e.g. Callahan and Holzer, 1994; Epstein, et. al., 2000). 
GPRA requires agencies to focus on program results, service quality, and customer 
satisfaction by incorporating strategic planning and performance measurement in their 
management processes (Radin: 2000). The NPR movement sought to replace top-down 
ruled-based government with a bottom-up customer-driven entrepreneurial approach 
(Kettl, 1998). It promised a “government closer to the people” (Kettl, 1998: 22), and “set 
out to reconnect citizens with government, to make public programs more responsive, 
and to use the out-ward looking features of customer service to break bureaucrats out of 
the tunnel vision that too often afflicts government agencies” (Kettl, 1998: 24).   
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In addition, legislation that deals particularly with administrative agencies shows 
an increase in public access to the work of government. For example, the Administrative 
Procedures Act (APA) is argued to be a significant breakthrough in the public's right to 
know about and participate in the governance processes of federal administrative 
agencies (Bingham, Nabatchi, and O’Leary, 2005; Kerwin, 2003; Rosenbloom, 2003).  
The APA fundamentally altered the relation of citizens and stakeholders to 
the governance activities of administrative agencies. Its requirement of 
publication made the work of government more transparent. Through 
public notice and comment in rulemaking, it created an explicit and 
legitimate voice for citizens. Through adjudication, it assured stakeholders 
they would have a voice and be heard before government substantially 
interfered with their interests in life, liberty, or property (Bingham, 
Nabatchi, and O’Leary, 2005: 550-551).  
 
Moreover, the history of changes in the federal rulemaking process, which is governed by 
the APA, is essentially one that has expanded public access and input (Kerwin, 2003). In 
addition, two amendments to the APA, Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1996 (NRA; 5 
U.S.C. §§561, et seq.) and the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 (ADRA; 5 
U.S.C. §§571, et seq.), further expanded the forms and opportunities for public 
participation in the work of government (Bingham, Nabatchi, and O’Leary, 2005). 
 Second, other scholars discredit the democracy deficit thesis by arguing that 
individual and aggregate policy decisions are generally responsive to public opinion (for 
an extensive review of this literature, see Manza and Cook: 2002; see also Stimson, 1998, 
2005). Evidence used to demonstrate a high degree of policy responsiveness to public 
opinion is found in quantitative studies of the effects of district or national majority 
opinion on policy outputs and in examinations of policy making in a single or small 
number of policy domains (Manza and Cook, 2002). 
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Several studies use a micro-level approach to compare representative’s behavior 
with the preferences and opinions of their constituents. Although these employ a variety 
of methodological assumptions and use different measures of opinions and behavior, 
many find significant relationships between representatives’ votes and constituents’ 
policy preferences (Bartels, 1991; Erikson, 1978; McDonagh, 1992; Miller and Stokes, 
1963, 1966; Page, Shapiro, Gronke, and Rosenberg, 1984). Other studies use a more 
macro-level approach, comparing government policies with aggregate public opinion, 
and find similar results (e.g., Erikson, 1976; Monroe, 1979; Page and Shapiro, 1983; 
Weissberg, 1976). Some scholars have attempted to develop a comprehensive global 
model of the impact of opinion and policy across a wide range of issues (e.g., Erikson, 
MacKuen, and Stimson, 2002; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson, 1995). This research 
shows that there are both direct and indirect avenues through which public opinion 
influences policy. Moreover, when taken together, these direct and indirect effects of 
public opinion produce large coefficients for the impact of public opinion and mood on 
policy outcomes such that “there exists about a one-to-one translation of preferences into 
policy (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson, 2002: 316).  
In addition, several scholars have used a case study approach to examine the 
relationship between public opinion and policy making in a single or small number of 
policy domains. In general, these studies also suggest a high degree of governmental 
responsiveness. Substantial evidence of responsiveness has been found in studies of equal 
employment opportunity legislation (Burstein, 1985/1998), welfare reform legislation 
(Weaver, 2000), Medicaid legislation (Jacobs, 1993), and defense spending (e.g., Hartley 
and Russett, 1992; Jencks, 1985; Shapiro and Page, 1994; Wlezien, 1995, 1996). 
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Similarly, Quirk and Hinchliffe (1998) assert that during the 1970s and 1980s, public 
opinion influenced several policy domains, including social security, business regulation, 
tax cuts, and petroleum policy among others.  
Arguments denying the existence of the citizenship deficit also exist. In a review 
article, Stolle and Hooghe (2004) lay out four different arguments and evidence 
formulated against the decline of social capital and civic engagement thesis. One group of 
scholars rejects the decline thesis on empirical grounds, questioning the validity of the 
data used by scholars to support the claim. For example, in analyses of the General Social 
Survey for the period of 1975-1994, both Paxton (1999) and Wuthnow (2002) find that 
not all social capital and civic engagement indictors are declining simultaneously. Thus, 
there may not be a social capital syndrome, but rather a decline in only some components 
of social capital (Stolle and Hooghe, 2004). Other critics find fault with the measures and 
indicators of social capital and civic engagement (see generally, Sobel, 2002). For 
example, McDonald and Popkin (2001) find fault with the way the voter turnout 
percentages are calculated. The U.S. Census Bureau calculates voter turnout as a ratio of 
votes cast to the total number of voting-age residents; however, the ineligible population 
has been growing faster than the eligible population, thus giving the appearance that voter 
turnout is declining (McDonald and Popkin, 2001). Regardless of how it is calculated, 
other scholars claim that low voter turnout is sign of widespread satisfaction with the 
political system (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002). From an economic perspective, not 
voting is a rational choice: 
Any rational, self-interested person would leave the work of voting – as 
well as the work of becoming informed about issues and candidates – to 
other citizens, and spend election day pursuing personal responsibilities or 
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individually rewarding activities such as earning money on the job or 
spending a day at a ballgame or the beach (Rolfe, n.d.: 1).  
 
Thus, low voter turnout may be simply a sign that people are coming to their senses and 
behaving in a politically rational manner. This research and works by others scholars 
(e.g., Ladd, 1996; Schudson, 1996) raises doubts about the empirical validity of 
arguments purporting to show deficiencies among American citizens.  
A second group of scholars accept the decline thesis, but view it as an example of 
American exceptionalism. These scholars assert that although Western societies are 
experiencing political disenchantment, increasing cynicism, and political alienation, the 
same trends with regard to forms of participation that are not expressly political cannot be 
observed (Stolle and Hooghe, 2004). The brunt of this argument is that “not all forms of 
participation seem to be in decline through Western democracies. Whereas most 
democratic countries struggle with a decline in conventional political participation, such 
as voting, party membership and even political trust, social relations are not threatened to 
the same extent” (Stolle and Hooghe, 2004: 159). Scholars articulating this criticism 
suggest a need for comparative research that uses meaningful indicators of social capital 
and civic engagement before the civic decline claims can be accepted (e.g., Hall, 1999; 
Mayer, 2003; Torpe, 2003).  
Similarly, a third critique also accepts that traditional participation may be on the 
decline, but argues that its participatory measures fail to capture and pay attention to 
emerging forms of participation and interaction (Stolle and Hooghe, 2004). The argument 
is that new participation mechanisms, which tend to be informal, non-hierarchical, 
grassroots based, and related to life-style or sporadic mobilization efforts, are replacing 
the traditional formal and fixed participatory structures of the past (e.g., Gundelach, 
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1984; Rimmerman, 2001). Moreover, these new participatory mechanisms are not 
captured in traditional survey research on participation, but are nevertheless likely to 
contribute to and help maintain social capital (Stolle and Hooghe, 2004). Such critics 
assert that new instruments must be developed to capture these new and emerging forms 
of participation before any conclusions about the state of civil society can be made (e.g., 
Beck, 1997; Castells, 1996, 1997, 1998; Eliasoph, 1998; Lichterman, 1996).  
Finally, a fourth group of critics accepts the decline thesis, but disputes its 
normative interpretations. These scholars assert that the decline of traditional social 
capital measures does not necessarily mean a decline in social stability, political stability, 
or democratic order. Rather than viewing the decline as a threat to democracy, they assert 
that it should be viewed as a function of postmodernization (e.g., Inglehart, 1997; Norris, 
2002; Wetzel, Inglehart, and Klingemann, 2003). “In this view, declining levels of 
participation should not cause any concern about the future viability of democratic 
systems, as they are merely reflecting a transition from routine participation to a more 
reflexive and monitoring form of political involvement” (Stolle and Hooghe, 2004: 164). 
The issue for these scholars is how to ensure, in a post-modern world, that citizens have 
access to and influence over governments and political system (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart 
and Baker, 2000). 
 In addition, there are similar rebuttals to the assertions about a decline in civic 
engagement and social capital among youth. For example, some studies indicate that 
younger age cohorts adhere more strongly to democratic norms; they are more tolerant 
and tend to be more critical of authoritarian and hierarchical institutions (Inglehart, 
2003). Other studies indicate that youth may prefer more informal ways of participating 
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in politics, espousing more lifestyle-related and loosely structured forms of civic 
engagement (O’Toole, Lister, Marsh, Jones, and McDonagh, 2003). These arguments 
echo the broader criticisms of citizenship deficit thesis, and suggest that civic decline 
among youth is not as problematic as has been portrayed.  
In summary, many scholars assert that the democratic and citizenship deficits are 
non-existent, or to the extent that they do exist, have been exaggerated. Some scholars 
point to an increase in the opportunities for access to government work as evidence 
against the democratic deficit, while others point to the congruence of public policy and 
public opinion. In terms of the latter argument, scholars assert that to the extent that 
public policy is responsive to public opinion, complaints about falling perceptions of 
political efficacy, and particularly external political efficacy among Americans are of less 
significance and importance. There are also many arguments denying the existence of the 
citizenship deficit. One group of scholars question the validity of the data and empirical 
analyses used to show a decline in social capital. A second group believes the data 
demonstrate an example of American exceptionalism. A third argues that participatory 
measures fail to capture and pay attention to emerging forms of participation and 
interaction, and a fourth group of critics accepts the decline thesis, but disputes its 
normative consequences.  
Nevertheless, while researchers work to make sense of the data and trends, there 
seems to be an increasingly pessimistic view of the state of democracy and citizenship in 
the United States.  Regardless of the extent to which one buys into arguments about the 
democratic and/or citizenship deficits, there can be no doubt that public perceptions 
matter. As Dennis and Owen (2000: 401) assert,  
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public dissatisfaction with politics and government is connected 
fundamentally to popular perceptions about the political process and 
representation. In a fully operative democracy, people are likely to have 
developed the firm expectation that they have the right to be heard, and 
that officials should be responsible to their needs and take action. If people 
have come to feel that their own needs, wants, interests, concerns, values, 
or demands are not being effectively represented in the policy process, 
then no matter how felicitous the nature of the system outputs is perceived 
to be, popular resentment likely will result. Resistance will be especially 
pronounced if people feel effectively excluded from the early stages of the 
decision-making processes that produced government policies and actions.  
 
In other words, regardless of whether “participation is direct or indirect, actual or only 
imagined, citizens must be satisfied with the process of inputting their demands if they 
are to remain supportive of the political system more generally” (Dennis and Owen, 
2001: 400). To the extent that the skills and dispositions of citizenship, and particularly 
political efficacy, are eroding among Americans, the promise of deliberative democracy 
to remediate this problem is an important area of research. Thus, despite disagreement 
over whether democratic and citizenship deficits exist, the arguments of deliberative 
democrats cannot be ignored. There also remains the fact that the deliberative democracy 
movement is gaining momentum. 
Since Jürgen Habermas (1996) promulgated the view that communicative 
power coming from the subjects of a regime may be one of the only 
sources for the legitimation of state power, communication and 
deliberation have become the focus of democrats interested in finding 
ways for the voice of the people to be heard more loudly, providing a 
forum for the rulers to heed the informed views of the ruled (Leib, 2004: 
2).  
   
The following sections review the benefits and pitfalls of deliberative democracy, 
particularly with respect to its potential to remedy (or exacerbate) the democratic 
and citizenship deficits. 
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THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
Numerous scholars have outlined the potential instrumental and intrinsic benefits 
of deliberative democracy. Elster (1998: 11) asserts that “deliberation is (or can be) good 
because (or to the extent that)” it: 
• Reveals private information, 
• Lessens or overcomes the impact of bounded rationality, 
• Forces or induces a particular mode of justifying demands, 
• Legitimizes the ultimate choice, 
• Makes for Pareto-superior decisions, 
• Makes for better decisions in terms of distributive justice, 
• Makes for larger consensus, and/or 
• Improves the moral or intellectual qualities of the participants.  
Similarly, Gutmann and Thompson (2004: 10-13) outline four purposes of deliberative 
democracy: (1) to provide the most justifiable conception for dealing with moral 
disagreement in politics; 2) to encourage public-spirited perspectives on public issues; 3) 
to promote mutually respectful processes of decision making; and 4) to help correct past 
mistakes.  
Fung (2005) argues that deliberative democracy serves three important 
democratic values: legitimacy, justice, and effectiveness of public action. Following 
Robert Dahl’s (1989) idea of a minipopulus and Jack Nagle’s (1992) notion of 
Deliberative Assemblies on a Random Basis (DARBs), Fung (2003: 339) refers to the 
convening of citizens in self-consciously organized public deliberations as minipublics. 
The term ‘minipublic’ denotes  
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some form of small-scale deliberative forum which is designed to foster a 
process with aspects of the discursive democratic ideal: that is, some form 
of inclusive and competent engagement between all affected parties over 
issues of mutual concern in search of judgments that can be assented to by 
all as representing fair and effective decisions (Davies, Blackstock, and 
Rauschmayer, 2005: 602).  
 
Examples of minipublics offered by Fung (2003) include Citizen Summits 
(deliberative forums where residents reflect upon city priorities and communicate their 
views to the mayor), the Oregon Health Plan (a public participation process that gathered 
residents to build consensus on health service allocation decisions), and Chicago 
Community Policing (a process used to engage citizens in problem-solving around public 
safety issues). It should be noted however, that in Fung’s (2003) conception, deliberative 
processes, despite great variation in their institutional designs, are minipublics in that 
they advance and have consequences for democratic governance.  
Fung (2003) asserts that minipublics are among the most promising efforts for 
civic engagement and public deliberation in contemporary politics. He also asserts that a 
healthy minipublic contributes to the quality of democratic governance by (1) improving 
the character of participation in a minipublic by dealing with issues of quantity, bias, and 
quality of deliberation; 2) informing officials and citizens and fostering the dispositions 
and skills of citizenship; 3) connecting deliberation to state action in terms of official 
accountability, the justice of policies, and their efficacy and wisdom; and 4) increasing 
popular mobilization. These and other potential benefits of deliberative democracy are 
discussed in more detail below. 
First, advocates of deliberative democracy assert that through the process of 
deliberation, private information may be revealed, which in turn can help overcome or at 
least reduce the impacts of bounded rationality and force the justification or giving of 
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reasons for individual positions (Elster, 1998; Fearon, 1998; Gambetta, 1998; Gutmann 
and Thompson, 1996, 2004). Deliberation deemphasizes the aggregation of and/or 
bargaining among pre-established preferences and individual interests (Button and Ryfe, 
2005); therefore, discussion allows people to express diverse intensities of preferences, 
whether they have strong or indifferent feelings about particular policy choices (Fearon, 
1998). In this sense, deliberation helps with greater distribution of information 
(Gambetta, 1998), improves one’s understanding of policy problems and alternative 
solutions, and thus, expands the boundaries of rationality for decision making (Fearon, 
1998; Manin, 1987). Indeed, research shows that greater discussion can increase the use 
of new, less commonly shared information (Kelly and Karau, 1999) 
Second, building on the influential theories of Jürgen Habermas (1984, 1990) who 
argues that individual preferences are transformed through the active exchange of ideas, 
or the voicing of and listening to preferences expressed in an ideal speech situation, 
advocates of deliberative democracy assert that deliberation can help people clarify, 
understand, and refine their own preferences and positions on issues (e.g., Elster, 1998). 
Even if preferences are not transformed, advocates of deliberative democracy assert that 
the process of discussion can create greater understanding among persons with divergent 
preferences, as well as more tolerance for opposing views (Benhabib, 1996; Cohen and 
Rogers, 1995; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 2004; Hunold and Young, 1998) because 
people may begin to think beyond their own self-interest, to include greater concern for 
others and their community (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 2004; Macedo, 1999). In 
addition, deliberation should enhance mutual respect, recognition, and empathy, because 
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"participants are forced to think of what would count as a good reason for all others 
involved in, or affected by, the decisions under discussion" (Cooke, 2000: 950). 
A considerable amount of empirical research supports these contentions. For 
example, research indicates that face-to-face communication is a highly significant factor 
in determining the likelihood of cooperation (Bornstein, 1992; Dawes, van de Kragt, and 
Orbell, 1990; Ostrom, 1998; Sally, 1995). Talking in a face-to-face situation allows 
individuals to demonstrate their willingness to cooperate with others, and thus determines 
others’ willingness cooperate (Bornstein and Rapoport, 1988; Kerr and Kaufman-Gilland, 
1994; Orbell, van de Kragt, and Dawes, 1988). Other research shows that face-to-face 
deliberation enables people to see the connection between their individual interests and 
group interests (Dawes, van de Kragt, and Orbell, 1990; Orbell, van de Kragt, and 
Dawes, 1988). As Delli Carpini, Cook and Jacobs (2004: 325) note, minority opinions 
can lead majorities to consider new alternatives and perspectives (Nemeth, 1986; Nemeth 
and Kwan 1985; Nemeth and Wachtler, 1983; Turner, 1991), to seek out and process new 
information (Nemeth and Mayseless, 1987; Nemeth and Rogers, 1996), and to more 
generally empathize with the minority’s viewpoint (Moscovici, 1980). In addition, the 
group consensus that emerges from talk appears to lead to actual cooperative behavior, 
with more talk leading to more cooperation (Bouas and Komorita, 1996).  
A third potential benefit is that deliberation may increase consensus about a 
policy decision. As Cohen (1989: 33) notes, “deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally 
motivated consensus – to find reasons that are persuasive to all.” Thus, to the extent that 
public discussion increases individuals’ awareness and consideration of other’s interests, 
deliberation can improve compromise and consensus, such that concessions are made 
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beyond one’s immediate self-interests to the general interests of the community and/or 
other groups (Gambetta, 1998). Empirical research on the role of unanimity in 
deliberation suggests that this mode of consensus can lead to a greater belief that the 
deliberation was fair and comprehensive (Kameda, 1991; Kaplan and Miller, 1987; 
Nemeth, 1977). Moreover, research indicates that requiring consensus can encourage 
greater open-mindedness toward the views of others (Kameda, 1991).  
Fourth, the procedures and preconditions of deliberative democracy are designed 
to generate legitimate outcomes (Button and Ryfe, 2005; Elster, 1998; Fung, 2003, 2005; 
Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 2004; Young, 2000), which may lead to increased buy-in 
and longer-term support of policy implementation (Fearon, 1998) and the effectiveness of 
public action (Fung, 2005). It is argued that deliberation can produce better public 
decisions and policies both generally, and in terms of distributive justice, by recognizing 
weaker groups and breaking the cycle of political inequality (Gambetta, 1998; Fearon, 
1998; Fung, 2005; Young, 2000). Deliberative processes address legitimacy deficits in 
that they shift the locus of power and influence away from government officials toward 
citizens (Fung, 2003, 2005). Thus, the perceived legitimacy of policy decisions increases 
to the extent there is agreement that all relevant voices are equally heard. The policy 
outcomes of deliberation are more likely to be seen as distributively and procedurally 
legitimate because they are the result of an inclusive, voluntary, reasoned, and equal 
process (Button and Ryfe, 2005; Cohen, 1996; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 2004; 
Habermas, 1996; Rawls, 1996). In turn, the process improves the quality of the decisions 
reached by the group (Winquist and Larson, 1998). 
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Social psychology research on distributive and procedural justice provides some 
support for these contentions. Distributive justice is rooted in social equity theory, and 
based on the idea that social behavior is conditioned by the distribution or allocation of 
outcomes. A significant body of research indicates that satisfaction increases when 
outcomes are allocated in a fair manner (e.g., Pruitt, 1981; Raiffa, 1982; Rubin and 
Brown, 1975). Procedural justice refers to perceptions about the fairness of the rules and 
procedures that regulate a process (Austin and Tobiasen, 1984; Kressel, Pruitt, and 
Associates, 1989; Thibaut and Walker, 1975). In general, research suggests that when 
processes and procedures are perceived to be fair, then individuals are more satisfied, 
more willing to accept the resolution of that procedure, and more likely to form positive 
attitudes about the decision makers, regardless of whether they substantively agree with 
the outcome (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1994, 2001; Tyler and Blader, 2000; Tyler and 
Lind, 1992). 
Finally, and most important in terms of this dissertation, advocates of deliberative 
democracy assert that deliberation serves an educative function in that it improves the 
moral and intellectual capacities of participants. Fearon (1998: 59) describes deliberation 
as “a sort of exercise program for developing human or civic virtues” that helps 
participants cultivate certain skills and virtues such as eloquence, rhetorical skill, 
empathy, courtesy, imagination, and reasoning ability. It is in this vein that Luskin and 
Fishkin (2003) assert that deliberation can make for “better citizens” by fostering and 
increasing political sophistication, interest, participation, internal and external efficacy, 
trust, respect, empathy, and sociotropism. The next chapter provides a theoretical 
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perspective on how deliberation improves the skills and dispositions of citizenship and 
explores the empirical research on the subject. 
 
THE POTENTIAL PITFALLS OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
Not all scholars agree that deliberative democracy has such benefits; in fact, many 
see a distinct dark side to deliberative democracy. On a practical note, some scholars 
point to the high the transaction costs for participants in deliberative forums and suggest 
that these costs may outweigh the potential benefits of participation for citizens and 
policy makers (e.g., Huntington, 1975). For citizens, transaction costs may include time, 
money (e.g., lost wages or child care costs), and otherwise forgoing more preferable 
activities (Rydin and Pennington, 2000). Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) articulate this 
issue well:  
The last thing people want is to be more involved political 
decisionmaking; they do not want to provide much input to those who are 
assigned to make these decisions; and they would rather not know all the 
details of the decisionmaking process. Most people have strong feelings 
on few if any of the issues the government needs to address and would 
much prefer to spend their time in non-political pursuits. 
 
Moreover, “securing broad-based, meaningful deliberation on contentious issues 
from ordinary citizens, most of whom have little desire to engage in public policy 
discussions, is next to impossible no matter how creative the contrived forum may be” 
(Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2005: 228). Following this argument, the lack of political 
participation among Americans may in fact not be a bellwether of democratic crisis, but 
rather a sign of widespread content and satisfaction with the status quo (Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse, 2002; Macedo et al., 2005). In fact some scholars argue that many of the 
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problems of governance in the United States today stem from an excess of democracy 
(Huntington, 1975: 113).  
Other scholars assert that the high transaction costs of such participatory 
endeavors also extend to government officials and decision makers. Time and money are 
two transaction costs that public agencies and their administrators must deal with when 
organizing citizen participation efforts. Citizen participation processes require large time 
commitments; it may take significantly longer to reach a decision through a citizen 
participation process than if a single administrator or group of administrators made the 
decision on their own (Lawrence and Deagen, 2001; Irvin and Stansbury, 2004). Citizen 
participation efforts also often carry significant financial expenses. “Although 
comparative costs have not been subject to close scrutiny, the low end of the pre-decision 
cost of citizen-participation groups is arguably more expensive than the decision making 
of a single agency administrator, even if the citizen participants’ time and costs are 
ignored” (Irvin and Stansbury, 2004: 58). Thus, increased citizen participation may 
diverge from today’s managerial emphasis on rational decision-making, efficiency, and 
expediency. Indeed, administrators tend to think that citizen engagement impedes 
administrative processes and increases inefficiency and red tape (King, Feltey, and Susel, 
1998).   
Additional transaction costs to government officials and decision makers concern 
their ability to broker policy compromises (e.g., Huntington, 1975). “Because citizen 
participants are not paid for their time, committees may be dominated by strongly 
partisan participants whose livelihood or values are strongly affected by the decisions 
being made, or by those who live comfortably enough to allow them to participate 
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regularly” (Irvin and Stansbury, 2004: 59). Thus, given the potential limits of 
representation among citizen participants, there is little to guarantee that participants will 
be adequate proxies for the community. This is especially true in larger, more 
heterogeneous communities (Ostrom, 1990). Even if there is diversity among 
participants, this diversity can make it more difficult for political elites to make policy 
decisions that satisfy citizen demands (Huntington, 1975; Sunstein, 2003). As more 
citizens participate, more views and positions are brought to the table. Policy makers 
must not only sort through these views, but also take into account the preferences and 
demands of larger and more diverse groups of citizens (for practical and recent examples 
of this situation, see Margerum and Whitehall, 2004; Throop and Purdom, 2006; USFS, 
2002).  
As noted earlier, one of the strongest arguments in favor of deliberative 
democracy is that such participation has intrinsic benefits for citizens. Not all agree with 
this assertion. Some scholars argue that the inverse is true, that participation can injure 
citizens, causing them to feel frustrated and to perceive personal inefficacy and 
powerlessness.  
Real-life deliberation can fan emotions unproductively, can exacerbate 
rather than diminish power differentials among those deliberating, can 
make people feel frustrated with the system that made them deliberate, is 
ill-suited to many issues, and can lead to worse decisions than would have 
occurred if no deliberation had taken place (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 
2002: 191). 
 
Advocates of deliberative democracy argue that “[w]hen people come into contact 
with those who are different, they become better citizens, as indicated in their values and 
behavior” (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2005: 232); however, to get the full benefits of 
associational involvement, the groups must be diverse. The logic here is straightforward – 
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to experience the benefits of deliberation, one must hear a variety of viewpoints. Despite 
this argument, social psychology research indicates that it is difficult to get people 
involved in heterogeneous groups, and that when they do join such a group, they tend to 
interact with groups members who are similar to them (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2005; 
Sunstein, 2003).  
Social psychology research on small groups highlights several potential pitfalls of 
deliberation (for an extensive review of this literature, see Mendelberg, 2002). In 
particular, research suggests three psychological limits to participation: risky shift, the 
Abilene paradox, and groupthink (e.g., Cooke and Kothari, 2002: 106-109; see also 
Torres, 2003: 72-73). Risky shift describes the phenomenon that group discussion can 
lead members to make riskier decisions than they would have made as individuals. The 
Abilene paradox reflects the experience of groups who make decisions and take actions 
that contradict their wants and interests in order to alleviate the anxieties and tensions of 
individual members. Groupthink refers to the replacement of independent critical 
thinking with irrational and dehumanizing actions against out-groups. As Sunstein (2003: 
82) notes, “deliberative enclaves can be breeding grounds for both the development of 
unjustly suppressed views and for unjustified extremism, indeed fanaticism.”  
 Research on small group deliberation supports these contentions. For example, 
communication has been found to enhance cooperation among individuals at the expense 
of that between groups (Insko, et al., 1993). When group interests are consistent with 
individual interests, communication can increase cooperation among groups; however, 
when group interests compete with individual interests, individual and in-group 
cooperation increase at the expense of cooperation across groups (Bornstein, 1992). 
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Moreover, communication across groups of unequal size can make group differences 
more salient, and thus decrease cooperation (Bettencourt and Dorr, 1998; Miller and 
Davidson-Podgorny, 1987). Other research suggests that individuals who are perceived to 
have particular expertise in the subject under deliberation are more likely to be influential 
in the group’s decision (Bottger, 1984; Kirchler and Davis, 1986; Ridgeway, 1981, 
1987). Moreover, groups tend to use information that is already commonly shared, and 
focus less on distinctive information held by specific individuals that could arguably 
improve the outcome or decision (Gigone, and Hastie, 1993, 1997; Larson, et al, 1998; 
Stasser 1992, Stasser and Titus, 1985; Stasser, Taylor and Hanna, 1989; Wittenbaum, 
Hubbel, and Zuckerman, 1999).  
The sum of these effects not only limits the potential benefits of participation, but 
also increases the potential for unwise decisions and polarization (e.g., Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse, 2002; Huntington, 1975; Sunstein, 2003). The issue of group polarization 
is especially relevant:  
Though standard, the term “group polarization” is somewhat misleading. 
It is not meant to suggest that group members will shift to the poles, nor 
does it refer to an increase in variance among groups, though this may be 
the ultimate result. Instead the term refers to a predictable shift within a 
group discussing a case or problem. As the shift occurs, groups, and group 
members, move and coalesce, not toward the middle of antecedent 
dispositions, but toward a more extreme position in the direction indicated 
by those dispositions. The effect of deliberation is both to decrease 
variance among group members, as individual differences diminish, and 
also to produce convergence on a relatively more extreme point among 
predeliberation judgments (Sunstein, 2003: 83).   
 
Indeed, research suggests that discussion tends to move collective opinion in the direction 
of the preexisting views of the majority (Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1969; Myers and 
Lamm, 1976; Schkade, Sunstein, and Kahneman, 2000). Moreover, when unanimity is 
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the decision rule, the chances of deadlock increase (Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington, 
1983), as does polarization (Kaplan and Miller, 1987; Mendelberg and Karpowitz, 2000) 
Other criticisms of deliberation and deliberative democracy exist. To the extent 
that polarization occurs, the possibility of co-optation also increases. As Arnstein (1969: 
217) notes, “participation without redistribution of power is an empty and frustrating 
process for the powerless. It allows the powerholders to claim that all sides were 
considered, but makes it possible for only some of those sides to benefit. It maintains the 
status quo.” Young (2003) articulates this point well, demonstrating how a political 
activist, a person who would be expected to want to participate in deliberative democratic 
efforts, might have legitimate moral objections to the compromises required during 
deliberation.  
The activist is suspicious of exhortations to deliberate, because he believes 
that in the real word of politics, where structural inequalities influence 
both procedures and outcomes, democratic processes that appear to 
conform to norms of deliberation are usually biased toward more powerful 
agents. The activist thus recommends that those who care about promoting 
greater justice should engage primarily in critical oppositional activity, 
rather than attempt to come to agreement with those who support or 
benefit from existing power structures (Young, 2003: 102-103). 
 
Clearly, there is disagreement among scholars about the potential benefits and 
pitfalls of deliberative democracy, and as discussed in the following chapter, empirical 
research does little to resolve this debate. Before reviewing this literature, however, it is 
useful to briefly discuss some of the processes of deliberative democracy and provide 
some examples.  
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PROCESSES OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
 Thus far, this chapter has described deliberative democracy in broad, 
normative, and almost philosophical terms; however, in practice, deliberative 
democracy does not translate into a single method or process. Instead, deliberative 
democracy serves as an umbrella term for a wide variety of processes. For 
example, the Co-Intelligence Institute lists over 50 civic engagement processes, 
many of which are deliberative in nature (see http://www.co-
intelligence.org/CommunityEngagement.html). The Deliberative Democracy 
Handbook (Gastil and Levine, 2005) discusses numerous models of public 
deliberation, including but not limited to the Kettering National Issues Forum, 
electoral deliberation and public journalism, deliberative polling, consensus 
conferences and planning cells, citizen juries, on-line dialogues, the 
AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting, study circles, and e-thePeople and 
similar e-democracy initiatives.  
A discussion about the specific design of each these deliberative 
democracy processes is beyond the scope of this study, and details about the 
AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting are provided in the next chapter; 
however, brief examples of some processes are useful for illustrative purposes.  
• The AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting engages large 
numbers of citizens (anywhere from 500 to 5000+) in deliberation 
around a specific policy issue or set of issues in a particular political 
community. Participation technology is used to relay information from 
small table deliberations, to a “Theme Team” that distills the 
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information into major topics, which are then presented back to the 
entire room for clarification, modification, and voting. The recorded 
the preferences (i.e., the ‘votes’ of participants) are provided to all 
participants at the end of the day, including decisions makers, who are 
expected to act upon the deliberated outcomes.  
• The Kettering National Issues Forum (NIF) convenes citizens in a 
variety of institutional settings to deliberate about public problems and 
the costs and benefits of specific solutions. The goals of these forums 
are to enhance knowledge about public issues, to explore the 
underlying values and deeper motivations behind the issues, to help 
form a public with the skills needed for democratic dialogue and 
reasoned judgment, and to help (re)define the interests of the public.  
• Public journalism, or civic journalism, engages the press in directly 
helping to revive civic life and public dialogue by convening town 
meetings where citizens have the opportunity to discuss public 
problems, question candidates skillfully and in-depth, review policy 
options, discuss solutions at work in other communities, set an action 
agenda, and facilitate voluntary citizen action.  
• Deliberative Polling®, originated by Professor James Fishkin, 
constructs a random, representative sample and polls participants on a 
targeted issue or set of issues. After the baseline poll, members of the 
sample are invited to gather for a weekend to discuss the issues in 
depth in small groups led by trained facilitators. Participants are re-
 72
polled after the weekend. The resulting changes in opinion represent 
the conclusions the public would reach, if people had opportunity to 
become more informed and more engaged by the issues.  
• Study circles are voluntary, self-organizing groups of citizens (5-20 
people) whole deliberate, with the assistance of trained facilitators, 
about community problems and potential solutions. The study circles 
generally meet three to six times for two to three hours each to explore 
a subject. Between meetings participants read materials they were 
given at the end of the last meeting. These materials are used as 
springboards for dialogue and education about the issue. 
Some scholars expand the list of deliberative processes and categorize 
them as quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial deliberative processes (e.g., Bingham, 
Nabatchi and O’Leary, 2005; Bingham, O’Leary and Nabatchi, 2005). Quasi-
legislative processes occur “upstream” in the policy making process; they are 
prospective activities that help to set standards, guidelines, expectations, or rules 
and regulations for behavior. Quasi-legislative processes include, but are not 
limited to e-democracy, public conversations, consensus-building, public 
dialogues, study circles, deliberative polling, participatory budgeting, the 
Kettering National Issues Forum, and the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town 
Meeting. Quasi-judicial processes are retrospective, fact-based, and/or determine 
the rights or obligations of selected citizens or stakeholders. Quasi-judicial 
deliberative processes include numerous alternative or appropriate dispute 
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resolution (ADR) processes, including but not limited to mediation, early neutral 
assessment, and arbitration.  
It is important to point out that while these processes vary along a number 
of salient dimensions, they also share key features. Key features shared among the 
processes are: 
1) A focus on action: deliberation is not conducted for its own sake, but 
rather is conducted to determine what should be done in some situation 
by some agent;   
2) An appeal to values: the interests, principles, and motivations that 
underlie a problem and its potential solution are explored;  
3) The absence of pre-existing commitments: the goal of deliberation is 
not to persuade others to accept a pre-defined proposal or solution, but 
to identify, articulate, and develop various possibilities;   
4) Mutuality of focus: personal interests are not negotiated; instead the 
goal is to identify and articulate community interests with respect to a 
specific issue or set of issues; 
5) The free exchange of knowledge and information: information is not 
withheld; it is shared widely with participants and other interested 
members of the community; and  
6) Activities occur within small groups: while dozens, hundreds, or even 
thousands may participate in the overall process, the deliberative 
elements of the process occur within groups of 8-15 people 
(Lukensmeyer and Brigham, 2005; Torres, 2003). 
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Differences among the processes include, but are not limited to (1) who 
participates in deliberation, 2) how participants exchange information and make 
decisions, and 3) the link between the deliberations and policy or public action 
(Fung 2005; Bingham, Nabatchi, and O’Leary, 2005). For example, some 
processes include only selected stakeholders within particular communities of 
interest deliberating in a private, confidential forum (e.g., most ADR processes), 
while others involve a cross-section of the electorate in a mass, public process 
(e.g., NIF, Deliberative Polling, or the 21st Century Town Meeting) (Bingham, 
Nabatchi, and O’Leary, 2005; Bingham, O’Leary, Nabatchi, 2005; Williamson, 
2004). Some processes are small and more informal (e.g., public conversations or 
study circles) and rely more on relational communication and storytelling; other 
processes are large and more structured (e.g., NIF or the 21st Century Town 
Meeting) and favor logical, rational discourse over relationship building 
(Bingham, Nabatchi, and O’Leary, 2005; Bingham, O’Leary, Nabatchi, 2005; 
Ryfe 2002). Moreover, the processes vary with their point of connection to the 
policy process (Fung, 2003, 2005). For example, some may deliberate about 
emerging community issues (e.g., study circles or public journalism), whereas 
others aim to provide specific policy recommendations to government officials 
(e.g., the 21st Century Town Meeting) (Torres 2003).  
  
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide a broad overview of the concept of 
deliberative democracy. The chapter began by comparing deliberative and 
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aggregative/representative democracy. The chapter then moved into a discussion about 
why deliberative democracy has been gaining popularity in the U.S. and in other parts of 
the world. Specifically, it argued that the increased interest is, in large part, a response to 
claims about a democratic deficit and a citizenship deficit in the United States (and in 
other Western democracies). For some scholars, deliberative democracy, with both its 
instrumental and  intrinsic value, represents a potential cure for these ills. The chapter 
then reviewed the potential benefits and pitfalls of deliberative democracy and concluded 
with an overview of deliberative democracy process and some examples.  
The next chapter explores the theory of deliberative democracy and explains the 
hypothesized educative effects of deliberation, including its potential to increase 
perceptions of political efficacy. In addition, the chapter provides a detailed discussion of 
the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting. It explains why and how the functional 
design of the 21st Century Town Meeting may contribute to the development of 
citizenship skills and dispositions generally, and specifically explores how the process is 
expected to impact perceptions of political efficacy.  
 76
Table 1: Voter Turnout for U.S. Presidential and Midterm Elections, 1960-2004 
 
Year 
Population 
of voting 
age 
Percent of  
voting-age  
population 
that voted  
for President 
Percent of  
voting-age 
population  
that voted in mid-term 
elections  
1960 109,672 62.8 58.5 
1962 112,952 -- 45.4 
1964 114,090 61.9 57.8 
1966 116,638 -- 45.4 
1968 120,285 60.9 55.1 
1970 124,498 -- 43.5 
1972 140,777 55.2 50.7 
1974 146,338 -- 35.9 
1976 152,308 53.5 48.9 
1978 158,369 -- 34.9 
1980 163,945 52.8 47.6 
1982 169,643 -- 38.0 
1984 173,995 53.3 47.8 
1986 177,922 -- 33.5 
1988 181,956 50.3 44.9 
1990 185,812 -- 33.1 
1992 189,524 55.1 50.8 
1994 193,650 -- 36.6 
1996 196,928 49.0 45.8 
1998 198,228 -- 32.9 
2000 205,815 50.2 46.3 
2002 215,077 -- 34.3 
2004 220,377 55.5 51.4 
Source: Federal Election Commission. Data drawn from Congressional Research Service reports, 
Election Data Services Inc., and State Election Offices. Available at: 
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781453.html  
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Figure 1: Trust in Government to Do What is Right Just About Always or Most of 
the Time, 1964-2004  
 
Source: ANES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior 
Available at:  http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/tab5a_1.htm 
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Table 2: Percentage of Respondents that Agreed with ANES Questions  
about Internal and External Political Efficacy, 1964-2004 
 
YEAR COMPLICATED
a 
(IPE) 
NO SAYb  
(EPE) 
NO CAREc 
(EPE) 
1964 ** 29 36 
1966 67 34 34 
1968 69 41 43 
1970 71 36 47 
1972 73 40 49 
1974 74 40 50 
1976 72 41 51 
1978 71 45 51 
1980 72 39 52 
1982 70 45 47 
1984 ** 32 42 
1986 71 ** 52 
1988 ** 41 21 
1990 70 54 63 
1992 66 36 52 
1994 66 56 66 
1996 65 53 61 
1998 63 42 62 
2000 73 41 56 
2002 60 29 31 
2004 ** 43 50 
aCOMPLICATED: Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me 
can't really understand what's going on (measures internal political efficacy). 
bNO SAY: People like me don't have any say about what the government does (measures external 
political efficacy).  
cNO CARE: I don't think public officials care much what people like me think (measures external 
political efficacy).  
Source: ANES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior 
Available at: http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/gd-index.htm#5 
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CHAPTER THREE 
IN SEARCH OF THE EFFICACY EFFECT:  
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP 
 
... in many cases, though individuals may not do the particular thing so 
well, on the average, as the officers of government, it is nevertheless 
desirable that it should be done by them, rather than by the government, as 
a means to their own mental education—a mode of strengthening their 
active faculties, exercising their judgment, and giving them a familiar 
knowledge of the subjects with which they are thus left to deal (Mill, 
1997: 127). 
       
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As noted in the previous chapter, many scholars believe that deliberative 
democracy has the power to create better and more efficacious citizens. This chapter 
provides a more detailed theoretical analysis of how participation and deliberation are 
thought to improve the skills and dispositions of citizenship. The chapter begins with a 
general explanation of the theorized claims regarding the educative effects of 
participation, and then moves to a more specific discussion about the potential effects of 
participatory and deliberative democracy on political efficacy. Next, the chapter turns to 
an examination of the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting and discusses why the 
design of this deliberative process is expected to benefit citizens and improve perceptions 
of political efficacy. The chapter concludes with a review of previous research on these 
issues. Specifically, it reviews research that assesses the impact on efficacy of 
participation in traditional political activities (i.e., voting, campaign activities, protest 
activities, and activism), participation in workplace/industrial democracies, and 
participation in direct democracy (i.e., ballot initiatives, referenda, and town meetings). It 
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also reviews research that focuses specifically on deliberative democracy processes, 
including research that broadly examines the effects of deliberation on the skills and 
dispositions of citizenship, and research that specifically examines the AmericaSpeaks 
21st Century Town Meeting. 
 
THE EDUCATIVE EFFECTS OF PARTICIPATION 
As Morrell (1998) notes, arguments for direct participation by citizens in political 
decision making have existed at least since Aristotle, who wrote that “man is by nature a 
animal intended to live in a polis.” In recent history, however, arguments for participatory 
democracy (re)emerged in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s in the literature of 
the student movement (e.g., Adelson, 1972; Daniels, 1969; Myers, 1989; Sale 1973; 
Stewart, 1976) and in the works of political scholars such as Bachrach (1971, 1975), 
Kaufman (1960), Macpherson (1967, 1973, 1977), and Pateman (1970). Although the 
modern participatory model of democracy was developed during the turbulence of the 
1960s3, many of its ideas originate in the classic works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and 
                                                 
3 Although it is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is interesting to hypothesize about why the ideas of 
participatory democracy reemerged in the U.S. during the 1960s and 1970s. At the nation’s founding, only 
the landed aristocracy, about 10 to 16 percent of the nation's population, had the right to vote. This reflected 
the widely held idea that only educated citizens were capable of wisely leading and influencing the 
activities of government. It would take almost two centuries before all citizens of legal voting age would be 
allowed the rights of suffrage without any obstacles.  
Religious prerequisites for voting were eliminated in 1810, and by the 1850s, property ownership and 
tax requirements were also eliminated, thereby extending voting rights to almost all adult white male 
citizens. In 1870, the 15th Amendment to the Constitution was passed. In theory, this amendment gave 
former slaves the right to vote, thus protecting the voting rights of most adult male citizens regardless of 
race. In practice, however, a series of impediments such as literacy tests, poll taxes and grandfather clauses 
were often instituted to keep black males from voting. In 1920, voting rights were extended to women with 
the passage of the 19th Amendment. In 1924, the Indian Citizenship Act granted all Native Americans the 
rights of citizenship, including the right to vote in federal elections. Finally, in 1971, the 26th Amendment 
set the minimum voting age at 18. 
Despite the establishment of voting rights, there were still problems in gaining access to those rights. 
Beginning in the late 1950s, efforts were made to ensure the guarantee of voting rights to all citizens. In 
1957, the Civil Rights Act was passed. This law was the first aimed at implementing the 15th Amendment; 
it established the Civil Rights Commission to investigate voter discrimination, among other duties. In 1965, 
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John Stuart Mill and have been seen in the New England town meetings for more than 
two centuries (Rimmerman, 2001). 
Participatory democracy emphasizes the broad involvement of constituents in the 
direction and operation of political systems. The word “democracy” implies that such 
governments would rely on and encourage the participation of their citizens; after all, its 
etymological roots are found in the Greek words demos and kratos, which combine to 
suggest that "the people rule." However, as noted in the previous chapter, traditional 
representative democracy tends to limit citizen participation to voting, leaving the main 
work of governance to professional political elite. Pateman (1970: 1) claims,  
the widely accepted theory of democracy (so widely accepted that one 
might call it the orthodox doctrine) is one in which the concept of 
participation has only the most minimal role. Indeed, not only has it a 
minimal role but a prominent feature of recent theories of democracy is 
the emphasis placed on the dangers inherent in widespread popular 
participation in politics.  
 
In contrast, the “theory of participatory democracy is built round the central 
assertion that individuals and their institutions cannot be considered in isolation from one 
another” (Pateman, 1970: 42). Participatory democracy seeks to broaden the range of 
people who have access to such opportunities; it strives to create opportunities for all 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Voting Rights Act was passed to protect the rights of minority voters and eliminate voting barriers such 
as the literacy test. The Act was expanded and renewed in 1970, 1975, and 1982. In 1966, poll taxes were 
found to be unconstitutional by Supreme Court, and in 1975, literacy requirements were permanently 
banned with the decision of Oregon v. Mitchell. The Supreme Court’s opinion was written by Judge Hugo 
Black, who cited the “long history of the discriminatory use of literacy tests to disenfranchise voters on 
account of their race" as the reason for the decision (for en excellent review of the history of the vote in 
America, see Keyssar, 2000).  
This brief history demonstrates that until relatively recently, the primary concerns about citizen 
participation were in gaining and guaranteeing the right of all citizens to vote for representation in 
government. Once these rights were firmly established, the debate about the role of the citizen in 
government changed drastically; a new debate emerged – one that was focused on the extent, character, and 
nature of citizen participation in the work of government. Until this point, the “dominant theory of 
American government [had] emphasized the representative nature of government instead of direct 
participation by the citizenry in day-to-day activities of the state” (Stewart, 1976: 1).  
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members of a political group to make meaningful contributions to all stages of public 
decision making.  
Democratic participation…is a process in which persons formulate, 
discuss, and decide public issues that are important to them and directly 
affect their lives. It is a process that is more or less continuous, conducted 
on a face-to-face basis, in which participants have roughly an equal say in 
all stages, from formulation of issues to the determination of policies. 
From this definition it follows that demonstrations, sit-ins, confrontations, 
and pressure group bargaining on the one hand, and voting, speech 
making, and campaigning on the other, do not, singly or together, 
constitute democratic participation. All these forms of political action are 
legitimate and essential attributes of a democratic polity, and some are 
important if not vital means to the realization of democratic participation. 
However, among other things, none of them affords the individual the 
opportunity to engage in the decision making process on a regular face-to-
face basis (Bachrach, 1975: 41). 
 
Deliberative democracy is closely related to participatory democracy; the primary 
difference concerns the extent and nature of deliberation or reasoned discussion among 
participants in the process – it is given more weight and emphasis in deliberative 
democracy than in participatory democracy. As Mansbridge (1995) notes,  
Recently the focus of many democratic theories has shifted from the 
educative functions of democracy to its deliberative functions. Each is the 
means to the other’s end. Good deliberation ought to educate the 
participants on their interests, clarifying both underlying conflicts and the 
good of the whole. Educated participants, in turn, will be more likely to 
produce good deliberation, which takes the ideas of each into account, 
fosters commonality when appropriate, indicates which issues the group 
handle [sic] with the methods of conflict, and creates, through the 
deliberative process, mutually satisfactory understandings. 
 
Despite the minor differences, deliberative democracy is heavily predicated on the theory 
of participatory democracy; thus, it makes sense, and is necessary, to start this theoretical 
examination with participatory democracy.  
As noted in the previous chapter, most participatory and deliberative democrats 
accept that some institutions of representation must exist for the system to function well; 
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the sheer size and scope of the polity makes a pure participative or deliberative system of 
governance all but impossible. However, many also argue that citizens need to be 
provided with greater institutional opportunities to participate in the decisions that affect 
their lives. The “moral imperative” of democracy means that 
each individual should have the right to participate in making decisions 
that significantly and directly affect his life. In the absence of this right 
and its effective exercise, the political system cannot be considered 
democratic: without them, the system cannot respond to the real interests 
of the people. In other words, when the boundaries between the social and 
the political sectors are set at a place that prevents the political system 
from facilitating the political development of all its citizens, then only 
those who have the private resources for this kind of development can 
articulate their real interests and cross the boundary into the political. A 
significant number are thus blocked from making the conversion from 
feelings and moods to articulated preferences (Bachrach, 1975: 44). 
 
A primary reason for the argument in favor of participatory and deliberative 
democracy is that such experiences have beneficial effects on individuals’ moral and 
political development, and otherwise transform citizens in positive ways (e.g., Barber, 
1984; Elster, 1998; Fearon, 1998; Mansbridge, 1980, 1995; Mason, 1982; Morrell, 1998; 
Pateman, 1970; Thompson, 1970). The development of  
the necessary individual attitudes and psychological qualities…takes place 
through the process of participation itself. The major function of 
participation in the theory of participatory democracy is therefore an 
educative one, educative in the very widest sense, including both the 
psychological aspect and the gaining of practice in democratic skills and 
procedures (Pateman, 1970: 42). 
 
Thus, according to participatory and deliberative theorists, democratic participation has 
intrinsic value: 
were individuals more broadly empowered, especially in the institutions 
that have the most impact on their everyday lives (workplaces, schools, 
local governments, etc.), their experiences would have transformative 
effects: they would become more public-spirited, more tolerant, more 
knowledgeable, more attentive to the interests of others, and more probing 
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of their own interests. These transformations would improve the workings 
of higher-level representative institutions, as well as mitigate – if not 
remove – the threats democracy is held to pose to rights, pluralism, and 
governability (Warren, 1992: 8).  
 
In other words, “participation is an essential means for the individual to discover his real 
needs through the intervening discovery of himself as a social human being” (Bachrach, 
1975: 40; see also Cunningham, 2002). This “self-transformation thesis” rests on three 
assumptions that stand in contrast to those of standard liberal democracy.  
The first is that increased democracy transforms individualistic and 
conflicting interests into common and nonconflicting ones, in the process 
developing capacities of citizenship that reduce factional threats to rights 
and pluralism. Second, because these transformations reduce conflict, they 
allow reduced use of power as a medium of political interaction. This 
would increase consensus and governability, as well as being desirable in 
its own right. Third, far from being a threat to the dimensions of the self 
protected by rights and freedoms, democracy is necessary to the values of 
self-development, autonomy, and self-governance – the values that rights 
and freedoms presumably are designed to protect (Warren, 1992: 8).  
 
Carole Pateman (1970) is often credited with both sowing the seeds of this self-
transformation thesis and providing one of the clearest arguments about the possible 
beneficial effects of participation for citizens. However, as Mansbridge (1995) points out, 
it was Arnold Kaufman (1960: 272) who coined the phrase “participatory democracy,” 
and explained its intrinsic value, arguing that 
democracy of participation may have many beneficial consequences, but 
its main justifying function is and always has been, not the extent to which 
it protects or stabilizes a community, but the contribution it can make to 
the development of human powers of thought, feeling and action. 
 
In her seminal work, Participation and Democratic Theory, Pateman (1970) refined the 
concept of democratic participation so that it required equal power for it to have 
beneficial effects (Mansbridge, 1995). Pateman (1970) asserts that a more participatory 
democratic society would affect citizens in three areas: education, integration, and 
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acceptance of decisions. Most relevant to this dissertation is the suggestion that 
participatory democracy has an “educative effect” on citizens. 
As a result of participating in decision making the individual is educated 
to distinguish between his own impulses and desires, he learns to be a 
public as well as a private citizen…Once the participatory system is 
established, and this is a major importance, it becomes self-sustaining 
because the very qualities that are required of individual citizens if the 
system is to work successfully are those that the process of participation 
itself develops and fosters; the more the individual citizen participates the 
better able he is to do so (Pateman, 1970: 25, footnote omitted).  
 
In essence, Pateman’s (1970: 45) argument is that “the experience of participation in 
some way leaves the individual better psychologically equipped to undertake further 
participation in the future.” Pateman and other participatory and deliberative scholars root 
their theories in the work of Rousseau and Mill.  
 Pateman (1970: 22) suggests that “Rousseau might be called the theorist par 
excellence of participation.” For Rousseau, participation serves three purposes. First,  
the central function of participation in Rousseau’s theory is an educative 
one, using the term ‘education’ in the widest sense. Rousseau’s ideal 
system is designed to develop responsible, individual social and political 
action through the effect of the participatory process. During this process 
the individual learns that the word ‘each’ must be applied to himself; that 
is to say, he finds that he has to take into account wider matters than his 
own immediate private interests if he is to gain co-operation from others, 
and he learns that the public and private interest are linked (Pateman, 
1970: 24-25). 
 
Second, participation enables collective decisions to be more easily accepted by the 
individual. The “participatory process ensures that although no man, or group, is master 
of another, all are equally dependent on each other and equally subject to the law. The 
(impersonal) rule of law that is made possible through participation and its connection 
with ‘being one’s own master’” leads Rousseau to think that “individuals will 
conscientiously accept a law arrived at through a participatory decision-making process” 
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(Pateman, 1970: 27).  Finally, the participation “experience attaches the individual to his 
society and is instrumental in developing it into a true community”; therefore, 
participation “increases the feeling among individual citizens that they ‘belong’ in their 
community” (Pateman, 1970: 27). 
 For Rousseau, the most important aspect of participation is the discovery and 
identification of the general will. The idea is that “[b]y genuinely willing what is good for 
all, human beings can take up a new identity as part of a larger whole, and can experience 
the laws that result not as coercion, but as emanations from the better part of their beings” 
(Mansbridge, 1995). This argument is reflected in the works of various participatory and 
deliberative democrats who assert that deliberation helps people to clarify, understand, 
and refine their own positions on issues, begin to think beyond their own self-interest, to 
include greater concern for others and their community, and enhance mutual respect, 
recognition, and empathy to create greater understanding among persons with divergent 
preferences, as well as more tolerance for opposing views (see Chapter 2; see also Elster, 
1998; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 2004; Habermas, 1984, 1990; Sandel, 1996). As 
Pateman (1970: 23-24) explains,  
the only policy that will be acceptable to all is the one where any benefits 
and burdens are equally shared; the participatory process ensures that 
political equality is made effective in the decision-making assembly. The 
substantive policy result is that the general will is, tautologically, always 
just (i.e., affects all equally) so that at the same time individual rights and 
interests are protected and the public interest furthered. The law has 
‘emerged’ from the participatory process and it is the law, not men, that 
governs individual actions. 
 
Rousseau (1953) believes that certain precautions must be taken for the general 
will to be discovered: factions must be prevented and limited (29-30) and there must be a 
rough equality of wealth among citizens (55). These arguments may sound familiar as 
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they were articulated widely during the founding of the American Republic. They are 
also shared by some theorists of participatory democracy. For example, Bachrach (1975) 
requires that all participants possess an approximately equal amount of power resources 
in the formulation of issues and in the decision-making process. However, recognizing 
that this is all but impossible to achieve in practice, he suggests three standards for 
judging the degree to which a particular form of political participation is likely to expose 
or conceal interests: 
1. Whether new issues important to non-elites reach the decision making agenda 
and are seriously debated and considered; 
2. Whether the pattern of decisions manifest a shift in the structure of power in 
the sub polity in favor of non-elites; and  
3. Whether the pattern of policy outputs reflects a more equitable allocation of 
values between established elites and non-elites (Mansbridge, 1995). 
Rousseau also asserts that the proper discovery of the general will requires that 
citizens do not communicate with one another in decision making processes. “If the 
people were sufficiently well-informed, and if in their deliberations the citizens held no 
communication with one another, the general will would always result from the large 
number of small differences, and the deliberations would always be good” (Rousseau, 
1953: 29). Thus, while Rousseau favors participation, he opposes deliberation 
(Mansbridge, 1995). It is on this point that Rousseau’s theory conflicts with modern 
participatory theory. Like modern participatory and deliberative theorists, Rousseau 
agrees that citizens must think about the course of action that best conforms to the 
general will; however, unlike modern participatory theorists, Rousseau asserts that 
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citizens must not communicate with each other during decision making, as 
communication may serve only private interests and distort perceptions about the general 
will (Morrell, 1998).  
It is important to note that deliberation can occur at two levels: “Deliberation, on 
the individual level, is defined as ‘careful consideration with a view to decision’ and, on 
the institutional level as ‘consideration and discussion of the reasons for and against a 
measure by a number of councilors (e.g. in a legislative assembly)’” (Gutmann, 1987: 52, 
footnote omitted). For Rousseau, the proper locus of deliberation is at the institutional 
level (i.e., the assembly); for participatory and deliberative democrats, both individual 
and institutional deliberation are essential (Morrell, 1998). This closer examination 
reveals that Rousseau’s theories about participation are in some ways inimical to modern 
participatory theories. In particular, Rousseau’s social contract theory diverges from 
modern participatory theories in at least three ways: “Rousseau’s’ discussion of the 
improvement of citizens centers on the role of the legislator and other non-deliberative 
institutions; the people Rousseau claims are open to the social contract are limited and 
unavailable in contemporary society; and most important, participation in the social 
contract does not include dialogic deliberation among citizens (Morrell, 1998: 7).  
Given these difficulties with Rousseau, Pateman (1970) turns to John Stuart Mill 
for the further development of her participatory theory. Mill (1865: 21) recognizes a need 
for some system of representation in government, but also argues that the best form of 
government affords citizens “a voice” in the exercise of sovereignty, where “at least 
occasionally, [citizens are] called on to take an actual part in the government, by the 
personal discharge of some public function, local or general.” Unlike Rousseau, Mill 
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explicitly acknowledges that if political participation is intended to improve citizens, then 
it must include communication during citizen decision making. Specifically, Mill (1965: 
763) cites “institutions for lectures and discussion” and “collective deliberations on 
questions of common interest” as forums for increasing the intellectual faculties of 
citizens (Morrell, 1998).  
Mill (1865: 22) identifies two criteria for good government: “how far it 
[government] promotes the good management of the affairs of society by means of the 
existing faculties, moral, intellectual, and active, of its various members, and what is its 
effect in improving or deteriorating those faculties.” For, participation allows for the best 
management of public affairs because it improves citizens’ active, intellectual, and moral 
faculties. Participation in a democratic polity develops an ‘active character’ because it 
gives citizens a voice -- a say -- in the operations of their government (Morrell, 1998). 
Mill (1865: 26) argues that people with active characters are the “best hopes for the 
general improvement of mankind,” because they “are those who, in the long run, do most 
to make the world better.” Mill (1865) also asserts that participation in public affairs 
improves the intellectual capacities of citizens by giving them both the incentive and 
opportunity to become educated about public matters. For proof of this assertion, he 
looks to ancient Athens, where “the practice of the dicastery and the ecclesia raised the 
intellectual standard of an average Athenian citizen far beyond anything of which there is 
yet an example in any other mass of men, ancient or modern” (1865: 27).4 Finally, Mill 
argues that participation improves the moral faculties of individuals. 
                                                 
4 The ecclesia was the assembly in which all citizens directly made decisions about public issues and the 
dicastery was the jury system in which large numbers, often 500, decided suits brought against other 
citizens. 
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Still more salutary is the moral part of the instruction afforded by the 
participation of the private citizen, if even rarely, in public functions. He is 
called upon, while so engaged, to weigh interests not his own; to be 
guided, in case of conflicting claims, by another rule than his private 
partialities; to apply, at every turn, principles and maxims which have for 
their reason of existence the common good: and he usually finds 
associated with him in the same work minds more familiarized than his 
own with these ideas and operations, whose study it will be to supply 
reasons to his understanding, and stimulation to his feeling for the general 
interest. He is made to feel himself one of the public, and whatever is for 
their benefit to be for his benefit. Where this school of public spirit does 
not exist, scarcely any sense is entertained that private persons, in no 
eminent social situation, owe any duties to society, except to obey the laws 
and submit to the government. There is no unselfish sentiment of 
identification with the public. Every thought or feeling, either of interest 
or of duty, is absorbed in the individual and in the family (Mill, 1865: 27-
28).  
 
The brunt of Mill’s argument is that moral improvement occurs through a 
psychology of associations where individuals first take into account interests other than 
their own private or family concerns, come in contact with others whose perceptions on 
issues are more developed, and create an “identification with the public” such that one’s 
neighbor is seen as an “ally or associate” (Mill, 1865: 28). Mill believes that the 
educative effect of participation works through the vote and public office (Mansbridge, 
1995). 
It is by political discussion that the manual labourer, whose employment is 
a routine, and whose way of life brings him in contact with no variety of 
impressions, circumstances, or ideas, is taught that remote causes, and 
events which take place far off, have a most sensible effect even on his 
personal interests; and it is from political discussion, and collective 
political action, that one whose daily occupations concentrate his interests 
in a small circle round himself, learns to feel for and with his fellow-
citizens, and becomes consciously a member of a great community (Mill, 
1865: 67). 
 
Like Mill, Cole (1919, 1920a, 1920b) advocates a theory of associations, and 
claims that it is within these associations that individuals ‘learn democracy’ (for a 
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detailed discussion of Cole’s theories, see Pateman, 1970: 35-42). Cole defines society as 
a “complex of associations held together by the wills of their members” (1920b: 12) and 
“assume[s] that the object of social organisation is not merely material efficiency, but 
also essentially the fullest self-expression of all the members” (1920a: 208). In this view, 
self-expression “involves self-government” and requires efforts to “call forth the people’s 
full participation in the common direction in the affairs of the community” (Cole, 1920a: 
208). According to Cole, if an individual is to be self-governing, then he has to be able to 
participate in decision making in all the associations of which he is a member, and the 
associations themselves have to be free to control their own affairs (Pateman, 1970: 36). 
Thus, like Rousseau, Cole (1919: 182) believes that the individual is “most free when he 
co-operates with his equals in the making of laws.” Moreover, Cole believes that the 
educational function of participation is crucial (Pateman, 1970). He advocates “the 
constant participation of the ordinary man in the conduct of those parts of the structure of 
Society with which he is directly concerned, and which he has therefore the best chance 
of understanding” (Cole, 1920a: 114).  
As Morrell (1998) discusses, despite the strengths of Mill’s concepts of 
participation, his theories do present problems for modern conceptions of deliberation 
and participation. It is worth briefly noting these issues. First, Mill does not provide an 
institutional model of participation that is practical and practicable in modern society 
(Morrell, 1998). Mill (1865: 27) identifies juries and parish offices as examples of 
institutions in which participatory education can occur. However,  
[t]here will never be enough juries, especially in large nation-states, for 
participation in them to create the changes Mill desires…The same holds 
true for parish offices, but with an additional problem. Officials at the 
local level are either elected or appointed, and, therefore, persons holding 
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these offices must either seek them out or be sought out for them (Morrell, 
1998: 17).  
 
Second, Mill believes that political participation is valuable not because it gives 
citizens avenues of control over their lives, but because it educates citizens to recognize 
and identify the wisest members of society (Morrell, 1998). In other words, participation 
causes an “increase in intelligence” and a “progress of … mental cultivation” that gives 
the masses the intellectual capacity to “judge for themselves of the persons who are and 
are not entitled” to deference and power in political decision making (Mill, 1965: 765). 
This argument for a political elite is inconsistent with contemporary participatory 
democratic thought, although at some level, it is consistent with modern pressures for 
professional, technocratic policy making. Nevertheless, as Pateman (1970: 33) notes, 
Mill’s “educationally crucial local political level might give scope for direct participation 
in decision making.” For Mill, the real educative effects of participation are most likely to 
occur at the local level, because local issues most directly affect people and their 
everyday lives, and one has the best chance of serving on a local body (Pateman, 1970). 
In sum, theorists of participatory and deliberative democracy assert that 
participatory political action should have beneficial and positive effects on the 
individual’s moral and political development (e.g., Mansbridge, 1980, 1995; Mason, 
1982; Pateman, 1970; Thompson, 1970). Thus, irrespective of the value of participatory 
and deliberative democracy in promoting or achieving “instrumental” goals (Parry, 
1972), participatory and deliberative scholars advocate for higher levels of mass 
participation because of its value in terms of individual self-actualization and its positive 
effects on human character (Finkel, 1985). As Pateman (1970: 24-25), notes  
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the central feature of participation is an educative one, using the term 
education in the widest sense. [The system] is designed to develop 
responsible individual social and political action through the effect of the 
participatory process … The human results that accrue through the 
participatory process provide an important justification for a participatory 
system. 
 
The key psychological variable that reflects these “human results” is the “sense of 
political efficacy” (Finkel 1985; Mansbridge, 1995; Pateman, 1970). The next section of 
the chapter examines the specific theoretical links between participatory and deliberative 
democracy and perceptions of political efficacy.  
 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL EFFICACY 
Scholars have yet to develop a clear and concise theory of how participation 
affects perceptions of political efficacy5; however, Carole Pateman (1970), looking 
primarily at the work of John Stuart Mill, provides a strong argument for the 
operationalization of political efficacy in participatory and deliberative democracy. As 
explained in the previous section, Mill believes that participation develops an ‘active 
character’ in citizens. Pateman (1970) asserts that this concept of an “active character” is 
akin to the modern concept of political efficacy. Several scholars agree with this 
operationalization (e.g., Finkel, 1985; Mansbridge, 1995; Morrell, 1998, 2003). Pateman 
(1970: 45-46) notes, “If one is to be self-governing … then certain psychological 
qualities are clearly necessary. For example, the belief that one can be self-governing, 
and confidence in one’s ability to participate responsibly and effectively, and to control 
one’s life and environment would certainly seem to be required.” Although she 
acknowledges that it does not fully capture the educative effects of participation, she does 
                                                 
5 For an excellent discussion about the theoretical effects of deliberative and participatory democracy on 
political efficacy (in addition to their effects on tolerance and empathy), see Morrell, 1998.  
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understand “the sense of political efficacy or competence to be an operational 
interpretation of, or at any rate part of, the psychological effect referred to by the theorists 
of participatory democracy” (Pateman, 1970: 46). This articulation resulted in the 
concept of political efficacy becoming the major psychological quality and educative 
effect that participation should develop (Mansbridge, 1995). 
As Morrell (1998) discusses, the core idea of participatory theory is that when 
provided with opportunities to participate in public decision making, citizens will develop 
a propensity to actively address the problems they face. Without such opportunities to 
address and engage in discussions of public policy, citizens are “reduced to plead from 
outside the door to the arbiters of their destiny, not taken into consultation within” (Mill, 
1865: 27). As one participates in politics, s/he acquires political skills and perceptions of 
self-competence, which are thought to be qualities necessary for popular self-government 
and effective control over one’s environment. As Pateman (1970: 26) explains, an 
“individual’s actual, as well as his sense of, freedom is increased through participation in 
decision making because it gives him a very real degree of control over the course of his 
life and the structure of his environment.” In addition, the development of this attitude 
makes it more likely that individuals will participate in the future. Thus, participation 
creates a circular causal process (Finkel, 1985) whereby “[p]articipation develops and 
fosters the very qualities necessary for it; the individuals participate, the better able they 
become to do so” (Pateman, 1970: 42-43). 
This articulation of the educative effect of participation most closely resembles 
internal political efficacy, which reflects feelings about one’s competence and ability to 
participate effectively in government and politics. Participatory theorists also evoke the 
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concept of external political efficacy, which reflects perceptions about the responsiveness 
of the political system. The development of ‘active character’ requires not only 
opportunities for participation, but also a belief that participation will be effective. Mill 
(1865: 26) notes, “Endeavour is even more effectually restrained by the certainty of its 
impotence, than by any positive discouragement.” Moreover, because individuals feel 
that “success depends on the impression he can make upon the sentiments and 
dispositions of a body of whom he is not one” the “maximum of the invigorating effect of 
freedom upon the character is only obtained, when the person acted on either is, or is 
looking forward to becoming, a citizen as fully privileged as any other” (Mill, 1865: 27). 
In other words, the development of internal political efficacy must be accompanied by the 
development of external efficacy; to feel confident and competent, one must also feel that 
participation matters, that government is listening and will be responsive.  
As Finkel (1985: 893-894) notes, the effects of participation on external political 
efficacy can be well understood with the “mobilization of support” theory, articulated by 
scholars such has Ginsberg (1982), Weissberg (1975), and Wright (1976). Mobilization 
theorists assert that participation should increase the belief that regime authorities are 
responsive to attempted influence from citizens (Craig, 1979). The idea is that 
participation will promote citizens’ feelings of legitimacy toward the political system and 
increase acquiescence to government (Finkel, 1985). In turn, regime stability is enhanced 
by “inducing citizens to believe that the government is responsive to their own needs and 
wishes” (Ginsberg, 1982: 182) and by “encouraging [citizens] to believe that they are 
ultimately controlling the government …and keeping them committed to the existing 
system” (Olsen, 1982: 6). Indeed, external political efficacy has been closely linked to 
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feelings of trust in political authorities (Balch, 1974), the concept of diffuse political 
support (Easton, 1965, 1975), and more generalized support for the political system 
(Iyengar, 1980).  
Finally, it is important to note that participation must be structured in a certain 
way for it to have the transformational effects predicted by participatory theorists 
(Morrell, 1999). Conflict resolution theorists have long recognized that dispute resolution 
structures affect functional outcomes, and have suggested that interest-based systems are 
more effective and less costly than rights-based procedures (e.g., Costantino and 
Merchant, 1996;  Ury, Brett, and Goldberg, 1988). Participatory scholars have also 
asserted that institutional features and designs affect outcomes (e.g., Kaufman, 1960), 
particularly in workplace settings (Form, 1973; Greenberg, Grunberg, and Daniel, 1996; 
Lipset, 1962; Pateman, 1970; Sheppard and Herrick, 1972; Sobel, 1993). Indeed, 
Kaufman (1960: 272) asserts that “different institutional forms of democracy may be and 
are defended on the basis of different functional outcomes.” It holds then that the design 
features of deliberative processes are also likely to affect outcomes. 
While some scholars theorize about how the design choices of deliberative 
processes affect outcomes (e.g., Fung, 2003, 2005; see also Fung and Wright, 2003), 
others look beyond the institutions in which participation takes place and examine the 
democratic structure of participation (e.g., Barber, 1984). For example, Benjamin Barber 
(1984) asserts that the participatory structure must be in harmony with the norms of 
strong democracy to have beneficial effects on citizens (Morrell, 1998). He argues that 
contemporary liberal democracy is “thin democracy” and is based on poor conceptual, 
epistemological, and psychological frames. According to Barber (1984), liberal, “thin” 
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democracy reduces politics to bargaining and exchange, and thus limits the effects 
participation can have on citizens. In contrast, “strong democracy” (as can be found in 
participatory and deliberative democracy) emphasizes the power of politics to transform 
citizens. 
The stress on transformation is at the heart of the strong democratic 
conception of politics. Every politics confronts the competition of private 
interests and the conflict that competition engenders. But where liberal 
democracy understands politics as a means of eliminating conflict (the 
anarchist disposition), repressing it (the realist disposition) or tolerating it 
(the minimalist disposition), strong democracy also aspires to transform 
conflict through a politics of distinctive inventiveness and discovery. It 
seeks to create a public language that will help reformulate private 
interests in terms susceptible to public accommodation (see Chapter 8); 
and it aims at understanding individuals not as abstract persons but as 
citizens, so that commonality and equality rather than separateness are the 
defining traits of human society (see Chapter 9) (Barber, 1984: 119). 
  
Barber (1984) asserts that the transformative power of strong democracy comes 
from the use of “strong democratic talk” as the process of decision making. Strong 
democratic talk serves nine functions: (1) the articulation of interests, bargaining and 
exchange; 2) persuasion; 3) agenda-setting; 4) exploring mutuality; 5) affiliation and 
affection; 6) maintaining autonomy; 7) witness and self-expression; 8) reformulation and 
reconceptualization; and 9) community-building as the creation of public interests, 
common goods, and active citizens (Barber, 1984: 178). Although the first two functions 
are found in liberal democracy, the remaining functions are “muted and undervalued in 
liberal theory” (Barber, 1984: 178). In contrast to liberal democracy, which reduces 
political talk to political speech, strong democratic talk emphasizes listening and 
empathizing with fellow citizens such that individuals are able to create mutual 
understanding with others. In its emphasis on the “mutualistic art of listening” (Barber, 
1984: 175), strong democratic talk is implicitly connected to interest-based conflict 
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resolution theory. More specifically, strong democratic talk, as one might find in the 
“talk-centric” approach of deliberative democracy (Chamber, 2003: 308), is similar to the 
concept of principled, or interest-based negotiation (Fisher and Ury, 1981; Fisher, Ury, 
and Patton, 1991). Indeed, the potential transformative power of deliberative democracy 
is inherently connected to the skills necessary in conflict resolution work: “Conflict-
resolution skills, practices, and processes can contribute to the quality of deliberation by 
assisting participants in expressing their preferences and reconciling differences in them” 
(Bingham, Nabatchi, and O’Leary, 2005: 553). 
 Barber (1984) argues that direct participation is intrinsically beneficial and can 
solve two related problems of the citizenship deficit: citizens’ disinterest in politics and 
their inability to make good public decisions. Moreover, strong democracy and direct 
political participation can presumably contribute to both internal and external political 
efficacy. In terms of internal political efficacy, participation in strong democracy can 
induce a cooperative and active public, or as Mill would call it, a public with an active 
character. Barber (1984: 236) quotes de Tocqueville to strengthen this point: “the most 
powerful and perhaps the only means that we still possess of interesting men in the 
welfare of their country is to make them partakers in the government … civic zeal seems 
to me to be inseparable from the exercise of political right.” In terms of external political 
efficacy, Barber (1984) asserts that citizens must believe their participation will be 
effective if they are to engage in politics. “Of course when participation is neutered by 
being separated from power, then civic action will be only a game and its rewards will 
seem childish to women and men of the world; they will prefer to spend their time in the 
‘real’ pursuits of private interests” (Barber, 1984: 236). 
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Although many have argued that deliberative democracy can increase perceptions 
of political efficacy (see for example Luskin and Fishkin, 2003; Fearon, 1998), as 
discussed later in this chapter, relatively little empirical research on this issue has been 
conducted (Bowler and Donovan, 2002). Nevertheless, since deliberative democracy 
processes are intended to serve a citizen education function, it is reasonable to expect 
them to increase internal political efficacy. Likewise, since deliberative democracy 
processes are generally intended to be a method of direct political participation, we can 
expect them to increase external political efficacy. The following section details these 
expectations in regard to the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting.   
 
THE AMERICASPEAKS 21ST CENTURY TOWN MEETING 
AmericaSpeaks is a nonprofit organization based in Washington, D.C. Its mission 
is to engage citizens in public decision making at every level of government 
(Lukensmeyer, Goldman, and Brigham, 2005; see also www.americaspeaks.org). To 
achieve its mission, AmericaSpeaks created the 21st Century Town Meeting, a 
deliberative process that enables large groups of citizens (from 100 to 5,000+) to 
simultaneously participate in deliberation around a specific policy issue in a particular 
political community, whether at the local, state, or national level (Lukensmeyer and 
Brigham, 2005). The goals of the 21st Century Town Meeting (hereafter referred to as the 
“Town Meeting”) are to engage large, demographically representative groups in public 
deliberation and to ensure that: (1) all voices are at the table (those of the general public 
and those of key stakeholders), 2) the priorities of the public get the attention of decision 
makers and the media, and 3) a substantial segment of the public supports the results of 
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the forum and has a stake it its implementation (Lukensmeyer, Goldman, and Brigham, 
2005: 157). The next following sections discuss the general Town Meeting process and 
its specific design features. 
 
The Town Meeting Process  
The Town Meeting has several critical components: (1) diverse participants; 2) 
neutral materials; 3) facilitated table deliberation; 4) participation technology; 5) 
immediate reporting and theming; and 6) links to decision makers (for a detailed 
discussion, see Lukensmeyer, Goldman, and Brigham, 2005; Lukensmeyer and Brigham, 
2005; see also www.americaspeaks.org). First, although participants are to some extent 
self-selecting, AmericaSpeaks works closely with sponsors to conduct widespread 
outreach and targeted recruitment. The goal of these activities is to ensure diversity 
among participants and to assemble a large group of citizens that resembles the 
demographic makeup of the community. Second, all participants receive materials that 
neutrally detail and balance the perspectives on the issue(s) under consideration. This 
material helps ensure that participants come to the table with at least a basic knowledge 
of the issues to be discussed. 
A third component of the Town Meeting is facilitated table deliberation; 
participants are randomly assigned to tables that seat between ten and twelve people 
including a trained facilitator who helps keep the dialogue on target. This component 
ensures small group discussion, thus, meeting the required characteristics of deliberative 
democracy (see Chapter 2), as well as the Habermasian criteria for an ideal speech 
situation (Habermas, 1984, 1990). The fourth and fifth features of the Town Meeting are 
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participation technology, including networked computers and polling keypads, and 
immediate reporting and theming. Each table is equipped with a networked laptop 
computer that serves as a ‘flipchart’ to generate an instant record of the ideas produced 
by participants at the table. This helps ensure that all voices are heard and that no ideas 
get lost in the discussion. The ideas recorded on each laptop are transmitted to a central 
database, where they are distilled and brought back to the entire body of participants for 
further discussion. This is called facilitated theming. Members of a “Theme Team” read 
the comments from each laptop in real time, and distill them into key themes, ideas, or 
messages. The themes are then presented back to all participants in the room to “build 
collective ownership of the group’s work” (Lukensmeyer, Goldman, and Brigham, 2005: 
159). In addition, each participant in the Town Meeting is given a wireless polling 
keypad for voting on issues and comparing personal positions to those of other 
participants. This use of electronic technology enables AmericaSpeaks to gather, distill, 
and articulate themes and allows participants to move between intimate, small-scale table 
deliberations and collective, large-scale group discussions. 
The final element of the Town Meeting is its link to decision makers. 
AmericaSpeaks works closely with sponsoring organizations to help ensure that decision 
makers are also participants in the process. Discussion questions and keypad votes are 
designed to generate information that will be useful to both decision makers and the 
decision making process. In turn, decisions makers pledge (and are expected) to seriously 
review and consider the input of participants.  
With these components in place, the 21st Century Town Meeting begins. There are 
brief opening comments from key political and civic leaders to set the context for the 
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day’s deliberation. Participants are then guided through the use of the polling keypads; a 
series of demographic questions are asked to teach people how the keypads work and to 
provide a demographic picture of participants. The next step is facilitated table 
discussions around a vision or values. This allows participants to gain clarity and to 
identify what is important to them with regard to the topic(s). Over the next several 
hours, participants engage in intensive deliberation about key issues and policy options. 
As each issue or option is discussed, information from each table’s laptop is transmitted 
to the “theme team” for distillation and then presented back to the entire room for 
clarification, modification, and voting. The Town Meeting concludes with an evaluation 
of the day and a review of next steps. Key decision makers are provided an opportunity to 
comment on the day’s work. Finally, all participants, including key political decision 
makers, are provided with a report that summarizes the outcomes as developed and voted 
upon by participants.  
As Williamson (2004: 82) notes, “[i]n some ways, AmericaSpeaks provides an 
ideal model for reform in that it accomplishes so many of the goals of deliberation, by 
engaging a diverse group of citizens, allowing for meaningful face-to-face dialogue, 
enabling a large-group prioritization and decision-making, and ensuring that officials 
respond.” Despite the strengths of the 21st Century Town Meeting, important criticisms of 
the process should be noted. First, AmericaSpeaks claims that the 21st Century Town 
Meeting is a redesigned and scaled-up version of the traditional New England town 
meeting (Lukensmeyer, Goldman, and Brigham, 2005). However, Jane Mansbridge 
asserts that the 21st Century Town Meeting is fundamentally different from the traditional 
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New England town meeting6 (personal conversation with author, December 2006). In 
particular, she contends that in the traditional New England town meeting, participants 
are linked by long-term, intimate community relationships. These relationships are absent 
in the AmericaSpeaks model. In their place are discussions among relative strangers who 
have come together as almost anonymous members of the community. This 
fundamentally changes the composition, nature, and tenor of deliberation (for a 
discussion of these issues in the New England town meeting, see Mansbridge, 1980).  
Second, the issues to be considered at the Town Meeting are determined and 
formulated by those who contract with AmericaSpeaks to conduct the process. The 
contractors identify the issue(s) for deliberation, in conjunction with AmericaSpeaks, 
develop the "neutral" materials about the issue(s). These contractors are, in essence, the 
architects of, and power holders in, the process. To that end, they have the ability to 
determine the nature and scope of the deliberation, as well as the degree of empowerment 
that is given to participants in the process (e.g., Arnstein, 1969). Given that the 
deliberative content does not emerge deductively from the process, there exists the 
possibility for artificiality in the content of deliberation.  
Third, the Town Meeting process of moving back and forth between small group 
deliberation and large group discussion presents potential problems. The policy options 
that are ultimately presented to participants for voting are determined by a ‘theme team’ 
that is not part of the deliberative structure. This theme team has the power and control to 
filter and organize opinions and outcomes; thus, there exists a potential for 
misspecification of the participants’ preferences, or worse, manipulation or cooptation of 
those preferences. Similarly, the menu of vote options is multiple choice; there is no 
                                                 
6 Personal conversation with author, December 2006.  
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room for additional input beyond what can be entered into the electronic polling keypads. 
Thus, despite deliberation, policy options are presented as either/or voting choices. 
Finally, although the 21st Century Town Meeting has greater links to decision 
makers than most other deliberative democracy process, there are no guarantees that 
these officials will act upon the preferences of participants or follow through with the 
deliberated recommendations. Moreover, and as discussed below, there often exist few 
opportunities for citizens to monitor the extent of implementation progress, and no 
opportunities for citizens to enforce the recommendations, as they are not binding.  
Nevertheless, the design of the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting makes 
it an excellent deliberative process to study in this dissertation, as many of its design 
choices create a context within which one would expect to find evidence of the educative 
and efficacy effects promulgated by participatory and deliberative theorists. Archon Fung 
(2003, 2005) has done interesting theoretical work about how the design of a deliberative 
process functionally impacts outcomes. Fung (2005) asserts that deliberative democracy 
or direct participation efforts vary along three important dimensions: 1) who participates 
in deliberation; 2) how participants exchange information and make decisions; and 3) the 
link between the deliberations and policy or public action. In another article, Fung (2003) 
outlines eight institutional design choices and their functional consequences for 
democratic governance. These design choices are reviewed below and illustrated for the 
AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting.  
 
The Town Meeting Design 
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A first design choice concerns the ideal of the public sphere, or what a minipublic 
should do. Fung (2003) suggests several visions for minipublics, including serving as an 
educative forum, acting as a participatory advisory panel, collaborating through 
participatory problem-solving, and promoting participatory democratic governance. 
These visions can be arranged on a continuum of how they link deliberation to policy 
making or public action. Thus, for example, an educative forum, which “aims to create 
nearly ideal conditions for citizens to form, articulate, and refine opinions about 
particular public issues through conversations with one another,” is far less connected to 
policy or decision making than a minipublic that promotes participatory democratic 
governance, which “seeks to incorporate direct citizen voices into the determination of 
policy agendas” (Fung, 2003: 340, 342). While the Town Meeting serves an explicit 
educative function, it is better classified as a participatory problem-solving minipublic 
and/or as a minipublic that promotes participatory democratic governance.  
In terms of education, AmericaSpeaks works with sponsors to develop accessible, 
neutral guidebooks to help ensure that participants have adequate information to 
participate effectively in deliberation. The guidebooks are written in simple, clear 
language to help “people understand an issue and the diverse menu of options that 
policymakers are considering” (Lukensmeyer, Goldman, and Brigham, 2005: 158). The 
guidebooks are usually translated into multiple languages and mailed to registered 
participants before the Town Meeting. Guidebooks are also distributed throughout the 
community (e.g., to grocery stores and libraries), and circulated to local the press and 
media. The guidebooks are given to participants again at the Town Meeting, where they 
are supplemented with additional information such as presentations and videos. Beyond 
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these guidebooks, AmericaSpeaks asserts that the format of the Town Meeting has 
additional educative elements in that the process “gives citizens an opportunity to learn 
more about important public issues, hear a diversity of perspectives and understand 
critical trade-offs” (AmericaSpeaks, 2006).  
 Despite this educative element, the 21st Century Town Meeting is better 
classified as a participatory problem-solving minipublic. A critical component of the 
Town Meeting is that outcomes are tied directly to decision and policy making processes. 
Typically, a sponsor organization (or organizations) contracts with AmericaSpeaks to 
convene a Town Meeting around a specific issue facing a community. The sponsor is 
generally the public official or institution that has decision making authority on a given 
topic; however, sometimes a civic organization without decision making power will 
contract with AmericaSpeaks to convene a Town Meeting. In these cases, AmericaSpeaks 
works with the sponsoring organization(s) to bring decision makers into the process and 
to ensure that they are committed to responding to the outcomes of the Town Meeting as 
decided upon by the citizens (Lukensmeyer, Goldman, and Brigham, 2005).  
A second design choice involves participant selection and recruitment. Although 
the most common mechanism is voluntary self-selection, this is not typically the most 
inclusive selection mechanism, as those who decide to attend such events are generally 
wealthy, educated, and professional (Fung, 2003). Other options for participant selection 
include “affirmative action through recruitment” or trying to get participants that are 
demographically representative of the general community, and creating structural 
incentives for low-status and low-income citizens to participate (Fung, 2003: 342). The 
Town Meeting promotes large-scale, demographically representative public participation. 
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To ensure representativeness, AmericaSpeaks examines U.S. Census Bureau data and 
considers what, if any, special groups may need additional representation at the Town 
Meeting. AmericaSpeaks then uses active, targeted recruitment to ensure that all cross-
sections of the community are represented. Data collected from the polling keypads at the 
start of the Town Meeting is later compared to Census Bureau data to determine whether 
representativeness was achieved.  
A third design choice revolves around the subject and scope of deliberation, that 
is, what issue(s) the participants will consider. As Fung (2003: 343) notes, “the choice of 
subject importantly shapes the subsequent operation and impact of a minipublic. It 
determines what, if anything, citizens are likely to contribute in terms of insight, 
information, or resources in the course of participatory deliberation.” As noted earlier, 
AmericaSpeaks is contracted to create a deliberative forum around a specific policy issue 
that is important in a particular political community. Thus, the subject of deliberation is 
concrete, but the scope of discussion, though structured, is relatively flexible and open.  
A fourth consideration involves the mode of deliberation, or how discussions are 
styled and organized. For example, some deliberative processes aim to provide a space 
for participants to articulate and gain confidence in their positions; this is particularly 
useful in helping weaker groups find their voice (Fung, 2003). Other deliberative 
processes seek to generate consensus or to solve concrete problems; these processes 
structure dialogue differently. The deliberative mode of the Town Meeting moves 
between small and large group discussion. This format is important in helping 
participants to clarify their own positions, understand the positions of other citizens and 
provide feedback and policy options/solutions to officials.  
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A fifth design choice involves the recurrence and iteration of the deliberative 
process, or the frequency of meetings. Educative or participatory advisory panels tend to 
meet less frequently (and have less need to meet frequently) than those deliberative 
processes that seek to solve problems or engage in democratic governance. In general, the 
Town Meeting is a one-time affair; however, AmericaSpeaks generally encourages 
clients to create opportunities for future public deliberation on the same and related 
issues, albeit on a smaller scale.  
A sixth issue concerns why the deliberative process exists, or the stakes for 
participants. For example, the issue under discussion might affect the participants’ 
welfare or involve deeply held beliefs and values. The issue may be one of large-scale 
public controversy, or might be an issue in which they hold a personal interest. 
Regardless, the stakes for participants will impact the nature of discussion and 
deliberation, and thus, constitute an important design choice (Fung, 2003). In general, the 
stakes for participants in the Town Meeting process are moderate to high; the issues in 
deliberation are of significant political and social importance and interest in the 
community.  
A seventh design choice involves empowerment – or the degree to which a 
deliberative process influences public policy, decisions, or actions. This issue is a major 
point in arguments for empowered deliberative democracy, or deliberative processes that 
directly connect government or public action to deliberation (Fung and Wright, 2003). 
Intuitively, it is logical to assert that the degree of empowerment affects numerous other 
elements in the design of a deliberative process. For example, empowered participants 
may be more committed to engaging in productive deliberations because their stakes will 
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be higher. Likewise, if assured that their voices will be heard and used in public decision 
making, more community members may be willing to participate in the process. 
AmericaSpeaks seeks to ensure that policy makers are committed to the outcomes of the 
Town Meeting and that substantial segment of the public supports the 
results/recommendations and has a stake in implementation (Lukensmeyer, Goldman, 
and Brigham, 2005: 157). Thus, there are moderate to high levels of empowerment in the 
21st Century Town Meeting process. 
Finally, monitoring, or the extent to which a deliberative process promotes a 
longer-term review of the quality and level of implementation, is an important design 
choice. The expectation is that politicians and other government officials will take public 
deliberations seriously, and incorporate deliberative opinions and outcomes into 
subsequent decisions and actions. Although AmericaSpeaks generally does little in terms 
of follow-up after a Town Meeting, possibilities for monitoring and participation in 
future implementation are often generated as an outcome of the Town Meeting process. 
However, there are likely low to moderate levels of monitoring over the longer-term 
implementation of outcomes. 
Fung (2003) also examines these eight institutional design choices in relation to 
their functional consequences. Specifically, he connects design choices to civic 
engagement as quantity of participation, participation bias, quality of deliberation, 
informing officials, informing citizens, democratic skills and socialization, official 
accountability, justice of policy, effectiveness of public action, and popular mobilization. 
Each of these functional outcomes is explored below and examined within the context of 
the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting. 
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One group of potential benefits from public deliberation (civic engagement as 
quantity of participation, participation bias, and quality of deliberation) concerns the 
character of participation in a minipublic or deliberative process. As Fung (2003: 347) 
notes, “[b]y definition, all minipublics aim to increase civic engagement by drawing 
citizens to deliberate;” therefore, “the quantity of participation is an important measure of 
success.” Design characteristics such as frequency, selection and recruitment, the subject 
of deliberation, the stakes for participants, and the extent of empowerment of the 
minipublic all impact the potential quantity of participation. Participation bias concerns 
the overall profile of participants. Recruitment and selection efforts, the subject of 
deliberation, the stakes for participants and the extent of empowerment of the minipublic 
all impact the issue of participation bias. Quality deliberation is not only equal and 
inclusive, it also should be rational in the instrumental sense that individuals advance 
their own individual and collective ends through discussion, brainstorming, information-
pooling, planning and problem-solving. It should also be reasonable in the sense that 
participants respect the claims of others and constrain the pursuit of their own self-
interest according to the norms of justification (Fung, 2003: 348). Design characteristics 
such as the subject of deliberation, the deliberative mode, recurrence, monitoring, the 
stakes for participants, and the degree of empowerment affect the quality of deliberation. 
As noted above, the Town Meeting is designed to increase both the quantity of 
participation and the quality of deliberation and to reduce participation bias.  
A second set of potential benefits (official accountability, the justice of policy, 
and the effectiveness of public action) connect public deliberation to state action. Official 
accountability is affected by design choices such as the subject of deliberation, the mode 
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of deliberation, the level of empowerment and the degree of monitoring. The justice of 
public policy increases to the extent that a deliberative process allows “those who are 
politically weak or excluded to form, express, and press for their preferences and values” 
(Fung, 2004: 351). Design choices such as recruitment and selection, the subject of 
deliberation, the deliberative mode, and the level of empowerment all affect the potential 
contribution of deliberative processes to the justice of policy. Fung (2003: 351) asserts 
that deliberation can contribute to the efficacy of state action by: (1) creating 
“opportunities for those who will be subjected to a policy to criticize it, consider its 
justification, and perhaps to modify it”; 2) addressing policy areas where citizens have 
comparative advantages in terms of resources or information; and 3) helping to improve 
the details of implementation. Design choices such as the subject and mode of 
deliberation, the degree of empowerment and monitoring, and recurrence affect these 
potential benefits of deliberative processes. As noted earlier, a major goal of the Town 
Meeting is to connect the outcomes of public deliberation to state action; the “Town 
Meeting restores the citizens’ voice in public decision making by creating an opportunity 
for the general public to give those in leadership positions direct, substantive feedback on 
key public issues” (AmericaSpeaks, 2006). Thus, the Town Meeting process seeks to 
increase official accountability, the justice of policy, and the effectiveness of public 
action. 
Third, the popular mobilization of citizens is another potential benefit of public 
deliberation. Several design factors such as the subject of deliberation, the stakes for 
participants, the deliberative mode, recurrence, and the degree of empowerment and 
monitoring all affect the potential ability of deliberative processes to create and sustain 
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popular mobilization. Design choices such as the subject of deliberation, the deliberative 
mode, and empowerment all suggest that the Town Meeting will produce greater popular 
mobilization; however, other design features such as low recurrence and monitoring, 
suggest that popular mobilization may not be sustained over the long-term.  
A final group of potential benefits from public deliberation concerns informing 
both officials and citizens, and fostering the dispositions and skills of citizenship. 
Advocates of deliberative democracy assert that it can help politicians, public 
administrators, and other officials gain information. The purpose and vision of the 
minipublic, the subject of deliberation, recurrence and monitoring are design 
characteristics that contribute to the ability of public deliberation to inform officials. 
Similarly, design characteristics such as the subject of deliberation, stakes for 
participants, and empowerment affect the ability of deliberative processes to inform 
citizens. A final contribution in this group concerns the function of deliberative processes 
as “schools of democracy where individual acquire the skills of citizenship” (Fung, 2003: 
350). The degree of empowerment, the stakes of participants, and the recurrence of 
deliberation all affect the potential of a deliberative process to affect democratic skills 
and socialization. The design of the Town Meeting suggests that it will be effective in 
informing officials and citizens and in fostering the dispositions and skills of citizenship. 
As indicated in the above discussion, and explained further in the next chapter, the design 
choices for the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting make the process an excellent 
candidate with which to assess the impacts of deliberation on citizens’ perceptions of 
internal and external political efficacy. 
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EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
This section of the chapter reviews the research on participation and efficacy. 
Despite a resurgence in the popularity of deliberative democracy and the calls for more 
studies (e.g., Boyte, 2005; Elster, 1998; Gastil and Levine, 2005; Gutmann and 
Thomspon, 2004; Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003), empirical research on deliberative 
democracy has lagged behind both theory (Delli Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs, 2004) and 
practice (Bingham, O’Leary, Nabatchi, 2005). Moreover, little systematic research and 
evaluation has been conducted specifically on the effects of deliberation on political 
efficacy. Thus, while the promises of deliberative democracy may be reasonable and 
compelling, they remain largely untested. Therefore, this review of the empirical 
literature is broadened to search for the potential effects of participation and deliberation 
on political efficacy. Accordingly, this review of the research is divided into six sections. 
The first three sections explore various areas of research regarding participation and 
political efficacy, including: 1) participation in traditional political activities in 
representative systems (i.e., voting, campaign activities, protest activities); 2) 
participation in workplace/industrial democracy; and 3) direct participation (i.e., ballot 
initiatives, referenda, town meetings). The final two sections look at research more 
specific to deliberative democracy processes, including research that examines 4) 
evidence of any effects of deliberative democracy processes on the skills and dispositions 
of citizenship, and 5) evidence that relates specifically to the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century 
Town Meeting. In an effort to avoid cross-national differences, only studies conducted in 
the U.S. are examined.  
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Participation in Traditional Political Activities 
As noted previously, political efficacy is defined as the “feeling that individual 
political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process” (Campbell, 
Gurin and Miller, 1954: 187). Using this definition, Eulau and Schneider (1956) were 
among the first to explore the concept of political efficacy. They assert that participation 
in politics is determined by the degree to which an individual has internalized political 
expectations (i.e., ‘efficacy’) and the degree to which the individual appraises his or her 
role as being politically significant and effective (i.e., ‘relatedness’). They combine these 
two dimensions of political involvement into an ‘index of political relatedness.’ Using 
data from the 1952 U.S. election, they find that those more highly related to the political 
process are  
more sensitive to differences between the parties, more issue orientated, 
more concerned about the outcome of the election, more partisan on 
issues, more partisan in their choice of candidates, more likely to have 
strong party identifications, more interested in the campaign, know more, 
are more exposed to the mass media, more likely to vote and otherwise 
participate in the campaign, know more, are more exposed to the mass 
media, more likely to vote and otherwise participate in the campaign, than 
the less related (Eulau and Schneider, 1956: 142).  
 
In short, their research suggests that political efficacy is strongly related to political 
involvement.  
This early study of American voters grounded the research on political efficacy 
and its impact on participation. Since then, the relationship between political efficacy and 
traditional political activities has been of great empirical interest. As such, it is perhaps 
the most voluminous body of literature on political efficacy. This section reviews the 
research about political efficacy and participation in traditional political activities, 
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including voting and campaign activity. In addition, it explores the relationship among 
political orientation, political efficacy, and protest activities. 
 
 
 
Political Participation  
With few exceptions, the early studies measured and explored political efficacy at 
the individual level, in isolation from macro-level events. Scholars in the 1960s and 
1970s generally viewed trust and efficacy as predictors of political participation. 
Research linked high levels of efficacy to high levels of trust in political institutions 
(Orum, 1989). Scholars reasoned that people who are efficacious and trustful do not have 
the need to participate, as they are more likely to feel confident that government officials 
will make decisions in their interest with or without their participation (Fraser, 1970; 
Gamson, 1968). The hypothesis was that among those who are politically efficacious, the 
politically mistrustful are more likely to mobilize and participate than the trustful 
(Gamson 1968; Paige, 1971). Research, however, does not support this contention 
(Hawkings, Marando, and Taylor, 1971), and sometimes suggests the opposite (e.g., 
Fraser, 1970). In general, research indicates that the higher sense of self-esteem and 
political efficacy one has, the more likely s/he is to be an active participant in the political 
process (Orum, 1989). Indeed, a considerable amount of survey-based research 
consistently shows that those with high levels of political efficacy get involved in 
politics, while those with low levels of political efficacy do not (Abramson and Aldrich, 
1982; Austin and Pinkleton, 1995; Balch, 1974; Blais, 2000; Campbell, Gurin, and 
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Miller, 1954; Clarke and Acock, 1989; Converse, 1972; Craig, 1979;  Craig and 
Maggiotto, 1982; Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990; Finkel, 1985; Fraser, 1970; Good and 
Mayer, 1975; Hawkins, Marando, and Taylor, 1971; Horwitt, 1999; Langton and Karns, 
1969; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei, 1991; White, 1968).  
Research on political participation and efficacy often looks at voting and 
campaign activities. In addition to political efficacy, a wide variety of factors are 
important in influencing voter turnout decisions, including candidate differentiation, 
sense of social duty, attachment to relevant groups, resource constraints, residence, the 
cost of registering, and the closeness of the election (Moon, 1992). In addition, campaign 
activities are thought to motivate voters (Gerber, Green and Shachar, 2003). Studies 
generally find that self-confident citizens believe in their ability to participate, and 
therefore do so; in other words, voters and those who engage in campaign activities tend 
to feel more politically efficacious while non-voters are more likely feel powerless 
(Almond and Verba, 1963, 1989). 
In one of the most frequently cited articles on the subject, Finkel (1985) uses 
1972-1974-1976 panel data from the Survey Research Center to examine the effects of 
electoral activities on internal and external political efficacy. He finds that voting and 
campaign activities positively influence perceptions of external political efficacy, but that 
they have no significant effects on perceptions of internal political efficacy. Other 
studies, however, arrive at different results and challenge the assumption that 
participation enhances political efficacy. For example in an empirical analysis of pre- and 
post-test data from the 1984 National Election Studies, Clarke and Acock (1989) show 
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that that voting and campaigning have no effect on perceptions internal or external 
political efficacy.  
By the 1980s, scholars developed a more sophisticated view of the links between 
political participation and efficacy. Until this point, political efficacy was assumed to be 
positively associated with electoral participation, yet the causal mechanisms were not 
well understood. Most researchers simply assumed that the causal arrow ran from 
efficacy to participation; however, research demonstrated that the relationship between 
efficacy and participation is reciprocal, that is, political efficacy impacts participation, 
and participation impacts political efficacy (Clarke and Acock, 1989; Finkel 1985; 
Madsen, 1987). For example, Madsen (1987) finds that internal efficacy is bolstered 
(though not changed significantly) by activity that results in a desired outcome. Similarly, 
Clarke and Acock (1989) show that perceptions of internal efficacy increase or decrease 
depending on whether the individual’s preferred candidate wins or loses, regardless of 
whether the individual voted. Changes in external efficacy in response to political events 
are even more profound (Clarke and Acock, 1989; Gurin and Brim, 1984). Given these 
findings, it may be that election (and other political) outcomes, rather than the act of 
voting or campaigning, are essential to perceptions of political efficacy (Clarke and 
Acock, 1989). This argument is in accord with the ideas of distributive justice (Pruitt, 
1981; Raiffa, 1982; Rubin and Brown, 1975). 
More recent research demonstrates that the relationship between political efficacy 
and voting is even more complex. “Certain people have longstanding feelings of civic 
obligation, interest in political affairs, and a sense of themselves as voters. These 
attitudes, or enduring response tendencies, continually express themselves over a series 
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of elections” (Gerber, Green and Shachar, 2003: 540). Pointing to the fact that various 
election studies show that socio-economic position, education level, ethnicity, and other 
demographic variables impact one’s propensity to vote, Gerber, Green and Shachar 
(2003) assert that the underlying link in all of these studies is whether the respondent has 
voted previously. Thus, they conclude that habit may be the most important determinate 
of one’s propensity to vote.  In fact, they assert that the effect of past voting amounts to a 
47 percent increase in likelihood of voting in the future.  
Finally, increasing cynical perceptions of the political system seem to be 
correlated with an increase in campaign activities, even in electorates with declining 
participation (Pollock, 1983). Building on the finding that candidate induced anxiety 
results in political learning but not political action (Marcus and MacKuen, 1993), 
Rudolph, Gangl, and Stevens (2000) describe how political efficacy acts as a moderating 
influence in emotions and its connection to campaign involvement. Specifically, anxiety 
about a candidate among the highly efficacious drives involvement, while anxiety among 
those with low political efficacy is of little consequence. Thus, campaign involvement is 
linked to how people feel about the political situation; the extent of ‘negative’ effects on 
campaign involvement is conditional, at least in part, on an individual’s perceived ability 
to successfully undertake political action (Rudolph, Gangl, and Stevens, 2000). 
 In summary, research has lined high levels of political efficacy to high levels of 
trust in government. High levels of efficacy appear to lead to more frequent political 
participation, particularly with respect to voting and campaigning. Likewise, more 
participation in these political activities generally leads to higher perceptions of political 
efficacy, although not all studies find this result. In general, the reciprocal effects of 
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participation and political efficacy appear to be stronger with respect to external political 
efficacy than internal political efficacy. 
 
 
 
Political Orientation and Protests Activities 
Another important area of research with regard to traditional political activities 
concerns political orientation and protest activities. It is hypothesized that “different 
combinations of efficacy and trust produce decidedly different political orientations 
which, in turn, lead to either conventional or radical politics” (Bockman and Gayk, 1977: 
536). Before reviewing the empirical research on orientation and protest activities, this 
section provides a brief summary of research on the relationship of demographic 
characteristics, and particularly race and socio-economic status, to perceptions of political 
efficacy.  
Perceptions of political efficacy have been found to vary with age and gender; 
older individuals generally feel more efficacious than younger individuals, and men 
generally feel more efficacious than women (e.g., Lane, 1959). Race has also been found 
to be a factor in determining perceptions of political efficacy, with minorities feeling less 
efficacious than whites (e.g., Abramson, 1983; Lyons, 1970; Martinussen, 1972). 
However, the effects of race on perceptions of political efficacy diminish to the extent 
that racial minorities are provided with political power (Kleiman, 1976). In fact, although 
research demonstrates that across the population, blacks exhibit lower perceptions of 
political efficacy and lower levels of political engagement, these differences disappear 
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when socio-economic status is controlled for. Thus, middle class blacks are as likely to 
participate in politics as middle-class whites, while upper-class blacks are more likely to 
participate than upper-class whites (Orum, 1989).  
The most explored demographic characteristic is socio-economic status (SES), 
perhaps because it is so strongly connected to other demographic characteristics. Verba 
and Nie (1972) were among the first to study socio-economic status and political 
participation. They hypothesized and found that individuals of higher socio-economic 
status feel more personally and politically efficacious and were more interested and 
active in politics than individuals of lower socio-economic status. The logic is that higher 
socio-economic status enables higher educational and occupational attainment. In turn, 
this results in greater accessibility and interpretability of political information and 
facilitates behavior that is conducive to political participation. Consequently, higher 
socio-economic status results in higher perceptions of efficacy (Dowse and Hughes, 
1972; Kleiman, 1976). This structural view of political participation and efficacy is 
echoed by Orum (1989). He asserts that those in higher social strata are more likely to 
have access to political information, engage in political discussions, and have incentive to 
vote. Therefore, the nature of a class society reinforces and perpetuates lower rates of 
political efficacy and engagement among those who are in lower socio-economic strata. 
Empirical research has shown a reasonably strong positive correlation between 
socio-economic status and political participation (for a discussion, see Orum, 1989). For 
example, early research using data from the 1976 University of Michigan presidential 
election finds that lower socio-economic status respondents are less committed to voting, 
feel less efficacious, are less interested in politics, and are less politically active than 
 121
persons of higher status (Scott and Acock, 1979). In addition, results indicate that 
participation attitudes are more adversely affected by unemployment experience among 
those of lower than higher socio-economic status. In other words, there is a consistent 
relationship between socio-economic status and participation; however, the effect of 
unemployment on participatory attitudes and behaviors is contingent on socio-economic 
status (Scott and Acock, 1979). 
Underlying this research is an implicit, but often an unstated, concern about 
political stability. As noted previously, political efficacy is thought to be a key indicator 
of the stability of a democratic regime. To the extent that there are low perceptions of 
political efficacy among sub-groups of a population, threats (from those sub-groups) to 
the overall health of the system grow. Thus, some researchers propose that people who 
have a high sense of efficacy and a high degree of political trust are more likely to 
support conventional political ideologies and participate in conventional actions, whereas 
those who have a high sense of political efficacy, combined with a low sense of political 
trust are more likely to participate in radical or revolutionary political ideologies 
(Bockman and Gayk, 1977). Likewise, Orum (1989) describes how citizens with high 
levels of political efficacy, but low levels of trust are more easily mobilized for resistance 
efforts aimed at challenging the political establishment and its leaders. 
Research seems to generally confirm this position. For example, Pierce and Carey 
(1971) used data from a survey of black residents in New Orleans to study the effects of 
participation on political efficacy. From these data, they constructed a single index of 
political efficacy, as well as an index measuring traditional political activities (whether 
the respondent discussed politics, tried to influence others on political matters, tried to 
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register to vote, voted, attended political meetings, helped in political campaigns, and 
contacted public officials) and an index measuring political protest activities (talking 
protest, boycotting, marching, picketing, sitting-in). They find that as one’s sense of 
efficacy increased, participation in both traditional and protest activities also increased. 
Moreover, at all levels of efficacy, respondents agreed that voting was better than protest; 
however, as perceptions of efficacy decreased, the proclivity to engage in protest 
activities increased. Pierce and Carey (1971: 218) also found interesting results about the 
relationship between political efficacy and one’s orientation in the political system:  
The most important conclusion of this paper concerns the relationship of 
an individual’s sense of political efficacy to his orientation toward the 
political system in a “participant” or “subject” manner. The participant is 
concerned with both the inputs and outputs of the political process; the 
subject interacts with the system at the output stage. We found that as the 
individual’s sense of political efficacy decreases, the orientation is more 
toward output issues and political problems commensurate with a subject 
view of the world. Moreover, those individuals with a lower sense of 
political efficacy are more likely to have been rejected by the system when 
attempting to become participants through voter registration. Thus, the 
degree to which the black citizen feels he can influence political decisions 
is linked to the type of political problems with which he is concerned and 
to the response he receives when he attempts to gain access to the 
participation channels of the system. 
 
Another study using data from the 1972 U.S. National Election Survey finds that 
when low levels of trust are combined with high levels of efficacy, there is a high 
potential for ‘nonallegiant’ or unconventional political action (Pollock, 1983). Moreover, 
individuals with feelings of high internal political efficacy and low external political 
efficacy are more likely to engage in non-conventional political action, and also are more 
likely to engage in highly innovative conventional participation. In other words, these 
individuals tend to favor high initiative modes of political influence (i.e., campaigning 
and contacting), as well as protest behavior. 
 123
 In sum, perceptions of political efficacy have been found to vary with a number of 
demographic characteristics, including age, gender, race, and socio-economic status. A 
significant body of research has show strong positive correlations between socio-
economic status and race and political participation. Furthermore, levels of political 
efficacy and trust are thought to be related to one’s propensity to engage in conventional 
versus radical political action. Those who have a high sense of efficacy and a high degree 
of political trust are more likely to support conventional political ideologies and 
participate in conventional actions, whereas those who have a high sense of political 
efficacy and a low sense of political trust are more likely to participate in radical or 
revolutionary political activities.  
 All in all, these studies on political participation and political efficacy provide 
inconclusive results with regard to the effects of traditional political participation on 
perceptions of political efficacy. While there are strong indications that participation can 
increase perceptions of political efficacy, the totality of the results do not provide 
conclusive proof supporting the claims of participatory democrats. That being said, 
perhaps the reason for these results is that these studies do not adequately operationalize 
the concepts of participation and political efficacy. Indeed, the studies use a variety of 
measures to operationalize the concept of political efficacy, and often do not distinguish 
between internal and external political efficacy. Moreover, the traditional political 
participatory opportunities studied in this body of research are not necessarily in accord 
with the models of participation promoted by participatory democrats. Theorists of 
participatory democracy would assert that more demanding methods of participation than 
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traditional political activities (i.e., voting, campaigning, and protesting) are required for 
participation to have educative and efficacy effects.  
 
 
 
 
Participation in Workplace/Industrial Democracy 
 Workplace and industrial democracies may provide the kind of participation 
envisioned by participatory theories. Thus, this body of research may offer more insight 
into the effects of participation on perceptions of political efficacy. As noted earlier, 
participatory democratic theorists believe that that participation is critical to the creation 
and development of democratic citizens. Some participatory theorists assert that 
participation must extend beyond political institutions to broader social institutions, as it 
is in these arenas and social relationships that people gain the confidence, knowledge, 
and perspectives that enable them to be effective participants in society (e.g., Bachrach, 
1967; Barber, 1984; Blumberg, 1968; Dahl 1985; Elden, 1981; Greenberg, 1986; Mason, 
1982; Pateman, 1970; Petersen, 1992; Smith 1985). Specifically, many participatory 
theorists view the workplace as a key institution in society for the development of 
political skills and engagement.  
 Carole Pateman (1970) was the first to articulate the potential beneficial effects of 
participation in workplace democracy in what has become known as the “workplace 
spillover” thesis. The core of the spillover thesis is that “when workplace and job 
experiences are such that they nurture the desire and the skills to participate in social 
institutions, people will participate in politics. When work and job are such that they fail 
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to nurture participatory aspirations and skills, people are discouraged from active 
engagement in politics” (Greenberg, Grunberg, and Daniel, 1996: 306). In other words, 
the “reinforcing nature of participation or nonparticipation at work molds employees’ 
dispositions” both in terms of future participation and the skills and dispositions 
associated with political participation, such as political efficacy (Sobel, 1993: 341). The 
assumption behind this thesis is that workplace authority patterns have a “heightened 
effect” on political participation and skills because the workplace is closer “in time and in 
kind” to the political sphere (Almond and Verba, 1963: 325). Indeed, Mason (1982) 
argues that workplace and government experience are similar in terms of the mode, 
intensity, and quality of participation; therefore, the most efficient and effective way of 
increasing political participation is to increase workplace participation. The logic is that 
those who are involved in workplace democracy “are getting [the] experience of 
participation in decision-making in that side of their lives – their lives at work – where 
their concern is greater, or at least more immediately and directly felt, than in any other” 
(Macpherson, 1977: 104).  
Pateman (1970) calls attention to two separate, but related, processes in the 
workplace spillover thesis: first, the connection between workplace democracy and wider 
political participation, and second, the connection between workplace participation and 
the development of an individual’s personal and political efficacy (Carter, 2006; 
Greenberg, Grundberg, and Daniel, 1996). Despite her major theoretical contributions, 
however, one of the major weaknesses in Pateman’s (1970) argument is a lack of data: 
she relies on only one fully worker-owned enterprise, and heavily uses studies of 
participation in conventional businesses to illustrate her claims. This is forgivable, given 
 126
the newness of this research topic at the time; however, almost 40 years later, there are 
still very few studies that empirically examine the links among workplace democracy, 
perceptions of efficacy, and political participation (Carter, 2006).  
In terms of participation, there is, “modest but intriguing evidence” supporting 
“the hypothesis that, other things being equal, occupational involvement generates 
political participation” (Sobel, 1993: 349). Among research that examines singular 
workplaces, findings suggest that one’s job status and degree of autonomy within the 
workplace is a key factor in determining the extent of political participation. For 
example, people in non-supervisory, assembly-line jobs tend to participate less in politics 
than people in white-collar, professional, supervisory, and high-status jobs where work 
autonomy is more likely (Form, 1973; Lipset, 1962; Sheppard and Herrick, 1972; Sobel, 
1993). Similarly, although participation in the workplace is associated with increased 
political participation, this does not hold equally across all jobs and workplaces. 
Specifically, variations in the degree of formality in the participatory experience at work 
affect the kinds of political activities that are engaged in outside of work. In other words, 
the more congruent the work participatory experience and the outside political activity in 
terms of authority patterns, the more likely the spillover is to take place (Sobel, 1993). 
Finally, research suggests that worker-shareholders participate more actively in politics 
outside of the workplace than traditional workers, and that the longer workers are 
involved in workplace decision making, the higher their rates of political participation 
(Greenberg, 1986). 
There are only a few studies that use samples beyond a singular workplace to 
examine the relationship between workplace participation and political participation. 
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Although these studies generally support the spillover thesis, they have weak statistical 
associations (e.g., Smith, 1985; Peterson, 1992; Sobel, 1993). Nevertheless, these studies 
suggest that decision making on the job is associated with involvement in local politics 
(Smith, 1985; Peterson, 1992) and that participatory acts on the job are a powerful 
predictor of political participation (Brady Verba, and Schlozman, 1995).  
The second element of the workplace spillover thesis looks for evidence that 
workplace democracy correlates with perceptions of political efficacy (e.g., Almond and 
Verba, 1963; Elden, 1981; Mason, 1982; Pateman, 1970).  Several studies from the 
1960s and 1970s found a connection between control over workplace decisions and 
feelings of personal and political efficacy (for a summary of this research, see Elden, 
1981: 53-54). An analysis of 17 early studies on industrial democracy concludes that all 
affirm the hypothesis that workplace participation increased political efficacy (Blumberg, 
1968). Other empirical evidence suggests that workplace participation develops 
“precisely the skills and resources necessary for participation in political life beyond the 
workplace” (Elden, 1981; see also, Ambrecht, 1975; Gardell, 1976; Mason, 1982). For 
example, respondents who report greater participation in workplace decision making 
reported higher levels of political efficacy and involvement in political activities 
(Peterson, 1992). Moreover, internal political efficacy is correlated with direct face-to-
face participation in workplace decisions, but not representative participation (Greenberg, 
Grunberg, and Daniel, 1996). Other research indicates that individual control over work 
and demands on skill are positively related to perceptions of political efficacy (Torbet 
and Rogers, 1972). Likewise, job autonomy, variety, and responsibility contribute 
positively to perceptions of political efficacy (Sheppard and Herrick, 1972). 
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Semiautonomous work groups are linked to a greater sense of political efficacy, while 
structures that simply make workers more satisfied with their jobs but do not increase 
their autonomy are not associated with a greater sense of political efficacy (Elden, 1981). 
Other research suggests a greater sense of embeddedness - the feeling that one's work is 
meaningful and connects to the work of others - can increase the belief that people can 
work together to influence their workplaces and communities (Schur, Eaton, and 
Rubinstein, 2004). 
 Among the most famous studies of workplace democracy is Adversary 
Democracy (1980) by Jane Mansbridge. In this book, she examines both workplace 
democracy and the New England town meeting. Her examination of a crisis intervention 
center that used a participatory approach to management indicates that there may be a 
relationship between participation and political efficacy. Specifically, she finds that two 
variables (length of time in the organization and physical proximity to the social center) 
are significantly related to perceptions of political efficacy. However, in her study, 
Mansbridge (1980) does not compare participants and non-participants, but rather 
correlates participants’ scores on demographic and other variables with their scores on a 
political efficacy index. Thus, while her results indicate that participation may have 
positively affected political efficacy among workers, no causal relationship between 
participation and efficacy can be established (Morrell, 1998).  
  Perhaps the most cited study on workplace democracy is Edward Greenberg’s 
(1986) study on the plywood cooperatives of the American Pacific northwest. In this 
study, Greenberg compares worker-shareholders in the cooperatives with employees of 
traditional companies.  
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He finds no significant difference between the two groups’ political efficacy scores. 
Moreover, he finds that workers in participatory settings did not show greater feelings of 
personal political competence than those in non-participatory workplaces. In terms of 
participation, he finds that cooperative workers have lower levels of involvement in 
community organization (such as trade unions, parties, churches) than workers in 
conventional organizations. However, he also finds that worker-shareholders participated 
more actively in politics outside of the workplace than traditional workers, although the 
findings are only statistically significant for community involvement and attendance at 
government meetings, but not for voting and party campaign activity. Thus, while they 
did not have higher perceptions of political efficacy, participants in workplace democracy 
did become more active and engaged in politics. Furthermore, he finds that the longer the 
cooperative workers had been involved in workplace decision making, the higher their 
rates of political participation. It is significant to note, however, that a 10-year follow up 
investigation of three cooperatives, an Employee Share Ownership Plan (ESOP), and a 
range of conventional firms, indicates that “members of the most democratic enterprises 
were the least likely to participate in outside politics” (Greenberg, Grunberg, and Daniel, 
1996: 306). Therefore, as Carter (2006: 414) notes, “the most important and thorough test 
of the spillover thesis is inconclusive.” 
 In sum, although there is some evidence that participation in workplace 
democracies can increase perceptions of political efficacy and rates of political 
participation, there is considerable disagreement about the magnitude and strength of the 
effects. For example, Schweizer (1995: 360) concludes that the educative effects of 
participation in the workplace are “negligible” and Sobel (1993) concedes that his 
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empirical support for the educative benefits of participation is of only “modest” strength. 
Given this, Dahl (1985: 98) concludes that the “evidence as we have does not, I think, 
warrant high hopes for huge changes in attitudes, values, and character from greater 
democracy at work.” Likewise, Schweizer (1995: 364) asserts that the “empirical 
findings suggest that the democratization of the workplace may not bring with it the 
elevation of humankind as promised by Mill, Cole, and Pateman.”  
 In response, some scholars have claimed that the empirical literature suffers from 
inadequate theorizing (Radcliff and Wingenbach, 2000), and a lack of explicit models 
that contain intervening variables that affect the extent to which participation results in 
educative development (Greenberg, Grunberg, and Daniel, 1996). To remedy this 
situation, some scholars offer a respecification of “the simple spillover thesis” that takes 
into account: “(1) possible variable effects of the domains and forms of workplace 
participation; (2) the linkage of workplace and political participation by way if the impact 
of the former on psychological outlooks; and (3) the economic situation of enterprises 
within which participatory decision making is taking place” (Greenberg, Grunberg, and 
Daniel, 1996: 308). Carter (2006) takes this respecification one step further, identifying 
several factors that mediate the impact of workplace democracy on political efficacy and 
political participation.   
  While research on the workplace spillover continues, we must acknowledge that 
the results of these studies do not firmly establish an empirical connection between 
workplace/ industrial democracies and political participation and efficacy. Again, these 
problems may be a function of misspecification, poor and differing operationalizations of 
workplace participation, different measures of political efficacy, and methodological 
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issues. Nevertheless, the results do seem to indicate that there is some type of relationship 
between participation in a democratic or participatory workplace and perceptions of 
political efficacy, although the relationship between the concepts may be more complex 
than Pateman (1970) first acknowledged.  
Direct Participation 
This section reviews the research on the relationship between participation in 
direct democracy initiatives and perceptions of political efficacy. Specifically, it 
examines the ballot initiative and the referendum, community participation, and the New 
England town meeting. The ballot initiative (also known as popular or citizen's initiative) 
provides a means by which a petition signed by a certain minimum number of registered 
voters can force a public vote on a proposed statute, constitutional amendment, charter 
amendment, or ordinance. Similarly, a referendum is a direct vote in which an entire 
electorate is asked to either accept or reject a particular proposal, such as the adoption of 
a new constitution, constitutional amendment, or law, or the recall of an elected official 
or a specific government policy. The New England town meeting is an annual legislative 
assembly in which all or some voters are empowered to conduct the community's affairs. 
Town meetings first took place in New England in the colonial era and are still largely a 
New England phenomenon, partly because the region's towns tend to hold powers that 
are granted to counties elsewhere (Bryan, 2004). Advocates of direct democracy assert 
that such measures can increase citizens’ perceptions of political efficacy (e.g., Bohnet 
and Frey, 1994). Despite the popularity and use of these methods of direct democracy, 
relatively little research based in the United States has examined the effects of these tools 
of direct democracy on perceptions of political efficacy. 
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In terms of ballot initiatives and referenda, advocates generally adhere to the ideas 
of participatory democracy, arguing that meaningful political participation through such 
activities initiatives will increase citizens’ political the competence, interest, and 
satisfaction (e.g., Gilens, Glaser, and Mendelberg, 2001). Most research in this area has 
focused on the impact of ballot initiatives and referenda on political participation. Smith 
and Tolbert (2004) find that the use of the initiative is related to increased political 
participation in terms of voter turnout, civic engagement, political interest, and in some 
cases political knowledge. In addition, research finds the presence of ballot measures 
increases turnout in low-profile, mid-term elections (Smith, 2001; Lacey, 2005; Tolbert, 
Grummel, and Smith, 2001), as well as in higher profile presidential elections (Tolbert 
and Smith, 2005). Moreover, the salience of ballot propositions is associated with 
increases in voters’ factual political knowledge (Smith, 2002); Tolbert, McNeal, and 
Smith, 2003), with higher levels of political efficacy or confidence in government 
responsiveness (Bowler and Donovan, 2002; Hero and Tolbert, 2004; Mendelsohn and 
Cutler, 2000). Similarly, the combination of salient ballot measures and campaign efforts 
can raise voter turnout (Smith, 2001).  
There has been relatively little research on the impact of ballot initiatives and 
referenda on political efficacy. Bowler and Donovan (2002) examine survey data from 
the 1992 American National Election Study, and find that more frequent exposure to 
ballot initiatives is associated with higher levels of both internal and external political 
efficacy. Their analysis suggests that citizens living in states with more initiatives tend to 
have more positive views of their own political abilities (internal efficacy) and look more 
favorably on the responsiveness of government (external efficacy). Other studies support 
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these findings. For example, Hero and Tolbert (2004) find that citizens who live in states 
with more initiatives on the ballot have higher perceptions of external political efficacy 
over ten-year period (1988-1998). Recent research replicates these findings. Bowler and 
Donovan (2003) find that variation in institutional design (initiative qualification 
difficulty and legislating insulation) tends to significant affect measures political efficacy, 
with the frequency of initiative use as the most consistent predictor of efficacy attitudes.   
 In a related study of community participation, Berry, Portney, and Thomson 
(1993) found that respondents with higher scores on an Index of Community 
Participation (ICP) tended to have higher perceptions of internal and external political 
efficacy. Even after controlling for socioeconomic status, they found that face-to-face 
participation is strongly related to efficacy, but more closely related to internal than 
external efficacy. Using a reciprocal model, they also find that participation plays “a 
somewhat more important role in influencing external political efficacy than efficacy 
plays in determining participation” (Berry, Portney, and Thomson, 1993: 270). Finally, 
they find a greater influence on external political efficacy in cities with high levels of 
participation among citizens, than in cities with moderate or low levels of participation. 
However, these results did not hold for internal political efficacy. Rather, internal 
political efficacy had a fairly strongly influence on participation in high participation 
cities, a weaker level of influence in cities with moderate participation, and no influence 
in low participation cities. In short, their study suggests that face-to-face participation 
improves perceptions of external efficacy especially in cities with highly participatory 
citizens and institutions, but that it does not increase perceptions of internal efficacy. 
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Moreover, the results suggest that feelings of internal political efficacy can increase the 
likelihood that a citizen will engage in political activity.  
In short, these studies indicate that ballot initiatives and referenda are related to 
increased participation, and that frequent exposure to such methods of direct democracy 
is associated with higher levels of both internal and external political efficacy. It must be 
pointed out, however, that even though the ballot initiative and referendum are methods 
of direct political participation, they do not meet the criteria for what Bryan (2004: 4) 
calls “real” democracy: “in a real democracy, the citizens – in person, in face-to-face 
meetings of the whole – make the laws that govern the actions of everyone within their 
geographic boundaries.”  
The best example of real democracy in the United States is the New England town 
meeting, as it offers the best illustration of what real democracy might have looked like in 
ancient Greece (Bryan, 2004). As de Tocqueville (1984: 61) notes, in the town meeting,  
The native of New England...takes part in every occurrence in the place; 
he practises the art of government in the small sphere within his reach; he 
accustoms himself to those forms without which liberty can only advance 
by revolutions; he imbibes their spirit; he acquires a taste for order, 
comprehends the balance of powers, and collects clear practical notions on 
the nature of his duties and the extent of his rights. 
 
 Among the most frequently cited studies of the New England town meeting is 
Jane Mansbridge’s (1980) Adversary Democracy. In her examination of one New 
England town, Mansbridge found that residents of the village scored higher on a political 
efficacy index than did non-villagers; however, village residents did not show statistically 
significant higher levels of political activity than non-villagers. Thus, if village residence 
did cause higher perceptions of political efficacy, this result was not a function of 
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increased participation. In short, her study does not support the claim that participation 
increases perceptions of political efficacy. 
Beyond this study, there are few empirical assessments of political efficacy vis-à-
vis the New England town meeting. Even Bryan (2004) the preeminent scholar on the 
subject, who attended more than 1,500 town meetings during 28 years of fieldwork in 
Vermont, does not address whether attendance or participation in town meetings impacts 
perceptions of political efficacy. In fact, Bryan notes that overall, “little research exists on 
face-to-face democracy [as is found in the New England town meeting], and what there is 
has little to say about efficacy.” 7  
In sum, the results of empirical studies on direct democracy suggest that such 
practices may have an impact on citizens’ perceptions of political efficacy, and especially 
perceptions of external political efficacy. However, given the surprisingly scant amount 
of research on the subject, few conclusions about the effects of direct participation on 
political efficacy can be drawn. Therefore, the next section reviews research that is 
specific to deliberative democracy processes. 
 
Participation in Deliberative Democracy Processes 
As noted previously, there is scant empirical research on deliberative democracy. 
The few empirical studies on deliberative processes that do exist show mixed results. For 
example, several studies suggest that under certain conditions, deliberation can produce 
more sophisticated, tolerant, and participative citizens (Fung, 2001; Fung and Wright, 
2003; Gastil and Dillard, 1999b; Gastil, Deess, and Weiser, 2002; Luskin and Fishkin, 
1998; Sulkin and Simon, 2001, Walsh, 2003); however, other scholars report that these 
                                                 
7 Personal correspondence with author, June 2007. 
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positive outcomes are rare and not automatic (Button and Mattson, 1999; Hendricks 
2002; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2000; Holt, 1999; Kuklinski et al, 1993; Mendelberg 
and Oleske 2000). In general, this suggests that the possible positive effects of 
deliberation are far more complex than imagined and dependent on many factors (e.g., 
Delli Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs, 2004; Fung, 2003, 2005). 
In terms of the general effects of deliberation, deliberation has been found to 
increase participants’ levels of political knowledge (Cook and Jacobs, 1999; Fishkin and 
Luskin, 1999; Hansen and Anderson, 2004; Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell, 2002) and help 
participants form more reflective, coherent, and comprehensive judgments about the issue 
at hand (Carpella, Price, and Nir, 2002; Fishkin and Luskin, 1999; Luskin, Fishkin, and 
Jowell, 2002; Mathews, 1994; Sturgis, Roberts, and Allum, 2005). In a study of National 
Issues Forums, Gastil and Dillard (1999a) found that deliberation had a short-term effect 
on participants’ political sophistication; the effect of deliberation on long-term political 
sophistication was not studied. Research has also shown that deliberation can result in 
attitudinal changes for participants. For example, in a study of the 1996 National Issues 
Convention, a deliberative poll conducted during the 1996 presidential campaign, Fishkin 
and Luskin (1999) found significant attitude changes and considerable increases in 
political knowledge among participants. Likewise, Gastil and Dillard (1999a, 1999b) 
found that deliberation produced considerable individual level attitude changes, but 
negligible aggregative attitude change.  
Given that some research has established a connection between political efficacy 
and political action (e.g. Pollock, 1983; Wolfsfeld, 1986), some deliberative scholars 
suggest that if deliberation increases participants’ sense of political efficacy, it may spur 
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more political engagement. There is some evidence to support this argument. In a study 
of over 1,000 jurors, Gastil, Deess, and Weiser (2000) found that citizens who served on 
a jury that reached a verdict were more likely to vote in subsequent elections that those 
who served as alternate jurors or served on a jury that was dismissed or deadlocked 
Not all research finds such positive results. For example, Denver, Hands and 
Jones (1995) found little change in that attitudes of participants in Granada 500, a British 
public debate program using face-to-face deliberation. Research also shows that although 
participation can lead to short-term gains in terms of greater civic involvement, it results 
in little long-term activity (Kimmelman and Hall, 1997; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). 
Other research supports the arguments about the social psychology limits of participation 
(e.g., Cooke and Kothari, 2002). For example, Gastil and Dillard (1999a) found a 
consistent level of ideological polarization among participants after deliberation, 
supporting Sunstein’s (2003) criticism of deliberative democracy. Likewise, laboratory 
experiments point to negative outcomes from deliberation. For example, research 
suggests that deliberation reduces the consistency between attitudes and behavior among 
subjects and that deliberation can produce decisions that conflict with both expert 
decisions and subjects’ own personal opinions, and thus lead to decisions they later regret 
(Holt, 1993, 1999; Wilson, Dunn, Kraft, and Lisle, 1989; Wilson and Schooler, 1991). 
Moreover, some studies have shown that deliberation can cause participants to doubt that 
a “correct” decision exists (Armor and Taylor, 2003; Iyengar and Lepper 2000), which 
can leave them feeling more anxious and frustrated about the issue under discussion after 
deliberation than before (Cook and Jacobs, 1999; Button and Mattson, 1999; Hendricks, 
2003; Kimmelman and Hall, 1997).  
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Most research, however, has not directly examined the relationship between 
deliberation and political efficacy (Morrell, 2005), and the few studies that do exist 
provide mixed results. Some studies suggest increases in perceptions of political efficacy. 
For example, citizens who participate in National Issues Forums report higher confidence 
in their abilities to participate in politics after deliberation, suggesting increases in 
internal political efficacy (Gastil and Dillard, 1999b; Doble, Higgins, Begasse, and 
Fisher, 1996). Likewise, research on participants in the National Issues Convention, 
shows large gains in political efficacy (Smith, 1999) and increases in participants’ 
confidence in their political knowledge, judgment and influence, as well as greater trust 
in politicians and elected officials (Fishkin and Luskin 1999). Gastil and Dillard (1999a) 
show similar results in their qualitative and quantitative research on small deliberative 
forums held across the U.S.  
However, not all research has such positive results. For example, Gastil (2004) 
found that adult basic literacy students who participated in a National Issues Forum 
reported significantly lower levels of efficacy than non-participants. Likewise, research 
on Intergroup Dialogue Programs shows no effect on internal efficacy, although perhaps 
because participants entered the process with already high levels of efficacy (Walsh, 
2003). Moreover, in an experimental study, Morrell (1998, 2005) found no statistically 
significant effects of deliberation on internal political efficacy. Finally, participation in 
deliberative forums has been shown to increase political self-efficacy while reducing 
group efficacy, that is, after deliberation participants were more confident about their 
own ability to engage in political action, but less confident about group-based political 
action (Gastil 1999). Given the balance of this research, only one conclusion can be 
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drawn: the systematic evaluation of deliberative democracy processes and their impact is 
in relatively early stages and considerably more work must be done before the advocates’ 
claims can be verified.  
 
Participation in The AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting 
Since its inception, AmericaSpeaks has conducted more than forty-five 21st 
Century Town Meetings involving a total of more than 100,000 people in governance 
across the United States (Lukensmeyer and Brigham, 2005; Williamson, 2007). The 21st 
Century Town Meeting process was used for large-scale citizen participation in the 
redevelopment of the World Trade Center site, the creation of municipal budgets in 
Washington, D.C. and San Francisco, and regional planning economic development 
efforts in the greater Chicago area and northeast Ohio. It has also been used to address 
national issues such as Social Security reform and youth obesity. Despite the number of 
21st Century Town Meetings, empirical research on the process and its outcomes is 
extremely limited. There are numerous articles that describe the 21st Century Town 
Meeting process or a setting where it was applied, but few empirical studies (see 
http://www.americaspeaks.org/projects/cases/index.htm). Moreover, there is little 
empirical research that specifically examines the effects of the AmericaSpeaks 21st 
Century Town Meeting on participants’ citizenship skills and dispositions.  
One recent study examines the 21st Century Town Meeting process from the 
perspective of political leaders. The AmericaSpeaks process was recently used to engage 
citizens of New Orleans in the rebuilding of the city under the Unified New Orleans Plan 
(UNOP). The study found that local political leaders came to support the plan in large 
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part as a consequence of the 21st Century Town Meeting process (Williamson, 2007). 
“Interviews with 20 New Orleans public leaders indicated that [the process] enhanced the 
credibility of UNOP in their eyes by gathering a representative mix of citizen voices and 
enabling conversation across differences” (Williamson, 2007: 33).  
Another case study examines an AmericaSpeaks deliberative democratic process 
in Western Australia (Hartz-Karp, 2005: 7). On participant feedback forms, 42% of 
respondents indicated that they changed their views as a result of the dialogue, 99.5% 
thought that the deliberations went “okay or great,” and 97% said they would like to 
participate in such an event again.  
Some research has been conducted on the Citizen Summit III, a 21st Century Town 
Meeting held in the District of Columbia in November 2003 (D’Agostino, Schwester, 
Holzer, 2006; Moy, n.d.). A qualitative analysis of interviews suggests that the process 
was broadly inclusive and driven by the concerns of average citizens, as opposed to 
government officials or specialists. However, subjects also indicated there was too much 
emphasis on consensus, which marginalized minority viewpoints and stifled the two-way 
exchange of ideas. Moreover, participants reported that they did not critically evaluate 
their values, assumptions, or positions on specific issues during deliberation (D’Agostino, 
Schwester, Holzer, 2006).  
An analysis of panel participants in the Citizen Summit III suggests that 
participants experienced changes in political attitudes and behaviors, and well as in their 
perceptions of government (Moy, n.d.). Evaluation of survey data indicates that 
participants became more interested in national and local politics and became more 
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politically engaged. Moreover, although participants did not experience an increase in 
knowledge, they experience gains in external political efficacy. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter began by exploring the theories about how participatory and 
deliberative democracy are expected to affect the skills and dispositions of citizenship. 
The chapter also examined theory regarding the effects of participatory and deliberative 
democracy specifically on perceptions of political efficacy. Next, the chapter examined 
the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting and discussed why its design can be 
expected to benefit citizens and improve perceptions of political efficacy. The chapter 
concluded with a review of empirical research on these issues. Specifically, it reviewed 
research that assesses the impact on efficacy of participation in traditional political 
activities, participation in workplace/industrial democracies, and participation in direct 
democracy. It also reviewed research that focuses broadly on the effects of deliberative 
democracy on the skills and dispositions of citizenship, and research that specifically 
examines the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting. This review of the literature 
clearly shows that systematic evaluation of the AmericaSpeaks and other deliberative 
processes and their impacts is in the early stages. More research needs to be done before 
the claims of advocates can be properly assessed. This dissertation seeks to fill that void 
in the research. The next chapter explains the research design that guides this study. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
STUDY OVERVIEW: HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY  
 
"Insight, untested and unsupported, is an insufficient guarantee of truth… 
insight is what first leads to the beliefs which subsequent reason confirms 
or confutes” (Bertrand Russell, 2002: 24-25)  
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a methodological overview of the study. It first briefly 
examines the research questions that guide this study and notes the expected findings. 
Second, the chapter specifies the hypotheses and uses previous research and theory to 
provide support for both the hypotheses and expected results. The chapter then moves 
into a detailed discussion of the methodology used in this research. Specifically, it 
discusses the research design, the subjects and procedures for data collection, the survey 
instruments, and issues involving internal and external validity. Finally, the chapter 
explains variable measurement and construction, and briefly reviews the methods of 
statistical analysis used to address the research questions.  
 
OVERVIEW OF STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
As the previous chapter suggests, substantially more research about deliberative 
democracy must be conducted before advocates’ claims can be verified. As Bowler and 
Donovan (2002: 375) note, “[t]he more subtle effects of direct democracy on citizen 
attitudes about politics in the United States has rarely been tested.” Since political 
efficacy is a premier measure of citizenship, it is of particular importance that scholars 
assess its relationship to deliberative democracy. To that end, this study empirically 
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examines the impact of participation in the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting 
on perceptions of internal and external political efficacy. 
The specific methodology for this study is discussed in detail later in this chapter; 
however, it is useful to briefly outline the research design before exploring the research 
questions and hypotheses. This study uses a quasi-experimental, longitudinal research 
design and data from surveys collected at three times from two non-equivalent 
comparison groups. One group of subjects consists of “participants” in the 21st Century 
Town Meeting held in Charlotte, North Carolina. Participants were surveyed at three 
points in time: before the Town Meeting (Time 1), immediately after the Town Meeting 
(Time 2), and approximately 24 months after the Town Meeting (Time 3). The second 
group consists of “non-participants”, or citizens of the greater Charlotte area who did not 
register or attend the Town Meeting. Non-participants were surveyed at two points in 
time: before the Town Meeting (Time 1) and approximately 24 months after the Town 
Meeting (Time 3).  
As noted earlier, this study attempts to better understand the relationship between 
deliberative democracy and political efficacy. The primary research question is: Does 
participation in the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting affect participants’ sense 
of internal and external political efficacy? To address this question, additional questions 
must be addressed, including: 
1) Do participants and non-participants differ in terms of internal and external 
political efficacy before participation in the Town Meeting? 
 
2) Do participants have a higher sense of internal and external political efficacy 
after participation in the Town Meeting? If so, what variables affect 
perceptions of political efficacy? 
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3) If participants have a higher sense of internal and external political efficacy 
after participation in the Town Meeting, do those effects last over time? 
 
With regard to these questions, I generally expect that: 
1) Before the Town Meeting, participants will have higher perceptions of 
internal and external political efficacy than non-participants. 
 
2) Immediately after the Town Meeting, participants will have higher 
perceptions of internal and external political efficacy than they did before the 
Town Meeting.  
 
3) Several variables, including perceptions about the quality of deliberation, 
perceptions of the Town Meeting’s potential impact, and demographic 
characteristics, will affect participants’ perceptions of internal and external 
political efficacy. 
 
4) Participants’ sense of internal and external political efficacy will decrease 
over time, but remain higher 24 months after participation than before 
participation.  
 
The following section details the specific hypotheses and expected findings.  
 
HYPOTHESES 
This dissertation examines four sets of hypotheses. The first set of hypotheses 
explores differences between participants and non-participants’ perceptions of political 
efficacy. As noted previously, AmericaSpeaks engages in targeted recruitment to ensure 
that participants are demographically representative of the community. If such 
representativeness exists, then it is possible that participants and non-participants will 
have similar levels of political efficacy before the Town Meeting (Time 1). However, 
scholars argue that participants in deliberative processes are often not representative of 
the broader community, and that they differ significantly from the average citizen. For 
example, Fung (2003) asserts that deliberative processes (by design or not) have elements 
of voluntary self-selection, such that those who decide to attend are generally wealthy, 
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educated, and professional. Moreover, research suggests that wealthy, educated 
individuals with professional careers tend to have higher perceptions of political efficacy 
(Abramson, 1983). Given this, one would expect different levels of political efficacy for 
participants and non-participants of a deliberative forum. This produces the first set of 
hypotheses. 
H1a: Participants will have higher perceptions of internal political efficacy 
than non-participants at Time 1 (IPEP1 > IPE NP1). 
 
H1b: Participants will have higher perceptions of external political 
efficacy than non-participants at Time 1 (EPEP1 > EPE NP1). 
 
As detailed in Chapter 3, advocates of deliberative democracy assert that 
deliberation produces higher levels of both internal and external political efficacy for 
participants. This study seeks to empirically verify this claim. Thus, the second set of 
hypotheses compares levels of political efficacy among participants before the Town 
Meeting (Time 1) and immediately after the Town Meeting (Time 2). These hypotheses 
get to the heart of the dissertation, and thus, are the most important hypotheses in the 
study. 
H2a: Participants at Time 2 will have higher perceptions of internal 
political efficacy than participants at Time 1 (IPEP2 > IPE P1).  
 
H2b: Participants at Time 2 will have higher perceptions external political 
efficacy than participants at Time 1 (EPEP2 > EPE P1). 
 
Although the results of empirical studies about the impact of direct democracy 
and/or deliberation on political efficacy are mixed, these hypotheses are theoretically 
supportable (see Chapter 3). Scholars of participatory democracy assert that participation 
has an educative effect in that it increases self-confidence and skill-development for 
individuals (e.g., Barber, 1984; Mason, 1982; Pateman, 1970; Thompson, 1970). Scholars 
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of deliberative democracy echo this claim (e.g., Benhabib, 1996; Cohen and Rogers, 
1995; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 2004; Hunold and Young, 1998; Luskin and 
Fishkin, 2003). They assert that deliberation helps people clarify, understand, and refine 
their own positions on issues (e.g., Elster, 1998), and in doing so, can enhance the 
individual’s perceptions of both internal and external political efficacy (e.g., Barber, 
1984; Mansbridge, 1995; Morrell, 1998; Pateman, 1970) 
 Several elements of the 21st Century Town Meeting suggest that in this case, 
practice may support theory. For example, as noted in Chapter 3, the educative effects of 
participation and deliberation, including the advancement of political efficacy, are most 
likely to occur at the local level, because local issues most directly affect people and their 
everyday lives and this is the level of government where one has the best chances of 
contributing (e.g., Bachrach, 1967; Mansbridge, 1980, 1995; Mill, 1865, 1965, 1997; 
Pateman, 1970; Rousseau, 1953). Thus, because the UAC Town Meeting was a local 
process that focused on local issues, it is likely to increase perceptions of both internal 
and external political efficacy among participants.   
Several other design features of the Town Meeting suggest that internal political 
efficacy may increase after participation. Among the most important design features in 
terms of internal political efficacy are the use of targeted recruitment with the goal of 
obtaining diversity, the educative materials given to participants before deliberation, the 
deliberative mode, and the use of participation technology. First, people are more likely 
to feel confident about their participative abilities when they see other participants who 
share demographic characteristics (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002; Ostrom, 1990; 
 147
Sunstein, 2003). As noted in the previous chapter, AmericaSpeaks uses targeted to 
recruitment to ensure diversity among participants.  
Second, people may feel more confident about their political skills when they 
receive more relevant information about an issue than would other be available (Bowler 
and Donovan, 2002). Prior to beginning deliberation in the Town Meeting, participants 
receive guidebooks designed to provide them with adequate information for effective 
participation (Lukensmeyer and Brigham, 2005; Lukensmeyer, Goldman, and Brigham, 
2005). Participants are also provided with additional information, such as presentations 
and videos, at the start of Town Meeting. The goal of these actions is to help participants 
feel more confident about their political abilities. The more comfortable people are with 
the subject matter of deliberation, the more likely they are to feel internally efficacious.  
Third, the deliberative mode of the Town Meeting moves between small and large 
group discussions with the goal of helping participants to clarify their own positions and 
understand the positions of others. The process “gives citizens an opportunity to learn 
more about important public issues, hear a diversity of perspectives and understand 
critical trade-offs” (AmericaSpeaks, 2006). Moreover, given the technology used at Town 
Meetings, participants are likely to see their opinions reflected in the themes projected for 
large group discussion and voting, not only reassuring them of their political abilities, but 
also validating their political perspectives. Thus, the deliberative mode of, and 
participation technology used in, the Town Meeting may contribute to internal political 
efficacy among participants. 
Other design features of the Town Meeting suggest that external political efficacy 
may increase after participation. Among the most important design features in terms of 
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external political efficacy are the use of targeted recruitment and diversity, the 
participatory nature of the process, the links to decision and policy makers, the degree of 
empowerment offered to participants, and the focus on high stake issues. First, just as 
targeted recruitment and diversity may stimulate internal efficacy, they may also do the 
same for external political efficacy. The extent of diversity among participants may 
signal to them that decision and policy makers are interested in hearing different views 
from a cross-section of the resident citizenry. In turn, this signal may increase external 
political efficacy. 
Second, the goal and consequent design of the Town Meeting is to provide people 
with a chance to participate directly in decision making that is presumed to formally 
shape public policy. This restoration of “citizens’ voices” in the 21st Century Town 
Meeting creates the “opportunity for the general public to give those in leadership 
positions direct, substantive feedback on key public issues” (AmericaSpeaks, 2006). 
Moreover, the participatory democratic governance approach of the Town Meeting, 
which directly links deliberation outcomes to decision and policy makers, facilitates 
moderate to high levels of empowerment among participants. Thus, it is reasonable to 
assert that this shift in the locus of power from government officials to citizens may 
increase participants’ external political efficacy. Finally, we can also expect the process 
to increase external political efficacy since the stakes are high for participants. In other 
words, participants may have higher expectations of political responsiveness since the 
deliberation is focused on issues of significant political and social importance and interest 
in the community.  
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The third set of hypotheses deal with the potential impact of several variables on 
political efficacy, including perceptions about the quality of deliberation and expectations 
about the potential impacts of the Town Meeting. First, although the theory of 
deliberative democracy provides reason to support the expectation of increases in 
political efficacy for participants, it also suggests that norms of deliberation must be 
effectively facilitated for these benefits to occur. Thus, I expect that perceptions about the 
quality of deliberation will impact levels of political efficacy for participants at Time 2 
(immediately after the Town Meeting). Second, one goal of the 21st Century Town 
Meeting is that politicians and other government officials take the deliberations seriously, 
and incorporate deliberative opinions and outcomes into subsequent decisions and 
actions. Fung (2003) refers to this as participatory empowerment, and indicates that the 
greater the degree of empowerment, the greater the potential benefits of deliberation. This 
suggests that perceptions about the potential impact of the Town Meeting may affect 
perceptions of political efficacy.  
H3a: Among participants at Time 2, perceptions of the quality of 
deliberation will be positively correlated with perceptions of internal 
political efficacy. 
 
H3b: Among participants at Time 2, perceptions of the quality of 
deliberation will be positively correlated with perceptions of external 
political efficacy. 
 
H3c: Among participants at Time 2, perceptions of the potential impact of 
the Town Meeting will be positively correlated with perceptions of 
internal political efficacy. 
 
H3d: Among participants at Time 2, perceptions of the potential impact of 
the Town Meeting will be positively correlated with perceptions of 
external political efficacy. 
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Related to these hypotheses are subsidiary propositions about the effect of various 
demographic characteristics on political efficacy. Research shows that political efficacy 
is influenced by demographic characteristics, including race, gender, age, educational 
level, and socio-economic status (i.e., Abramson, 1983; see also Bowler and Donovan, 
2002). Indeed, socio-economic status (SES) has been found to be of crucial importance in 
the development of political efficacy (Almond and Verba, 1954; see also Pateman, 1970). 
Therefore, I expect that internal and external political efficacy will be affected by several 
demographic characteristics, including race, age, gender, employment status, parental 
status, education level, and socio-economic. 
The final set of hypotheses concerns the longevity of the efficacy effect. If there is 
an increase in participants’ sense of political efficacy immediately following the Town 
Meeting, then it is important to know whether this efficacy effect persists over time. In 
other words, it is important to know if participation results in temporary or longer-term 
increases in political efficacy. Thus, the fourth set of hypotheses compare participants at 
24 months after the event (Time 3) to participants at both immediately after the Town 
Meeting (Time 2) and before the Town Meeting (Time 1).  
H4a: Participants at Time 3 will have higher perceptions of internal 
political efficacy than at Time 1, but lower perceptions of internal 
political efficacy than at Time 2 (IPEP2 > IPE P3  > IPE P1).  
 
H4b: Participants at Time 3 will have higher perceptions of external 
political efficacy than at Time 1, but lower perceptions of external 
political efficacy than at Time 2 (EPEP2 > EPE P3  > EPE P1). 
 
H4c: The gap between participants and non-participants for internal 
political efficacy will be smaller at Time 3 than at Time 1 (IPEP3 - 
IPE NP1 > IPEP3 - IPE NP1). 
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H4d: The gap between participants and non-participants for external 
political efficacy will be smaller at Time 3 than at Time 1 (EPEP3 - 
EPE NP1 > EPEP3 - EPE NP1). 
 
Again, theory supports these hypotheses. Theory suggests that the recurrence or 
iteration of a deliberative process affects its ability to create and sustain popular 
mobilization (Fung, 2003). It is likely that this holds true for political efficacy as well. 
The 21st Century Town Meeting is generally a one-time affair, although AmericaSpeaks 
often works with clients to help create additional smaller-scale opportunities for 
deliberation on the same and related issues. Theory also suggests that monitoring, or the 
extent to which a deliberative process promotes a longer-term review of the quality and 
level of implementation, is an important design choice (Fung, 2003). AmericaSpeaks 
generally does little in terms of follow-up after a 21st Century Town Meeting, although 
possibilities for monitoring are often generated as an outcome of the process. Thus, while 
design choices such as the subject of deliberation, the deliberative mode, and 
empowerment all suggest that the Town Meeting will increase political efficacy, other 
design features such as low/no recurrence and monitoring, suggest that such increases 
may not be sustained over the long-term.  
The following sections of this chapter detail the methodology used to test these 
hypotheses and determine whether and how participation in the AmericaSpeaks 21st 
Century Town Meeting affect participants’ political efficacy. Specifically, the following 
sections provide an overview of the research design, discuss the subjects and procedures 
for data collection, explain variable measurement and construction, and examine research 
issues such as internal and external validity and selection bias. The chapter concludes 
with a brief discussion of the methods for statistical analysis.  
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METHODOLOGY 
As noted earlier, the primary research question explored in this dissertation is: What 
impact does participation in the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting have on 
participants’ sense of internal and external political efficacy? Secondary questions 
include: Do participants and non-participants differ in terms of political efficacy before 
participation in the Town Meeting? Do participants have a higher sense of political 
efficacy after participation in the Town Meeting? If so, what variables affect perceptions 
of political efficacy? If participants have a higher sense of political efficacy after 
participation in the Town Meeting, do those effects last over time?  
To answer these questions, this study focuses on one manifestation of the 
AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting held in Charlotte, North Carolina in 
December 2004. The United Agenda for Children (UAC) contracted AmericaSpeaks to 
hold a 21st Century Town Meeting about youth policy issues in Mecklenburg County (the 
greater Charlotte area), North Carolina. UAC is a coalition of citizens, civic leaders, 
corporations, public entities, and community agencies who collectively seek to ensure a 
positive future for all children (from birth to 21) in Mecklenburg County (UAC, 2006). 
The UAC goals are to create and implement a “united action plan that would ensure that 
all children in Mecklenburg County are healthy, safe and well-educated.” The first step 
toward that goal was the UAC 21st Century Town Meeting, held on December 11, 2004. 
At that meeting, more than 1,000 people who live in Mecklenburg County gathered to 
deliberate about youth policy issues and make recommendations to local decision- and 
policy makers. Three major youth policy areas were addressed, including education, 
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health, and safety. UAC planned to spend at least the two years following the Town 
Meeting implementing the public’s recommendations.   
 
Research Design 
Over the spring and summer of 2004, I worked closely with AmericaSpeaks staff 
to create a research design that would meet our respective research needs. The result is a 
study best categorized as quasi-experimental research that uses a modified pre-post-post 
test design with non-equivalent groups (a treatment group and a comparison group). I 
refer to it as a modified pre-post-post design because data were not collected from all 
subjects at each of the three points in time; the treatment group was surveyed three times, 
whereas the comparison group was surveyed twice. Figure 1 displays a diagram of the 
research design.  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
Subjects and Procedures for Data Collection 
All subjects in this study are members of the Mecklenburg County, North 
Carolina community. The subjects in this study consist of two groups: 1) participants in 
the UAC 21st Century Town Meeting (the treatment group), and 2) non-participants in the 
UAC 21st Century Town Meeting (the comparison group). Data were collected through 
the administration of surveys at three points in time: Time 1 (before the UAC Town 
Meeting), Time 2 (immediately after the UAC Town Meeting), and Time 3 (24 months 
after the UAC Town Meeting). Data collection procedures for each point in time are 
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discussed below. Figure 2 displays the number of respondents and the response rates for 
each time wave.  
 
Time 1 (Before the UAC Town Meeting) 
In the weeks priors to the UAC 21st Century Town Meeting, Pacific Market 
Research (PMR) administered a telephone survey to random samples of participants and 
non-participants. The sample of participants was randomly selected from the list of 
individuals who pre-registered to attend the UAC 21st Century Town Meeting. Most 
participants pre-registered; however, pre-registration for the Town Meeting continued 
until the evening before the event. Thus, the pre-registration list was constantly changing, 
and not all pre-registrants had an equal chance of being selected for the telephone survey. 
This issue of selection bias is discussed below in the section on internal and external 
validity. Non-participants were selected using random telephone dial technologies. A 
total of 138 participants and 299 non-participants completed telephone surveys. The 
overall response rate for both groups was 63%. The specific response rate for participants 
is 89.2%. The specific response rate for non-participants is 57.3%.  
 
Time 2 (Immediately After the UAC Town Meeting) 
On the day of the UAC Town Meeting, all participants received a self-
administered survey in the packet of materials provided by AmericaSpeaks at the event. 
Participants were informed about the research during the opening and closing statements 
of the day. Participants were not told what the research was about; rather, they were 
simply informed that they would be asked to complete the survey in their materials at the 
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end of the day. At the close of the Town Meeting, participants were reminded to 
complete the survey and return it to a drop-box before leaving the event. They were also 
provided with a pre-addressed, stamped return envelope so completed surveys could be 
mailed at a later point in time to the Indiana Conflict Resolution Institute at Indiana 
University. Approximately 1,103 individuals attended the event. Of these, 676 were pre-
registrants, 187 were walk-in participants, and about 240 were walk-ins that were not 
accounted for at the registration table. A total of 525 participants completed surveys, 
yielding a response rate of about 47.6%. Non-participants were not surveyed at Time 2. 
 
Time 3 (18 Months After the UAC Town Meeting) 
The final round of data collection took place approximately 24 months after the 
UAC Town Meeting. All subjects were mailed an informed consent letter explaining the 
research, a copy of the appropriate survey instrument, and a pre-addressed, stamped 
envelope to return completed surveys to the Indiana Conflict Resolution Institute at 
Indiana University. Surveys were first sent in December 2006, and again to all non-
respondents in February 2007. Subjects for this round of data collection included 
participants in the UAC 21st Century Town Meeting who were accounted for at the 
registration table, as well as all non-participants surveyed at Time 1 who provided full 
names and addresses during the telephone interview. Non-participants who refused to 
provide names or addresses were omitted from the mailing, as it would be impossible to 
link their responses from Time 1 to their responses at Time 3. With these restrictions, a 
total of 863 participants and 125 non-participants were mailed surveys. Participants 
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returned 140 completed surveys, producing a response rate of about 16.2%. Non-
participants returned 40 surveys, producing a response rate of 32%.  
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
In addition to displaying the number of respondents and the response rates for 
each round of data collection, Figure 2 also shows the potential individual-level data links 
between surveys at various times. Individual responses for both participants and non-
participants can be linked at Time 1 and Time 3 because identifiers were used with the 
surveys. However, among participants, individual responses cannot be linked between 
Time 1 and Time 2, or between Time 2 and Time 3. AmericaSpeaks, in conjunction with 
the UAC, made the decision about this feature of the research design. The use of survey 
identifiers at the Town Meeting was not allowed for at least two reasons. First, the time 
frame within which the study was designed was short, making it difficult to organize and 
overcome the logistical intricacies of such an effort. Second, and more importantly, both 
organizations felt that if participants knew their actions were being monitored for 
research, then they might be less willing or able to participate fully and freely in the 
deliberative process. Thus, although this feature of the research design creates additional 
difficulties in terms of data analysis, particularly with respect to selection issues, it was 
important to respect the wishes of AmericaSpeaks and the UAC and agree to this 
condition in the research design in order to proceed with the study. Unfortunately, due to 
low response rates, only 17 participants and 36 non-participants can be linked between 
Times 1 and 3. 
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Survey Instruments 
The survey instruments were designed in conjunction with AmericaSpeaks staff to 
capture a broad range of information from both participants and non-participants, 
including demographic characteristics, use of media, perceptions about various issues in 
government and politics, and perceptions about various citizenship characteristics such as 
political interest and knowledge, civic engagement, political and social trust, and political 
efficacy. 
Participants’ survey instruments vary slightly depending on the time frame of 
administration. For example, at Time 1 and Time 2, participants were asked questions 
about their expectations for the event in terms of the potential impact of the Town 
Meeting. At Time 3, the verb tense of these questions was changed to asses how well 
their expectations for the event were met in terms of the earlier perceived potential 
impact. In addition, participant surveys at Time 2 and Time 3 asked subjects about their 
perceptions of the content and context of the UAC in terms of the issues discussed at the 
meeting, the quality of deliberation, and perceptions about the overall Town Meeting 
process. Non-participants were administered identical surveys at Time 1 and Time 3, with 
the exception of one question that asks whether they attended the UAC Town Meeting. 
This question was added because it is possible that non-participants surveyed at Time 1 
attended the event; however, no non-participants answered this question affirmatively. 
Appendix 1 contains copies of all surveys. 
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Internal and External Validity 
All research designs have consequences in terms of threats to internal and external 
validity. Internal validity is concerned with causal relationships and the elimination of 
confounding variables within a study. External validity is concerned with 
generalizability, or the extent to which the findings hold in other settings.  
As noted earlier, this study uses a non-equivalent comparison group design, 
without the random assignment of subjects to either the treatment or comparison group. 
This design controls for many threats to internal validity caused by maturation, testing, 
instrumentation, and history (Campbell and Stanley, 1966; Cook and Campbell, 1979; see 
generally Bickman and Rog, 1998). Maturation refers to continuous processes that occur 
over time and emanate naturally from within the subjects of study (Reichardt and Mark, 
1998). In this study, example of maturation might include growing older, having a child, 
or learning more about local youth or political issues. Testing is a threat to internal 
validity when the test or recording of an observation affects the results of a later test or 
observation (Reichardt and Mark, 1998). In this study, an example of a testing threat 
would be if a participant became more familiar with the survey instrument over time, and 
thus changed his or her answers.  
History refers to specific events, other than the treatment, that occurred between 
the before and after observations and that could cause changes in the outcome of interest 
(Reichardt and Mark, 1998). An example of history relevant to this study is if there was a 
major redistricting of schools in the greater Charlotte area. In terms of this study, one 
would expect few historical threats between Time 1 and Time 2, because the interval 
between the periods is so small. Conversely, one might expect a greater threat from 
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history between Time 1 and Time 3, where the interval is approximately 24 months. 
However, history is controlled for in this research design insofar as general historical 
events would equally affect both the treatment and comparison groups. In other words, 
events that happened in Charlotte (or in North Carolina, the nation, or the world), would 
likely be experienced by both participants and non-participants. Moreover, other research 
about the UAC Town Meeting shows that there were no major political or social issues or 
upheavals in the Charlotte area from December 2004 through August 2006 (Napoli, 
Nesbit, and Bingham, 2006).  
Nevertheless, this research design does suffer from two threats to internal validity: 
experimental mortality and selection bias. Experimental mortality, also known as 
attrition, concerns the loss of subjects in the study, which can create a difference in a 
before-after comparison (Reichardt and Mark, 1998; Manheim, Rich, Willnat, and 
Brians, 2006). For example, if participants had a bad experience at the UAC Town 
Meeting, they might be less willing to complete the follow-up survey and refuse to 
participate in the study. The potential result is that only those who had a good experience 
would participate in the follow-up surveys, thus skewing the results. The design of this 
study prevents assessing mortality rates across all three time periods, since individual 
responses can only be linked between Time 1 and Time 3. However, between Time 1 and 
Time 3, there was a significant loss of subjects, as evidenced by the low responses rates 
of participants and non-participants to the third survey.  
A second threat to validity concerns selection bias. Selection bias occurs when the 
selection process is correlated with the current or future expected value of the dependent 
variable. In other words, selection bias is the extent to which various subgroups or target 
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populations are likely to participate in a program, thus affecting the sample and 
ultimately the results. There are two types of bias: 1) those due to differences in 
observables (which can be estimated from the data) and 2) those due to unobservables 
(which are either not known by the researcher or are not easily measured). The 
unobservables are problematic in that they affect both the decision to participate in the 
program and the outcome, in this case, political efficacy.  
In terms of this study, a particular concern is the issue of self-selection. Self-
selection involves “initial selection differences” and “the possibility that, because 
different groups of individuals are being compared, differences between the treatment 
group and the control (or comparison) group on the outcome measure are due to initial 
differences between the groups rather than to the treatment effect” (Reichardt and Mark, 
1998: 210). Self-selection is possible whenever the subjects being studied have control 
over the decision to participate, because subjects’ decisions to participate may be 
correlated with traits that affect the study, making the participants a non-representative 
sample. Thus, self selection is a threat because the outcome “effect may be due to the 
difference between the kinds of people in one experimental group as opposed to another” 
(Cook and Campbell, 1979: 53).  
The potential for selection bias is manifest in at least three ways in this study. 
First, there is the problem of self selection and initial selection differences. Although 
AmericaSpeaks uses targeted recruitment, there remains an inherent issue of self-
selection. It is possible that many of the participants at the event deliberately sought to be 
involved in the UAC Town Meeting. Thus, it is possible that the characteristics of 
participants fundamentally differ from those of non-participants, and that those differing 
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characteristics are what prompted some (and not others) to participate in the Town 
Meeting. Consequently, differences between participants and non-participants might not 
be due solely to the experience of deliberation, but may rather be a result of bias due to 
self-selection. Second, it is possible that the characteristics of participants who pre-
registered differ from those participants who walked-in on the day of the event. For 
example, the pre-registrants might be the more committed members of the community or 
activists who are inclined to become involved. If so, this is likely to influence the results. 
Thus, responses among participants at Time 1 (who were randomly selected from a list of 
pre-registrants) may differ from those who responded at Times 2 and 3 (both pre-
registrants and walk-ins) because of self-selection bias rather than because of any 
treatment effects. Finally, there may be self-selection bias among both participants and 
non-participants in terms of who decided to complete the survey. This is complicated by 
the fact that the survey was administered multiple times. As discussed later in this and 
future chapters, these selection issues are controlled for with various statistical methods.  
In terms of external validity, it should be noted that the 21st Century Town 
Meeting is a highly unique deliberative process, involving lengthy and elaborate 
preparation, significant use of new technologies, and varying modes of deliberation. 
Moreover, it is a highly managed process, from the development of a neutral statement of 
the issue (including issue definition), to intensive facilitation and deliberation, to the 
writing of outcomes and recommendations for decision makers. In addition, the process is 
intensive for participants, especially when compared to many other deliberative 
processes, involving at least 8 full hours of deliberation and discussion. When coupled 
with the design elements of the 21st Century Town Meeting, these features raise 
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important questions about the generalizability of findings from this study. Clearly, the 
findings are not generalizable across the spectrum of all deliberative democracy 
processes and applications; however, they may hold in deliberative democracy settings 
where the observed process shares similar procedural elements or structural 
characteristics with the 21st Century Town Meeting. Moreover, the findings from the 
study should be generalizable to other manifestations of the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century 
Town Meeting, as the process remains constant regardless of the deliberative topic. 
Despite the limits of generalizability, this research informs the study of deliberative 
democracy and is valuable to the development of both theory and practice. As noted in 
the previous chapter, there is a modicum of empirical research examining deliberative 
democracy. As scholars begin to understand the impacts and outcomes of singular 
deliberative democracy processes, in this case, the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town 
Meeting, they can use that information to both refine and build theory and enhance 
practice.  
 
Variable Measurement 
This study examines two dependent variables (internal political efficacy and 
external political efficacy) and eight independent variables (quality of deliberation, 
potential impact, race, age, gender, parental status, educational level, and socio-economic 
status). Each variable in the analyses, with the exception of demographic characteristics, 
is measured with a standardized summative index consisting of several different survey 
items. The survey instrument included numerous questions intended to measure each 
construct. Some survey items were taken directly from previous research (Center for 
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Political Studies (CPS) and American National Election Studies (ANES) survey data). 
Other items were developed based on the theory deliberative democracy and the practice 
of the 21st Century Town Meeting. Given the variety of question sources, it was 
important to test the items and the indices for validity and reliability. 
The general procedure for constructing valid and reliable indices involved several 
steps.8 First, items were grouped into a potential index based on face validity, that is, the 
concept that a particular item appeared to measure. Second, principle components factor 
analysis was conducted to test the fit of each item within the preliminary index. Third, 
items were selected based on both the unrotated and quartimax rotated factor loadings. 
Fourth, the psychometric adequacy of each index was evaluated using Cronbach’s alpha, 
an estimate of the reliability and internal consistency of responses to the items 
comprising a given scale (Cronbach, 1951). Finally, items were combined into a 
summative index, which was then standardized. In other words, raw scores for each item 
in a particular index were added together to create a raw index score for each subject. The 
individual raw index scores were then standardized using the mean of 0 and the standard 
deviation of 1 (i.e., the mean raw index score was subtracted from the individual raw 
score and then the difference was divided by the sample standard deviation). 
Standardization is used because these indices have no natural scale. Cases where a 
respondent did not answer a question that is included in a final index were omitted from 
the analyses. Specific details about this process are reviewed below for each of the four 
                                                 
8 Before creating the indices, the data were cleaned. Most of the Likert scale questions had an option to 
respond as “don’t know” or “not sure.” These responses were recoded from 99 to system missing so as to 
not skew analytic results. In addition, negatively worded questions were recoded with an inverse scale.  
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indexed variables (internal political efficacy, external political efficacy, quality of 
deliberation, and potential impact).  
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Political Efficacy 
Although political efficacy is one of the most frequently used measures of general 
political attitudes and is thought to be a key indicator of the overall health of democratic 
systems, there has been considerable dissatisfaction with and debate about the 
measurement of the concept. The first measures of political efficacy were developed at 
the University of Michigan’s Center for Political Studies (CPS). The CPS time-series 
scale used six items to measure political efficacy but did not distinguish between internal 
and external political efficacy. When scholars realized that political efficacy consisted of 
these two separate components (internal political efficacy and external political efficacy), 
many attempted to salvage the CPS time series by subdividing the traditional six-item 
scale in various ways (see for example Acock, Clarke, and Stewart, 1985; Clarke and 
Acock, 1989; Finkel, 1985; Miller, Miller, and Schneider, 1980; see also Craig, Niemi, 
and Silver, 1990: 290). However, the traditional measures of political efficacy were still 
frequently criticized for “their apparent lack of validity and reliability” (Craig, Niemi, 
and Silver, 1990: 289). 
To correct for these perceived problems, some researchers advocated for the 
development of alternative measures (e.g., Craig and Maggiotto, 1982). In 1988, 
researchers conducted pilot surveys in conjunction with the National Election Studies 
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(NES) to examine items related to political efficacy and political trust. Included among 
the items were most of the original CPS questions, as well as new, untested measures. 
Craig, Niemi, and Silver (1990) were the first to report the results of the pilot study. In 
terms of internal political efficacy, they concluded that researchers can best measure 
internal political efficacy with four to six items, with only one of the original measures 
remaining in the new scale. Their conclusions about external efficacy were less clear. 
They were interested in determining whether the concept of external political efficacy 
was divisible into regime-based efficacy and incumbent-based efficacy. They concluded 
that more research is needed particularly with respect to the best measures of external 
efficacy. In contrast to this research, Acock and Clarke (1990) and Acock, Clarke, and 
Stewart (1985) conclude that the CPS items are useful measures for internal and external 
efficacy and that the CPS model works well across a variety of contexts. Their argument 
is that “[g]iven the thirty-year investment in the SRC [University of Michigan’s Survey 
Research Center] efficacy measures, we believe that it would be premature to abandon 
these items without additional investigation” (Acock, Clarke, and Stewart, 1985: 1063).    
A review of more recent literature on political efficacy shows that the debate 
about measurement has continued. Researchers approach and measure the concept using 
and combining a variety of items taken from the original CPS data and the newer NES 
data, and sometimes even creating their own independent measures. Thus, it appears that 
there is no agreed upon scale for measuring the concepts. Indeed, one of the major 
difficulties in sorting out the findings concerning efficacy is that researchers have often 
relied on different measures (Morrell, 1998, 2005).  
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The research survey used in this study included most of the original CPS 
questions, several of the questions from the NES data, and additional questions that were 
designed with the concepts of internal and external political efficacy in mind. Based on 
face validity, 11 questions were selected for potential inclusion the efficacy indices. All 
items are 5 point Likert scale questions with the anchors of 1 = strongly agree and 5 = 
strongly disagree. Given the problems with previous measurements of internal and 
external political efficacy, factor analyses on these 11 items were individually conducted 
and examined for four samples: (1) both non-participants and participants at Time 1; 2) 
only non-participants at Time 1; 3) only participants at Time 1; and, 4) participants at 
Time 2.  
For the pooled sample of non-participants and participants at Time 1, the factor 
analysis extracted four components with Eigenvalues greater than 1. The Eigenvalues for 
the first two components are 2.283 and 1.999; they explain 38.927% of the cumulative 
percent of variance. The Eigenvalues for the remaining components are only slightly 
above 1; thus, they are excluded from the analyses. For the remaining three samples, the 
factor analyses extracted three components with Eigenvalues greater than 1. For the non-
participants at Time 1, participants at Time 1, and participants at Time 2 samples, the 
respective Eigenvalues for the first components are 2.369, 2.131, and 2.355. Likewise, 
the respective Eigenvalues for the second components are 1.780, 1.702, and 1.411. 
Eigenvalues for remaining components in each sample are only slightly above 1; thus, 
they are excluded from the analyses. For the non-participants at Time 1, participants at 
Time 1, and participants at Time 2 samples, the cumulative percent of variance explained 
is respectively 46.095%, 42.582%, and 41.839%. Table 1 displays all of the items used in 
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the initial allocation, as well as the items used in the final indices for both internal and 
external political efficacy. More detail about the construction of each of these indices is 
below. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Internal political efficacy (IPE) is measured with the following three items, 
which ask how strongly the subject agreed that: 
1) Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me 
can't really understand what's going on [COMPLICATED]; 
2) I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics [MEQUAL]; and 
3) I often don’t feel sure of myself when talking about politics or government 
[NOTSURE].  
Table 2 shows the rotated factor loadings for the internal political efficacy items, 
as well as the index alpha score, for each sample. However, for the purposes of 
constructing the IPE index, the most important samples are those from Time 1. The logic 
here is that after the treatment intervention (i.e., participation in the Town Meeting at 
Time 2), one would expect internal political efficacy to change among participants. Thus, 
the following discussion is restricted to the Time 1 samples only.  
The rotated factor loadings for all of the Time 1 samples are reasonable, perhaps 
with the exception of COMPLICATED for participants at Time 1. It is interesting to note 
the different values of the loadings for individual samples of non-participants and 
participants at Time 1, particularly with respect to COMPLICATED and MEQUAL. 
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These differences are not necessarily surprising as theory suggests that participants may 
have different levels of confidence with regard to their ability to participate political 
activities than non-participants (Fung, 2003). Cronbach’s alpha, a measure of reliability, 
is .610 for the pooled sample at Time 1, .622 for non-participants at Time 1, and .570 for 
participants at Time 1. These values are less than .70, the standard cut-off for high 
reliability. The low reliability scores are likely a function of two issues. Most obviously, 
they could be a function of poor measurement, that is, the “lack of validity and 
reliability” so often noted with political efficacy (Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990: 289). 
The low scores may also be a result of sample size. Comrey and Lee (1992) suggest the 
following with regard to sample sizes in factor and reliability analyses: 50 is very poor, 
100 is poor, 200 is fair, 300 is good, 500 is very good, and 1,000 is excellent. Others 
suggest that a good general rule of thumb for sample size is 300 cases (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 1996). Under these criteria, the pooled sample would be categorized as good (n = 
437), while both the individual non-participant (n = 299) and individual participant (n = 
138) samples would be categorized as poor to fair. However, both of the individual 
samples meet the more lenient criteria of 50 cases per factor (Pedhazur and Schmelkin, 
1991). 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
External political efficacy (EPE) is measured with the following four items, 
which ask how strongly the subject agreed that: 
1) Elected officials don't care what people like me think [NOCARE]; 
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2) People like me don't have any say about what the government does [NOSAY];  
3) Elected officials are only interested in people’s votes [OFFVOTE]; and  
4) Local government is responsive to citizen concerns [LOCRESP]. 
Table 3 shows the rotated factor loadings for the external political efficacy items, 
as well as the index alpha score, for each sample. Again however, and following the logic 
above, the most important samples for the purposes of constructing the EPE index are 
those from Time 1. The factor loadings for all of the Time 1 samples are reasonable, 
perhaps with the exception of NOSAY and LOCRESP for participants at Time 1. As was 
the case with IPE, these differences are not necessarily surprising as theory suggests that 
participants and non-participants may have different perceptions about the responsiveness 
of government to citizen concerns. Cronbach’s alpha, a measure of reliability, is .676 for 
the pooled sample at Time 1, .706 for non-participants at Time 1, and .531 for 
participants at Time 1. Again, the reliability scores may be a function of poor 
measurement and/or sample size.  
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
 A final issue should be noted. The low reliability scores suggest that there is 
measurement error in the two dependent variables. This measurement error is found in 
other studies of political efficacy (Craig, Niemi and Silver, 1990; or an excellent 
discussion particularly with respect to internal political efficacy, see Morrell, 1999, 2003, 
2005).Given the measurement error in the dependent variables, assumptions about 
statistical significance are relaxed. In other words, the analyses will check for statistical 
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significance at the traditional 95% confidence level (p < .05), as well as at the lower 
confidence level of 90% (p < .10). 
 
Independent Variables 
Quality of Deliberation  
Quality of deliberation (QD) is thought to be an important characteristic in 
determining the impact of deliberative democracy on citizens (see for example, Cohen, 
1989; Gastil, 1993, 2000, 2006; Habermas, 1989); however, there is a “dearth of 
measurement instruments that allow researchers to operationalize and quantify the quality 
of discourse” (Steenbergen, Bächtiger, Spörndli, and Steiner, 2003). The few existing 
research instruments use measurement indices with detailed coding instructions to be 
applied to observable behavior (e.g., Gerhards, 1997; Holzinger, 2001; Steenbergen, 
Bächtiger, Spörndli, and Steiner, 2003). Survey instruments with valid and reliable 
questions that measure deliberative quality have yet to be created. Thus, previous 
research was used to create theoretically grounded survey questions for this study.  
While there are multiple understandings of public deliberation, all agree that that 
substantive discussion among small, face-to-face groups is necessary (e.g., Fishkin, 1997; 
Gastil, 2006; Mathews, 1994; Mendelberg, 2002). As discussed in Chapter 3, these 
elements are readily present in the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting. In 
addition to these requirements, scholars and practitioners have articulated several other 
aspects or elements of quality deliberation. For example, AmericaSpeaks uses three 
dimensions with which to measure the quality of deliberation in Town Meetings, 
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including representation, inclusion, and participation. AmericaSpeaks describes each 
dimension (see www.americaspeaks.org/lab/research/quality/index.htm): 
Representation helps us understand the extent to which town 
meeting participants reflect the demographic profile of the host 
community. At the same time, we are working to understand the degree to 
which town meeting participants reflect the attitudinal dispositions of the 
population at large as well as larger civic patterns of behavior. 
Inclusion helps us understand the degree to which town meetings, 
and the table discussions, provide a safe and inclusive environment for all 
participants to contribute to and be heard. In addition to making town 
meetings accessible to participants for whom English is not spoken, 
AmericaSpeaks seeks to conform with ADA criteria.  
Participation helps us understand what actually takes place at 
discussion tables: do a few well-versed individuals dominate the table 
discussion? Do participants actually wrestle with trade-offs and conflicting 
world views? Does the group experience “tipping points” in conversation 
where new, socially constructed solutions to public problems are 
produced? 
  
These elements are echoed by Williamson (2004: 11-12), who suggests three important 
factors in quality deliberation, including whether 1) there is diversity among participants 
who are representative of their community; 2) the tenor of discussion is civil and 
respectful; and 3) the event evens the playing field for participation and influence.  
Other scholars seem to focus more on the discussion aspects of deliberation, 
rather than on structural, procedural, or participatory aspects. For example, two of the 
most frequently cited scholars of deliberation, Jürgen Habermas (1989) and Joshua 
Cohen (1989), stress the importance of rationality, consensus formation, and the search 
for a common good as critical features in quality deliberation. Habermas (1989) asserts 
that in a “rational-critical debate” individuals will use “the standards of reason” (28) and 
“the authority of the better argument” (36) to address matters of “common concern” (37). 
Building on this work, Cohen (1989) identifies freedom, reason, equality, and consensus 
as critical elements in judging the democratic legitimacy of deliberation.  
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Other scholars, however, suggest that quality deliberation requires a period of 
dialogue that is not focused on problem solving and consensus, but rather on 
understanding other participants’ experiences, perspectives, and ways of thinking and 
arguing. Such methods of deliberation allow participants to bring “different 
epistemologies to bear on a common problem, and that can result in a more sophisticated 
analysis of any public issue. At the same time, dialogue promotes fairness and inclusion 
by opening up conversation about alternative ways of speaking and knowing” 
(Burkhalter, Gastil, and Kelshaw, 2002: 411). In this way, deliberation helps to identify 
shared values and common interests in the community.  
 Gastil (2000: 22) suggests that “full deliberation includes a careful examination of 
a problem or issue, the identification of possible solutions, the establishment or 
reaffirmation of evaluation criteria, and the use of these criteria in identifying an optimal 
solution.” Elaborating on these ideas, Gastil (2006) focuses on the discussion aspects of 
deliberation, asserting that one important aspect of quality deliberation is the balanced 
presentation of alternative perspectives such that there is an equal opportunity for voice, 
where each viewpoint present has a chance to be expressed and heard. He emphasizes the 
importance of the “balance principle” in deliberation, the idea that “the deliberative 
process must not be undermined by individuals who take up all the meeting time and 
refuse to let other points of view be heard” (Gastil, 2006; see also Gastil, 1993).  
 Building on these works, Chambers (2003: 309) offers a concise definition of 
deliberation that also speaks well to the characteristics of quality deliberation:  
We can say that [quality] deliberation is debate and discussion aimed at 
producing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which participants are 
willing to revise preferences in light of discussion, new information, and 
claims made by fellow participants. Although consensus need not be the 
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ultimate aim of deliberation, and participants are expected to pursue their 
interests, an overarching interest in the legitimacy of outcomes 
(understood as justification to all affected) ideally characterizes 
deliberation. 
 
This definition reflects the elements of the discourse quality index (DQI) created by 
Steenbergen, Bächtiger, Spörndli, and Steiner (2003). The DQI has seven coding 
categories, including: 
1) Participation: the extent to which a speaker is able to participate freely in the 
debate; 
2) Level of justification: the nature of the justification of demands; 
3) Content of justification: whether appeals are made in terms of narrow group 
interests or the common good;  
4) Respect for groups: the degree to which negative and positive statements are 
made about groups; 
5) Respect for the demands: the extent to which the demands of others are 
acknowledged; 
6) Respect toward counterarguments: the level of attention given to opposing 
viewpoints; and, 
7) Constructive politics: the degree of consensus building (see Steenbergen, 
Bächtiger, Spörndli, and Steiner, 2003: 27-30).  
As noted above, no survey instruments (or even specific survey questions) that 
measure the quality of deliberation have been empirically identified or tested. Given this 
situation, the research survey used in this study was designed with numerous questions 
that capture various ideas from the literature about the quality of deliberation. Based on 
face validity, 16 questions from participant data at Time 2 were selected for potential 
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inclusion in the quality of deliberation index. Sample size is not an issue with this data set 
(n = 525) (Comrey and Lee, 1992; Pedhazur and Schmelkin, 1991; Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 1996). All items are 5 point Likert scale questions with the anchors of 1 = strongly 
agree and 5 = strongly disagree. All of the items were loaded into an exploratory factor 
analysis. The results showed that these 16 questions load into 4 components with 
Eigenvalues greater than one. The first component has an Eigenvalue of 5.693 and 
explains 35.579 percent of the variance. The remaining three components have 
Eigenvalues of 1.881, 1.283, and 1.149 respectively, and, together explain an additional 
26.956 of the variance. In sum, the four components explain 62.535 percent of the 
cumulative variance.  
The rotated factor loadings for the items in the first component were examined; 
the remaining components are excluded from the analysis. Further assessment of 
convergent validity and reliability resulted in dropping 6 of the items. Among the 10 
remaining items, inter-item correlations are high, and factor loadings range from .624 to 
.767. Cronbach’s alpha is .868, indicating a strong level of reliability. Table 4 shows all 
of the items used in the initial allocation, as well as the items used in the final index for 
the quality of deliberation.  
In its final construction, the quality of deliberation is measured with ten items, 
asking how strongly the subject agreed that: 
1) There was a diverse group of people at the United Agenda for Children Town 
Meeting [DIVERSE];  
2) Participants represented a cross-section of the community [CROSS]; 
3) Participants worked toward consensus agreements on the issues [CONSENSUS]; 
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4) A variety of policy alternatives were explored [POLALTS]; 
5) Participants suggested creative alternatives to the problems [CREATALT]; 
6) I [the subject] had an adequate opportunity to express my opinions [EXOPIN]; 
7) The discussions identified shared values in the community [VALUES]; 
8) The viewpoints of other participants were worth considering [CONSIDVIEW]; 
9) The discussions helped me [the subject] think more critically about the issues(s) 
[CRITICAL]; and  
10) The discussions helped me [the subject] consider other sides of the issues 
[OSIDE]. 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
Potential Impact 
Potential impact (IMPACT) measures the extent to which participants at Time 2 
believed that the Town Meeting recommendations would be generally beneficial to and 
positively affect the community. The survey contains 10 questions that, based on face 
validity, appeared to measure perceived potential impact. Seven items are 5 point Likert 
scale questions with the anchors of 1 = strongly agree and 5 = strongly disagree. The 
remaining three items are 10 point Likert scale questions with the anchors of 1 = no 
impact and 10 = great impact. Responses to these 10 point questions were multiplied by 
.5 to transform them into a 5 point scale.  
All of the items were loaded into an exploratory factor analysis. The results show 
that these 10 questions load into 3 components with Eigenvalues greater than one. The 
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first component has an Eigenvalue of 3.379 and explains 33.795 percent of the variance. 
The remaining two components have Eigenvalues of 1.620 and 1.017 respectively, and, 
together explain an additional 26.364 of the variance. In sum, the three four components 
explain 60.159 percent of the cumulative variance.  
The rotated factor loadings for the items in only the first component were 
examined. Further assessment of convergent validity and reliability resulted in dropping 4 
of the items. Among the remaining items, inter-item correlations are high, as are the 
factor loadings, which range from .663 to .752. In addition, the scale rates high for 
reliability with a Cronbach’s alpha value of .825. Table 5 shows all of the items used in 
the initial factor analysis, as well as the items used in the final indices for potential 
impact. 
In its final construction, the potential impact index is measured with six items, 
asking how strongly the subject agreed that: 
1) The United Agenda for Children Town Meeting helped decision makers and 
elected officials better understand the concerns of average citizens [DMUNDER]; 
2) The United Agenda for Children Town Meeting produced information that will 
improve future decision making [FUTUREDM]; 
3) Local groups and organizations will work together to implement the 
recommendations from the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting 
[LOCWORK]; 
4) The United Agenda for Children Town Meeting will increase the capacity of local 
groups and organizations to work together [CAPACITY]; 
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5) Decision makers were responsive to the recommendations of participants during 
the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting [DMRESP]; and, 
6) Decision makers and elected officials will use information from the United 
Agenda for Children Town Meeting to make decisions [USEINFO]. 
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
Demographic Variables 
In addition to these indices, several demographic variables are used in the study.  
Race (Race). In the survey, race is measured with categories of [1] Black/African 
American; [2] White/Caucasian; [3] Hispanic/Latino; [4] Asian/Asian-Indian; [5] Multi-
Ethnic/Other; [6] Unknown. For purposes of analyses, the data were recoded into a 
binary variable such that 0 = White/Caucasian, and 1 = all other racial groups. 
Age (Age). Age is measured with the categories of: [1] Under 18; [2] 18-21 years; 
[3] 22-34 years; [4] 35-44 years; [5] 45-59 years; [6] Over 60. For purposes of analyses, 
the data were recoded into a binary variable such that 0 = 18-44 years old, and 1 = 45 and 
older. Any survey completed by subjects that were under 18 years of age were eliminated 
from the analyses. 
Gender (Gender). Gender is a dichotomous variable with the categories of [0] 
Male, and [1] Female.  
Employment Status (Employ) is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the 
subject is employed. The categories are [0] No, and [1] Yes. 
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Parental Status (Parent). Parent is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the 
subject has children under the age of eighteen. The categories are [0] No, and [1] Yes.  
Educational Level (Educ). Education level is measured with the categories of [1] 
Some High School; [2] High School Graduate (including equivalency); [3] Some 
College, No Degree; [4] Associate Degree; [5] Bachelor’s Degree; [6] Graduate or 
Professional Degree. For purposes of analyses, the data were recoded into a binary 
variable such that 0 = no higher education degree, and 1 = associates, bachelors, or 
graduate/professional degree. 
Socio-Economic Status (SES). Socio-economic status is measured with a question 
about total household income before taxes. Categorical responses included [1] Under 
$10,000; [2] $10,000 to $19,999; [3] $20,000 to $29,999; [4] $30,000 to $39,999; [5] 
$40,000 to $49,999; [6] $50,000 to $59,999; [7] $60,000 to $69,999; [8] $70,000 to 
$79,999; [9] $80,000 to $89,999; [10] $90,000 to $99,999; [11] 100,000 or More. For 
purposes of analyses, the data were recoded into a binary variable such that 0 = total 
household income of $49,999 or less, and 1 = total household income of $50,000 or 
more.9  
 
Analyses 
As noted above, this study is complicated by selection issues and the fact that 
individual responses to survey items cannot be linked among participants at all three 
times. Moreover, answering the research questions requires making and assessing several 
different comparisons between and among non-participants and participants at various 
                                                 
9 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the median household income in 2004 in Charlotte, NC was $40, 
863 (see: http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/37000.html) 
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points in time. Each subsidiary research question and its related hypotheses are addressed 
separately using a series of analyses that follow similar logical progression. In general, 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are conducted for each subsidiary research 
question. OLS is used because all of the items that comprise the internal and external 
political efficacy indices are approximately normally distributed.10 Although OLS is not 
the most sophisticated approach to regression analysis, it is the simplest and most readily 
understood; therefore, its use allows for easy interpretation by the widest possible range 
of readers. These OLS regressions are completed by additional analyses such as summary 
statistics and t-tests. In addition, Heckman treatment effect models or propensity score 
matching models are also used to generate estimators of the political efficacy differences 
between groups.  
Although each analytic series is discussed in detail below and in the next chapter, 
it is useful to briefly outline their logical progression. In essence, each subsidiary 
research question asks whether there is a difference in political efficacy between two 
groups (i.e., non-participants and participants, or participants at different points in time). 
Estimates of the difference between the two groups are presented using OLS regression, 
where one’s participation status (i.e., participant or non-participant, or participant at a 
                                                 
10 A skewness statistic was calculated for each item in the IPE and EPE indices. A skewness value of less 
than 1 suggests that the responses to the item are normally distributed. The skewness statistics for the items 
in each index are: 
Index Item Skewness 
   Statistic Std. Error 
COMPLICATED -.074 .125
MEQUAL .650 .125IPE 
NOTSURE -.162 .125
NOCARE -.111 .125
NOSAY -.086 .125
OFFVOTE -.159 .125
EPE 
LOCRESP .273 .125
 
 
 180
certain point in time) is the only independent variable. However, the resulting OLS 
estimates of the difference between the two groups are likely to be biased due to selection 
issues. Moreover, it is highly probable that other variables besides participation status 
affect political efficacy among the subjects in this study. For example, a significant body 
of research indicates that political efficacy is correlated with demographic characteristics 
and that demographic characteristics are related to participation (Abramson, 1983; Dowse 
and Hughes, 1972; Kleiman, 1976; Lane, 1959; Lyons, 1970; Martinussen, 1972; Orum, 
1989; Verba and Nie, 1972). If this holds in the samples under study here, then the data 
face a selection on the observables problem.  
Several additional OLS regression models are used to test for this selection 
problem. In particular, analyses are conducted to determine whether demographic 
variables have an impact on political efficacy among the subjects under study. To the 
extent that demographic characteristics are related to subjects’ perceptions of political 
efficacy, probit regression models, completed by summary statistics, are used to 
determine the demographic differences between the two sample groups under 
investigation. With the information provided by these analyses, the next analytic steps 
seek to find a consistent estimator of the differences in political efficacy between the two 
groups. First, OLS regression models are conducted where internal and external political 
efficacy are regressed as a function of participation status and demographic 
characteristics. However, there is also the possibility of selection bias due to 
unobservable variables (i.e., data not captured by the survey), which may affect 
perceptions of political efficacy among subjects. Thus, the OLS estimators may be 
biased. The final sets of analyses employ either Heckman treatment effect models or 
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propensity score matching models to statistically control for this potential selection 
problem. The following sections detail the analytic methods used to address each of the 
subsidiary research question and their related hypotheses.  
 
 
Question 1: Do participants and non-participants differ in terms of 
political efficacy before participation in the Town Meeting? 
 
The first subsidiary research question concerns a comparison of participants and 
non-participants. Specifically, it seeks to determine whether there are baseline differences 
in political efficacy between the two groups before the Town Meeting intervention takes 
place. At the heart of this question is whether those who choose to participate in 
deliberative processes have different perceptions of political efficacy than those who do 
not participate. This question is important because its answer will shed light on the make-
up of the engaged (and disengaged) citizenry and help scholars to better understand the 
characteristics of those who are (and are not) engaged in deliberative processes. Five sets 
of analyses are performed to explore and answer this question. Within each set of 
analyses, internal and external political efficacy are examined in separate models.  
First, OLS regression models are used to assess internal and external political 
efficacy among participants and non-participants. More specifically, IPE and EPE are 
explored as a function of participation, that is, whether one is a participant or non-
participant. The resulting parameter on the participation variable will show whether 
participants and non-participants have different levels of IPE and EPE. These regression 
models are complemented by an independent samples t-test, which provides a more 
easily interpreted estimate of the magnitude and direction of differences in political 
efficacy between participants and non-participants. As noted above, however, this 
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estimate of the difference in political efficacy is likely to be biased, given the possibility 
of selection on the observables. Therefore, the second and third sets of regression 
analyses seek to determine the extent of selection on the observables in the samples.  
Specifically, the second regression models assess the extent to which political 
efficacy varies in response to demographic characteristics, including race, age, gender, 
employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status. The third 
regressions are probit models, which seek to determine whether the participant and non-
participant samples differ on these same demographic characteristics. If these regression 
models show that demographics in the samples are not related to political efficacy, then 
the estimate from the first OLS model will be consistent. However, if the regression 
models show that political efficacy is a function of demographic characteristics and that 
the demographic characteristics of participants and non-participants differ, then this 
indicates that there is a selection on the observables problem in the samples. This 
problem means that the first estimate of the difference in political efficacy between 
participants and non-participants is biased, and additional analyses are needed to find a 
statistically consistent estimator of the difference in political efficacy between 
participants and non-participants.  
The fourth and fifth set of analyses includes linear regression models and 
Heckman treatment effect models. The linear regression models can be thought of as a 
selection on the observables model as they examine the impact of both participation (i.e., 
whether one is a participant or non-participant) and all demographic characteristics on 
political efficacy. Even with this model, however, it is possible that there is selection on 
the unobservables, that the error term is capturing the effects on IPE and EPE of other 
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independent variables not included in the regression equations. To assess this possibility, 
Heckman treatment effect models are used.  
The Heckman approach uses a two equation model that addresses several classes 
of selection bias, including bias due to self-selection (Briggs, 2004; Heckman, 1978, 
1979; Heckman and Robb, 1985, 1986). One equation is a selection equation, which 
predicts some binary outcome. In this case, the binary outcome is participation (i.e., 
whether one is a participant or non-participant), as predicted by demographic variables 
(race, age, gender, employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-
economic status) and variables that indicate previous political participatory activities 
(whether in the last year the subject had attended a neighborhood or town-hall meeting, a 
meeting involving school affairs, or contacted a local public official, and whether the 
subject voted in the November 2004 presidential election). The second equation is a 
structural equation, which examines the ultimate dependent variable(s) of interest. In this 
case, the dependent variables are internal and external political efficacy, which are 
regressed as a function of participation and demographic variables (race, age, gender, 
employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status). Using 
these two equations, the marginal effects of participation on political efficacy are 
assessed. Moreover, the likelihood ratio test for independence will help determine 
whether the estimators from the OLS regression model or the Heckman model are more 
consistent.  
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Question 2: Do participants have a higher sense of political efficacy 
after participation in the Town Meeting? If so, what variables affect 
perceptions of political efficacy? 
 
The second subsidiary research question concerns differences between 
participants at Time 1 and at Time 2. Specifically, it seeks to determine whether 
participation in the Town Meeting has an immediate impact on subjects’ perceptions of 
internal and external political efficacy. This question is at the heart of the dissertation and 
has the potential to make important contributions to both theory and practice. The 
answers will inform our understanding of whether and how deliberative democracy 
contributes to participants’ perceptions of political efficacy. Numerous analyses are 
performed to explore and answer this question, and within each set of analyses, internal 
and external political efficacy are examined in separate models. The logical progression 
of the analyses resembles that presented above, but with some important differences.  
First, OLS regression models are used to assess internal and external political 
efficacy among participants at Time 1 and Time 2. The resulting parameter on the time 
variable will show whether participants have different levels of IPE and EPE after 
participating in the Town Meeting. These regression models are complemented by an 
independent samples t-test, which provides a more easily interpreted estimate of the 
magnitude and direction of differences in political efficacy after participation in the Town 
Meeting. Again, however, this estimate of the difference in political efficacy is likely to 
be biased, given the possibility of selection on the observables. The second and third sets 
of analyses test for this issue. The second regression models seeks to determine the extent 
to which political efficacy among participants at Time 1 and Time 2 varies in response to 
demographic characteristics including, race, age, gender, employment status, parental 
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status, education level, and socio-economic status. The third analyses are probit 
regression models that seek to determine whether the participant samples at Time 1 and 
Time 2 differ in respect to these same demographic characteristics. When combined, 
these three sets of regression models will help determine whether the samples suffer from 
selection on the observables, that is, whether political efficacy is a function of both 
demographic characteristics and participation in the process. If the selection problem 
exists, then two additional methods (linear regression analysis and propensity score 
matching) are used to find a statistically consistent estimator of the effect of participation 
in the Town Meeting on political efficacy. The regression models examine political 
efficacy as a function of time (i.e., participation in the Town Meeting) and demographic 
characteristics. Even with this model, however, it is possible that there is selection on the 
unobservables, that the error term is capturing the effects on IPE and EPE of other 
independent variables not included in the regression equations. To assess this possibility, 
propensity score matching (PSM) is also used.   
 PSM is a non-experimental method of sampling that deals with the problem of 
selection bias in research, and thus allows for more robust comparisons of two groups. 
PSM produces a control group whose distribution of covariates is similar to that of the 
treated group (Rosebaum and Rubin, 1983). Conditioning many covariates produces a 
problem of dimensionality that calls for a method of summarizing multi-dimensional 
covariates. PSM adopts one-dimensional propensity scores to achieve the “dimension 
reduction” (Hahn, 1998: 317; D’Agostino and Rubin, 2000). The PSM method consists 
of four steps: (1) estimating the propensity score; 2) checking the balance of covariates; 
3) matching subjects either through pair matching or sub-classification; and 4) calculating 
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the average treatment effects (Becker and Ichino, 2002; Dehejia and Wahba, 1999, 2002; 
Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, 1984).  
A binary probit model is employed to estimate the propensity score. The probit 
model uses demographic variables, including race, age, gender, employment status, 
parental status, education level, and socio-economic status, as well as variables that 
indicate previous political participatory activities, including whether in the last year the 
subject had attended a neighborhood or town-hall meeting, a meeting involving school 
affairs, or contacted a local public official, and whether the subject voted in the 
November 2004 presidential election. Participants at Time 1 are then “matched” to 
participants at Time 2 using one-to-one pair matching without replacement. Paired t-tests 
are then conducted to get consistent estimates of program effects, that is, to determine 
whether participation in the program had an impact on subjects’ perceptions of political 
efficacy.   
The final set of analyses pertaining to the second research question explores the 
impact of different variables on perceptions of internal and external political efficacy. 
Specifically, OLS models are used to regress internal and external political efficacy as a 
function of demographic and deliberative variables (quality of deliberation and perceived 
potential impact). Deliberative variables are not available for participants at Time 1; 
therefore, data used in these regression analyses include only participants at Time 2. 
These regression models show the relative influence of demographic and deliberative 
variables on internal and external political efficacy.  
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Question 3: If participants have a higher sense of political efficacy 
after participation in the Town Meeting, do those effects last over 
time? 
 
The third subsidiary research question concerns the persistence of the efficacy 
effect, that is whether changes in perceptions of political effect last over time. This 
question is important because it allows for an assessment of the long-term impacts of 
deliberative participation on perceptions of political efficacy. Just as it is important to 
know and understand whether deliberation increases political efficacy, it is important to 
know whether the efficacy effect persists over time. To determine the persistence of the 
efficacy effect, several comparisons are made. First, participants at Time 3 are compared 
to participants at Time 2 and Time 1. Second, participants at Time 3 are compared to 
non-participants at Time 3. Finally, non-participants at Time 1 are compared to non-
participants at Time 3.  
The comparisons of participants at Time 3 to Time 1 and Time 2 follow the same 
methodological approach outlined above for the comparison of participants at Time 1 and 
Time 2. Likewise, the comparison of participants and non-participants at Time 3 follows 
the methodological approach outlined above for the comparison of participants and non-
participants at Time 1. Finally, the comparison of non-participants at Time 1 and Time 3 
is made with a paired t-test.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter provided a detailed overview of the study. It examined the research 
questions and hypotheses that guide this study. It also discussed research design, subjects 
and procedures for data collection, survey instruments, and issues involving internal and 
external validity. Finally, the chapter explained variable measurement and construction, 
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and briefly discussed the methods of statistical analysis used to address the hypotheses 
and answer the research questions. Further details about the statistical methodologies and 
the results of the analyses are explored in the next chapter.  
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Figure 1: Diagram of Research Design 
 
 
 
T1 X T2 T3 (treatment/experimental group) 
C1   C3 (comparison group) 
 
where: 
T = participants of the UAC 21st Century Town Meeting 
C = community members who did not participate in the UAC 21st Century Town 
Meeting 
X = intervention (i.e., the UAC 21st Century Town Meeting) 
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Figure 2: Potential Individual-Level Data Links between Surveys at Various Times 
 
 
  
          Time 1       Time 2                Time 3  
 
    
 
Participants 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
Non- 
Participants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: A solid line shows that individual-level survey data can be linked for those times. 
A dotted line shows that individual-level data cannot be linked for those times. 
 
 
n = 138  
response rate =  
89.2% 
(random sample of 
pre-registrants for 
event) 
n = 299 
response rate = 
57.3% 
(random sample of 
community 
members) 
n = 525 
response rate =  
47.6%  
(all participants at 
event) 
n = 40 
response rate = 
32% 
(all those who  
provided names 
and addresses) 
n = 140 
response rate = 
16.2% 
(all participants at 
event who 
provided names 
and addresses)
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TABLE 1: Items Measuring the Internal and External Political Efficacy Indices 
 
Survey  Item*  Status in Final Index 
To what extent do you agree with each statement below?  
Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a 
person like me can't really understand what's going on. 
[COMPLICATED] 
FINAL  
IPE  
I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics. 
[MEQUAL] 
FINAL  
IPE 
I often don’t feel sure of myself when talking about politics or 
government.   
[NOTSURE] 
FINAL  
IPE 
Elected officials don't care what people like me think. 
[NOCARE] 
FINAL  
EPE  
People like me don't have any say about what the government does. 
[NOSAY] 
FINAL  
EPE 
Elected officials are only interested in people’s votes. 
[OFFVOTE] 
FINAL  
EPE 
Local government is responsive to citizen concerns. 
[LOCRESP] 
FINAL  
EPE 
It is important for people like me to have a voice in local 
government decisions. 
[MYVOICE] 
DROPPED 
Voting is the only way people like me can have a say about how 
government runs things.  
[VOTESAY] 
DROPPED 
Citizens should have more opportunities to participate in local 
government decision-making. 
[MOREPART] 
DROPPED 
Public policy decisions should be left to elected officials. 
[OFFPP] DROPPED 
* Note: text in the brackets [] represents variable name. 
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TABLE 2: Internal Political Efficacy – Rotated Factor Loadings and Alpha Scores 
 
Non-
Participants 
and 
Participants 
at Time 1 
(n = 437) 
Non-
Participants 
Time 1 
(n = 299) 
Participants 
Time 1 
(n = 138) 
Participants 
Time 2 
(n = 525) 
COMPLICATED .728 .704 .571 .577 
MEQUAL .669 .676 .809 .766 
NOTSURE .809 .804 .750 .793 
Cronbach’s Alpha .610 .622 .570 .232 
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TABLE 3: External Political Efficacy – Rotated Factor Loadings and Alpha Scores 
 
 
Non-
Participants 
and 
Participants 
at Time 1 
(n = 437) 
Non-
Participants 
Time 1 
(n = 299) 
Participants 
Time 1 
(n = 138) 
Participants 
Time 2 
(n = 525) 
NOCARE .791 .806 .751 .834 
NOSAY .690 .710 .423 .689 
OFFVOTE .723 .708 .784 .658 
LOCRESP .583 .678 .402 .630 
Cronbach’s Alpha .676 .706 .531 .249 
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TABLE 4: Items Measuring the Quality of Deliberation Index 
 
Survey  Item*  
Status in Final 
Index  
To what extent do you agree with each statement below? 
 
There was a diverse group of people at the United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting. [DIVERSE] FINAL  
Participants represented a cross-section of the community.  
[CROSS] FINAL 
Participants worked toward consensus agreements on the issues. 
[CONSENSUS] FINAL 
A variety of policy alternatives were explored.  
[POLALTS] FINAL 
Participants suggested creative alternatives to the problems. 
[CREATALT] FINAL 
I had an adequate opportunity to express my opinions.  
[EXOPIN] FINAL 
The discussions identified shared values in the community.  
[VALUES] FINAL 
The viewpoints of other participants were worth considering. 
[CONSIDVIEW]  FINAL 
The discussions helped me think more critically about the issue(s). 
[CRITICAL] FINAL 
The discussions helped me consider other sides of the issues. 
[OSIDE] FINAL 
A few people did all of the talking.  
[FEWTALK] DROPPED 
The costs and consequences of each alternative were evaluated. 
[COST] DROPPED 
My opinions were fairly reflected in the information shared with 
everyone during the Summit. [MYOPIN] DROPPED 
The discussions made me reconsider my opinions about the 
issue(s). [RECONSIDER] DROPPED 
The discussions changed my opinion about the issue(s). 
[CHANGEOP] DROPPED 
I encountered viewpoints that differed from my own.  
[DIFFVIEW] DROPPED 
* Note: text in the brackets [] represents variable name. 
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TABLE 5: Items Measuring the Potential Impact  
 
Survey  Item*  Status in Final Index 
To what extent do you agree with each statement below?  
The United Agenda for Children Town Meeting will help decision makers 
and elected officials better understand the concerns of average citizens. 
[DMUNDER] 
FINAL 
The United Agenda for Children Town Meeting produced information that 
will improve future decision making. [FUTUREDM] FINAL 
Local groups and organizations will work together to implement the 
recommendations from the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting. 
[LOCWORK] 
FINAL 
The United Agenda for Children will increase the capacity of local groups 
and organizations to work together. [CAPACITY] FINAL 
Decision makers will be responsive to the recommendations of participants 
during the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting. [DMRESP] FINAL 
Decision makers and elected officials will use information from the United 
Agenda for Children Town Meeting to make decisions.  [USEINFO] FINAL 
Decision makers and government representatives will not follow through 
with citizens’ recommendations. [DMFOLLOW] DROPPED 
How much impact do you think the United Agenda for Children 
Town Meeting will have on you?  [IMPYOU]** DROPPED 
How much impact do you think the United Agenda for Children 
Town Meeting will have on Mecklenburg County?  [IMPCHAR]** DROPPED 
How much impact do you think the United Agenda for Children 
Town Meeting will have on policy makers?  [IMPPM]** 
 
DROPPED 
* Note: words in the brackets {} represent the past tense version of the question that is 
used to measure perceived impact at Time 3. Text in the brackets [] represents variable 
name. 
** Denotes that question was originally in 10 point Likert Scale format; however, 
responses were converted into 5 point Likert scale before analysis.  
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CHAPTER FIVE  
RESULTS  
 
My pain and confusion covary, 
and my results look a bit scary.  
My measures have error -  
This gives me a terror 
Oh statistics! I should have been wary. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the results of the study. The results are arranged in order of 
the subsidiary research questions, and thus, are divided into three sections. The first 
section compares participants to non-participants at Time 1. Specifically, it seeks to 
determine whether participants and non-participants have different perceptions of 
political efficacy before the Town Meeting. The second section compares participants at 
Time 1 to participants at Time 2, and contains the most important analyses for the 
purposes of this study. Specifically, it seeks to determine whether perceptions of political 
efficacy increase among subjects after participating in the Town Meeting. It also seeks to 
determine the variables that contribute to perceptions of political efficacy among 
participants at Time 2. The third section examines the persistence of perceptions of 
political efficacy. It examines differences in participants’ perceptions of political efficacy 
between Time 2 and Time 3, as well as between Time 1 and Time 3 to look for changes 
over time. To allow for a fuller understanding of the effects of participation on political 
efficacy, the third section also compares political efficacy among participants and non-
participants at Time 3, as well as between non-participants at Time 1 and Time 3. The 
analyses and results for each section are presented below. In addition, there is a brief 
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summary of the results following each section. A full discussion of the results and their 
implications is provided in the next chapter.   
 
COMPARING PARTICIPANTS AND NON-PARTICIPANTS AT TIME 1 
This section of analyses and results addresses the first subsidiary research 
question: do participants and non-participants differ in terms of political efficacy before 
participation in the Town Meeting? The question concerns baseline differences in internal 
and external political efficacy between the two groups before the Town Meeting 
intervention takes place. At the heart of the question is whether those who participate in 
deliberative processes have different perceptions of political efficacy than those who do 
not participate. In Chapter 4, I posited that participants will have higher perceptions of 
internal and external political efficacy than non-participants at Time 1 (H1a and H1b). To 
address the research question and related hypotheses, this section compares participants 
and non-participants at Time 1 using five analytic steps, including various regression 
models and Heckman treatment effect models. The results for each of these analytic steps 
are presented below and summarized at the conclusion of the section.  
First, OLS regression models are used to assess internal political efficacy (IPE) 
and external political efficacy (EPE) among participants and non-participants. More 
specifically, IPE and EPE are explored as a function of participation, that is, whether one 
is a participant or non-participant. The model specification is:  
e
e
++=
++=
 bP  a  EPE
 bP  a  IPE
 
where P is a binary variable representing participation, with 0 = non-participant and 1 = 
participant.  
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The results, displayed in Table 1, suggest that participation is significantly related 
to EPE (p < .001), but not to IPE (p < .115). In other words, there are statistically 
significant differences between participants and non-participants in terms of external 
political efficacy, but not internal political efficacy. However, a closer look at the values 
of the coefficients indicates that the direction of the differences between the two groups is 
not what expected. The coefficients indicate that participants have lower perceptions of 
IPE and EPE than non-participants. Independent samples t-tests are conducted to 
complement the regression analyses and to provide for an easier and more direct 
interpretation of the OLS results. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
The results of the t-tests are displayed in Table 2.11 Due to the large difference in 
variance of two groups, the null hypothesis of equal variance was rejected in the F-test. 
Accordingly, the t-test uses the approximation of the degree of freedom, which is not 
necessarily an integer. A comparison of the means shows that on average, participants 
have lower perceptions of IPE and EPE than non-participants. The mean level of IPE for 
participants is -.1304. This value is .1671 lower than the mean of IPE for non-participants 
(.0367). Again, however, this difference is not statistically significant (p < .115). In 
contrast, the difference in EPE between two groups is statistically significant (p < .000). 
Participants’ mean level of EPE is -.2270, or .3419 less than the mean level of EPE for 
non-participants (.1149).  
                                                 
11 IPE and EPE are both summative standardized indices; therefore, a negative number is not interpreted as 
a negative efficacy score.  
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Insert Table 2 about here 
 
In short, the results of the regression models and t-tests suggest that non-
participants and participants have statistically significant differences in terms of external 
political efficacy, but not internal political efficacy. A closer examination of the 
regression results, however, shows that neither model is well specified. The values for R2 
(.006) and adjusted R2 (.004) indicate that in this sample, participation explains little of 
variation in IPE. Likewise, the values for R2 (.025) and adjusted R2 (.023) indicate that in 
this sample, participation explains little of variation in EPE. Moreover, it is likely that 
error term (e) is correlated with the independent variable for participation, resulting in 
biased estimates of the IPE and EPE differences between participants and non-
participants. More specifically, there may be a problem with selection on the observables; 
it is likely that other variables besides participation status affect political efficacy among 
the subjects in this study.  
A significant body of research indicates that political efficacy is correlated with 
demographic characteristics and that demographic characteristics are related to 
participation (Abramson, 1983; Dowse and Hughes, 1972; Kleiman, 1976; Lane, 1959; 
Lyons, 1970; Martinussen, 1972; Orum, 1989; Verba and Nie, 1972). If this holds in the 
samples under study here, then the data face a selection on the observables problem. The 
second and third analytic steps are used to test for this potential problem. 
The second step in the analyses seeks to determine the extent to which efficacy in 
these samples is related to demographic characteristics. In other words, it explores how 
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the demographic characteristics of participants and non-participants impact IPE and EPE. 
The model specification is:  
e
 e
++=
++=
∑
∑
 Xd  a  EPE
Xd  a  IPE
k
k  
where ∑Xk represents several demographic variables, including race, age, gender, 
employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status.  
 The results, displayed in Table 3, indicate that among subjects in this sample, IPE 
and EPE vary with gender, education, and socio-economic status. Women feel more 
internally efficacious (p < .005), but less externally efficacious (p < .013) than men. 
Surprisingly, those with higher education degrees have lower internal (p < .006) and 
external (p < .015) political efficacy than those without higher education degrees. 
Likewise, subjects in higher socio-economic strata have lower internal (p < .081) and 
external (p < .060) political efficacy than those in lower socio-economic strata. These 
results are surprising, and stand in contrast to a significant body of research on political 
efficacy.  
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
  
The third step in the analyses seeks to determine whether participants and non-
participants differ in terms of demographic characteristics. Table 4 provides summary 
statistics for the demographic characteristics of participants and non-participants. 
Specifically, the table shows the number and percentage of respondents for each sub-
category within the demographic variables. A review of the table suggests that 
participants and non-participants are similar in terms of age, employment status, and 
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socio-economic status; however, there appear to be more minorities, more women, more 
parents, and more educated individuals among participants than non-participants.   
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
 Despite the descriptive value of the summary statistics, they do not provide 
information about whether the apparent demographic differences between participants 
and non-participants are statistically significant. To determine statistical significance, a 
probit regression model is used. The model specification is: 
e++= ∑ kXd  a P  
where P is a binary dependent variable representing participation, with 0 = non-
participant and 1 = participant, and ∑Xk = demographic variables including, race, age, 
gender, employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status.  
The results of the probit regression, displayed Table 5, indicate that there are 
significant demographic differences between non-participants and participants with 
respect to gender (p < .004), parental status (p < .033), and educational status (p < .076). 
In conjunction with the summary statistics, we see that there are more females among 
participants (79.7%) than non-participants (60.6%), and more parents among participants 
(54.9%) than non-participants (37.6%). In addition, more participants have a degree in 
higher education (76.2%) than non-participants (62.7%). These differences are not 
surprising given the context of the UAC Town Meeting. It is reasonable to expect women 
and parents to participate in an event focused on youth policy. Moreover, the UAC is a 
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coalition of public, private, and third-sector organizations, and participants from the 
coalition groups are likely to be educated.  
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
The results from the first three analyses above provide a wealth of information. 
First, we know that participation is negatively related to perceptions of internal and 
external political efficacy. Second, we know that in this sample, IPE and EPE vary in 
relation to gender, education, and socio-economic status. Finally, we know that in this 
sample, participants and non-participant differ demographically in terms of gender, 
parental status, and education. Notice that two demographic characteristics, gender and 
education, covary with both of the dependent variables, IPE and EPE, as well as with 
participation. When viewed holistically, these results indicate that there is a problem with 
selection on the observables. Given the selection issue, the next analytic step is to find a 
statistically consistent estimator of the effect of participation on IPE and EPE. Two 
methods are used below in steps 4 and 5. 
The fourth step in the analyses uses OLS regression models, which can be 
considered ‘selection on the observables’ models as they examine the impact on IPE and 
EPE of participation and demographic characteristics. These regression models tell us 
how IPE and EPE differ between participants and non-participants while holding 
demographic variables constant. The model specification is: 
 Xd bP  a  EPE
Xd  bP a  IPE
k
k
e
e
+++=
+++=
∑
∑  
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where P is a binary variable representing participation, with 0 = non-participant and 1 = 
participant, and ∑Xk includes all demographic variables (race, age, gender, employment 
status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status). It is important to note 
that although only gender and education covary with both of the dependent variables and 
participation, all of the demographic variables from the survey are included in the 
regression models to provide more detailed analyses.  
 The results, displayed in Table 6, indicate that when controlling for demographic 
characteristics, participants have significantly lower levels of IPE (p < .032) and EPE (p 
< .037) than non-participants. Note that these results differ from the results in step 1, 
where statistically significant differences between participants and non-participants were 
found only for EPE. Moreover, these results indicate that, all else held constant, gender, 
education, and SES are predictors of  both IPE and EPE. These results echo those from 
step 2. Women have higher perceptions of IPE (p < .002), but lower perceptions of EPE 
(p < .034) than men. In addition, those who hold a higher education degree have lower 
perceptions of both IPE (p < .012) and EPE (p < .026) than those who hold no such 
degree. Likewise, those in higher SES groups have lower perceptions of both IPE (p < 
.087) and EPE (p < .065) than those in lower SES groups. As noted before, these results 
stand in contrast to the majority of research on demographics, political efficacy, and 
participation.  
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
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 Again, however, these regression models are not well specified. The values for R2 
(.115) and adjusted R2 (.092) indicate that the model explains little of the variation in 
IPE. Likewise, the values for R2 (.079) and adjusted R2 (.055) indicate that the model 
explains little of the variation in EPE. Moreover, it is likely that the OLS estimates of the 
IPE and EPE differences between participants and non-participants are biased. More 
specifically, there may be a problem with selection on the unobservables, that the error 
term is capturing the effects on IPE and EPE of other independent variables not included 
in the regression equations and not available in the dataset. To assess this possibility, the 
final analytic step employs Heckman treatment effect models.  
As noted above, even with this selection on observables model, it is still possible 
that the estimator of the efficacy differences between participants and non-participants is 
biased, that the error term is related to other variables not captured in the equation. 
Heckman treatment effect models (TEM) are used to handle the potential issue of 
selection on the unobservables. The Heckman approach uses is a two equation model that 
addresses several classes of selection bias, including bias due to self-selection (Briggs, 
2004; Heckman, 1978, 1979; Heckman and Robb, 1985, 1986). The first equation is a 
selection equation, which predicts some binary outcome. In this case, the binary outcome 
is participation (i.e., whether one is a participant or non-participant), as predicted by 
demographic variables (race, age, gender, employment status, parental status, education 
level, and socio-economic status) and variables that indicate previous political 
participatory activities (whether in the last year the subject had attended a neighborhood 
or town-hall meeting, a meeting involving school affairs, or contacted a local public 
official, and whether the subject voted in the November 2004 presidential election).  
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The second equation is a structural equation, which examines the ultimate 
dependent variable(s) of interest. In this case, the dependent variables are internal and 
external political efficacy, which are regressed as a function of participation and 
demographic variables (race, age, gender, employment status, parental status, education 
level, and socio-economic status). Using these two equations, the marginal effects of 
participation on political efficacy are assessed. Moreover, the Wald chi-square statistic (a 
measure of goodness of fit), along with rho and the likelihood ratio test of independent 
equations (LR test, a measure of the relationship between the two equations), will show 
whether the regression models from step 4 or the Heckman models provide more 
consistent estimators of the efficacy differences between participants and non-
participants. The model specification is: 
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where P is a binary variable representing participation, with 0 = non-participant and 1 = 
participant, ∑Xk = demographic variables, and  ∑Vk = previous participatory activities.  
 The results of the Heckman TEM are displayed in Table 7. Before we assess the 
coefficients, however, it is useful to first examine the Wald chi-square statistic and the 
LR test for both the IPE and EPE models to determine whether the Heckman or OLS 
results provide better estimates of the IPE and EPE differences between participants and 
non-participants.  
 
Insert Table 7 about here 
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In terms of IPE, the chi-square statistic is fairly large and significant (52.40, p < 
.000), suggesting that the model fits well. Moreover, the LR test is significant (14.45, p < 
.0001), indicating that we must reject the null hypothesis that rho is zero. This means that 
the two equations are related and that there is self-selection in the samples. This result 
indicates that the OLS estimate for the IPE differences in participants and non-
participants from Step 4 is biased; therefore, we need to examine the estimates from the 
Heckman TEM to find an unbiased estimate of the effect of participation on IPE. The 
structural model indicates that, holding all else constant, participation is related to IPE in 
a statistically significant way (p < .000), with participants feeling less internally 
efficacious than non-participants. Moreover, gender (p < .000) is also related to IPE, with 
women feeling more internally efficacious than men. Finally, holding all else constant, 
education is moderately related to IPE (p < .104).   
In terms of EPE, the chi-square statistic is fairly small (21.49), but still significant 
(p < .006), suggesting that the model fits well; however, the LR test is not significant 
(1.26, p < .2611), indicating that we should not reject the null hypothesis that rho is zero. 
This means that the two equations are not related and that there is no self-selection in the 
samples. These results indicate that the OLS estimate for the EPE differences in 
participants and non-participants from Step 4 are not biased. In other words, the OLS 
estimate of the EPE differences between participants and non-participants is better than 
the estimate generated by the Heckman TEM.   
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Summary of Results Comparing Participants and Non-Participants at Time 1 
This section provides a summary of the results comparing participants and non-
participants at Time 1. The first step in the analyses indicated that there are statistically 
significant differences between participants and non-participants in terms of external 
political efficacy, but not internal political efficacy. However, given previous research, 
there was a possibility of a selection on the observables problem; steps 2 and 3 confirmed 
this suspicion. Therefore, two additional models, an OLS selection on the observables 
model and a Heckman TEM, were conducted. The estimates provided by these two 
models were evaluated, resulting in the conclusion that we should use the Heckman 
estimates for IPE and the OLS estimates for EPE.  
These analyses produced three important and interesting results. First, the results 
of the Heckman TEM structural model indicate that, holding all else constant, 
participants have significantly lower perceptions of IPE than non-participants (p < .000). 
Second, the results of the OLS model indicate that, holding all else constant, participants 
have significantly lower levels of EPE (p < .037) than non-participants. While there are 
statistically significant differences between that participants and non-participants with 
respect to internal and external political efficacy, the direction of the differences is 
opposite of what was hypothesized. Therefore, hypotheses 1a and 1b are rejected: 
participants do not have higher perceptions of internal and external political efficacy than 
non-participants at Time 1. A third interesting result concerns the relationship between 
certain demographic variables and political efficacy. Specifically, the results from step 2 
and step 4 suggest that education and SES are negatively related to internal and external 
political efficacy. These results stand in contrast to the wealth of empirical research on 
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demographics, participation, and political efficacy. Each of these findings are discussed 
in more detail in the following chapter.  
 
COMPARING PARTICIPANTS AT TIME 1 AND TIME 2 
This section of analyses gets to the heart of the study, addressing the second set of 
subsidiary research questions: Do participants have a higher sense of political efficacy 
after participation in the Town Meeting? If so, what variables affect perceptions of 
political efficacy? In essence, this section searches for evidence of the efficacy effect. 
Accordingly, the analyses in this section compare participants at Time 1 to participants at 
Time 2. The results are relevant to the second and third sets of hypotheses presented in 
Chapter 4. Specifically, I hypothesized that participants at Time 2 will have higher 
perceptions of internal and external political efficacy than participants at Time 1 (H2a 
and H2b). In addition, and prompted by the second part of the research question, this 
section seeks to identify the variables that account for perceptions of political efficacy 
among participants at Time 2. Specifically, I hypothesized that the perceived quality of 
deliberation will be positively correlated with internal and external political efficacy (H3a 
and H3b) and that perceptions about the potential impact of the Town Meeting will be 
positively correlated with internal and external political efficacy (H3c and H3d). I also 
posited that demographic variables will affect perceptions of political efficacy.  
Five analytic steps are used to compare participants at Time 1 and Time 2, 
including various regression models and propensity score matching. A sixth step uses an 
OLS regression model to assess the impact of deliberative and demographic variables on 
political efficacy among participants at Time 2. The results for each of these analytic 
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steps are presented below and summarized at the conclusion of the section. A full 
discussion of the results and their implications is presented in the next chapter. 
First, OLS regression models are used to compare the levels of internal and 
external political efficacy among participants at Time 1 and Time 2. More specifically, 
IPE and EPE are regressed as a function of time, that is, before and immediately after 
participation in the Town Meeting. The model specification is:  
e
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where T is a binary variable representing time, with 0 = participant at Time 1 and 1 = 
participant at Time 2.  
The results, displayed in Table 8 suggest that time is a significant predictor of 
EPE (p < .041) but not IPE (p < .362). In other words, immediately after the Town 
Meeting, participants experience a statistically significant increase in external political 
efficacy, but not internal political efficacy. Independent samples t-tests are conducted to 
complement the regression models and to provide for an easier and more direct 
interpretation of the results. 
 
Insert Table 8 about here 
 
The results of the t-tests are displayed in Table 9. Due to the large difference in 
variance of two groups, the null hypothesis of equal variance was rejected in the F-test. 
Accordingly, the t-test uses the approximation of the degree of freedom, which is not 
necessarily an integer. A comparison of the means suggests that on average, participants’ 
perceptions of IPE and EPE are higher in Time 2 than in Time 1. The t-tests show that the 
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mean level of IPE for participants at Time 1 is -.1364. This value increases by .0965 for a 
mean IPE level of -.0399 among participants at Time 2. However, this difference is not 
statistically significant (p < .362). In contrast, the difference in EPE between the two 
samples is statistically significant (p < .029). Participants’ mean level of EPE at Time 1 is 
-.2318. At Time 2, this value increases by .2082 for a mean EPE level of -.0236.  
 
Insert Table 9 about here 
 
In short, the results of the regression models and t-tests suggest that immediately 
after the Town Meeting, participants experience statistically significant increases in 
external, but not internal, political efficacy. A closer examination of the regression results 
shows that neither model is well specified. The values for R2 (.002) and adjusted R2 
(.000) indicate that in this sample, time explains little to none of the variation in IPE. 
Likewise, the values for R2 (.011) and adjusted R2 (.008) indicate that in this sample, time 
explains little of the variation in EPE. Moreover, it is likely that error term (e) in the 
regression model is correlated with time, resulting in biased OLS estimates of the IPE 
and EPE differences between participants at Time 1 and Time 2. More specifically, there 
may again be a problem with selection on the observables; it is probable that other 
variables besides time affect political efficacy among the subjects in these samples. The 
second and third analyses are used to test for this potential problem by first determining 
the extent to which political efficacy is correlated with demographic characteristics in the 
samples, and second, by determining how demographic characteristics vary in the two 
participant samples.  
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The second analytic step seeks to determine the extent to which efficacy in the 
participant samples is related to demographic characteristics. In other words, it explores 
how the demographic characteristics of subjects impact internal and external political 
efficacy. The model specification is:  
e
 e
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where ∑Xk represents demographic variables, including race, age, gender, employment 
status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status.  
The results, displayed in Table 10, indicate that among participants at Time 1 and 
Time 2, age is a statistically significant predictor of IPE (p < .017), with older subjects 
feeling more internally efficacious than younger subjects. In terms of EPE, parental status 
is a statistically significant predictor (p < .018), with parents feeling more externally 
efficacious than non-parents. There are no other statistically significant predictors of IPE 
and EPE in these models. The next step is to determine whether the participant samples at 
Time 1 and Time 2 differ on these (and other) demographic characteristics. 
 
Insert Table 10 about here 
 
The third step in the analyses seeks to determine whether participants at Time 1 
participants at Time 2 differ in terms of demographic characteristics. Table 11 provides 
summary statistics for the demographic characteristics of participants and non-
participants. Specifically, the table shows the number and percentage of respondents for 
each sub-category within the demographic variables. A review of the table suggests that 
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participants at Time 1 and Time 2 are similar in terms of age, parental status, educational 
status, and socio-economic status; however, there appear to be more Caucasians, more 
women, and more unemployed subjects among participants at Time 1 than among 
participants at Time 2.  
 
Insert Table 11 about here 
 
Despite the descriptive value of the summary statistics, they do not provide 
information about whether the apparent demographic differences between participants at 
Time 1 and Time 2 are statistically significant. To determine statistical significance, a 
probit regression model is used. The model specification is: 
e++= ∑ kXd  a T  
where T is a binary dependent variable representing time, with 0 = participant at Time 1 
and 1 = participant at Time 2, and ∑Xk = demographic variables, including race, age, 
gender, employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status.  
 The results of the probit regression, displayed in Table 12, indicate that there are 
significant demographic differences between participants at Time 1 and Time 2 with 
respect to race (p < .001), gender (p < .001), employment status (p < .011), and parental 
status (p < .048). When viewed in conjunction with the summary statistics, we can see 
that there are more Caucasians (58.7%) among participants in Time 1 than in Time 2 
(44.2%). Likewise, there are more women among participants at Time 1 (79.7%) than at 
Time 2 (66.5). In addition, there are more unemployed participants at Time 1 (26.3%), 
than at Time 2 (14.6%), and more parents at Time 1 (54.9%) than at Time 2 (50.2%). 
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Insert Table 12 about here 
 
The results from the first three analyses above provide a wealth of information. 
First, they indicate that participants experience increases in external, but not internal, 
political efficacy immediately after participating in the Town Meeting. Second, they 
indicate that in the samples of participants at Time 1 and Time 2, age is significantly 
related to IPE, and parental status is significantly related to EPE. Finally, they indicate 
that participants at Time 1 and Time 2 differ demographically in terms of race, gender, 
employment status, and parental status. It is important to note that parental status covaries 
with both EPE and participation, suggesting that there may be a problem with selection 
on the observables. Given this selection issue, the fourth and fifth steps are used to find a 
statistically consistent estimator of the effect of participation on IPE and EPE.  
The fourth analytic step employs OLS regression models, which can be 
considered selection on the observables models as they examine the impact on IPE and 
EPE of time and demographic characteristics. The model specification is: 
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where T is a binary variable representing time, with 0 = participant at Time 1 and 1 = 
participant at Time 2, and ∑Xk includes all demographic variables (race, age, gender, 
employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status). It is 
important to note that although only parental status covaries with EPE, all of the 
demographic variables are included in both of the regression models to provide for richer 
analyses.  
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 The results displayed in Table 13, indicate that when controlling for demographic 
characteristics, time has no significant effect on IPE (p < .506); however, it does have a 
statistically significant effect on EPE (p < .024). In other words, immediately following 
the Town Meeting, participants experience a statistically significant increase in external 
political efficacy, but not internal political efficacy. Moreover, the results indicate that, 
when all else is held constant, age is a significant predicator of IPE (p < .017) with older 
subjects feeling more internally efficacious than younger subjects. In addition, when all 
else is held constant, parental status is a significant predicator of EPE (p < .009) with 
parents feeling more externally efficacious than non-parents. Race is also a moderately 
significant predictor (p < .102) of EPE, with minority groups feeling less externally 
efficacious than Caucasians.  
 
Insert Table 13 about here 
 
 Clearly, however, these regression models are not well specified. The values for 
R2 (.031) and adjusted R2 (.008) indicate that the model explains very little of the 
variation in IPE. Likewise, the values for R2 (.056) and adjusted R2 (.034) indicate that 
the model explains very little of the variation in EPE. Moreover, it is likely that the OLS 
estimates of the IPE and EPE differences between participants at Time 1 and Time 2 are 
biased. More specifically, there may be a problem in these samples with selection on the 
unobservables, that the error term is capturing the effects on IPE and EPE of other 
independent variables not included in the regression equations and not available in the 
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data. To assess this possibility, the fifth set of analyses employs propensity score 
matching to better estimate the effect of participation on political efficacy.  
As noted in the previous chapter, propensity score matching (PSM) is a non-
experimental method of sampling that deals with the problem of selection bias in research 
and allows for more robust comparisons of two groups. The general steps in PSM 
include: (1) estimating the propensity score; 2) checking the balance of covariates; 3) 
matching subjects either through pair matching or sub-classification; and 4) calculating 
the average treatment effects (Becker and Ichino, 2002; Dehejia and Wahba, 1999; 
Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984). Similar to the Heckman selection model, PSM specifies 
two equations. The first equation is a binary probit model, which predicts a propensity 
score. The second equation examines the dependent variable(s) of interest. Subjects from 
two groups are “matched” based on their propensity score, and paired t-tests are 
conducted to test for between-group differences.  
In this study, the probit model uses time as the binary dependent variable. 
Covariates include demographic variables and variables that indicate previous political 
participatory activities. The second equation examines IPE and EPE as a function of time 
and demographic characteristics. The paired t-tests provide estimates of average program 
effects on the treated, that is, whether participation in the program had an impact on 
subjects’ perceptions of political efficacy. The specification of the PSM models is:  
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where T is a binary variable representing time, with 0 = participants at Time 1 and 1 = 
participants at Time 2, ∑Xk = demographic variables (race, age, gender, employment 
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status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status), and  ∑Vk = previous 
participatory activities (whether in the last year the subject attended a neighborhood or 
town-hall meeting, a meeting involving school affairs, or contacted a local public official, 
and whether the subject voted in the November 2004 presidential election). 
Table 14 displays the results from the PSM models. Using these covariates, the 
PSM matched 93 pairs of participants with similar propensity scores. The one-to-one pair 
matching suggests that after the Town Meeting, participants’ perceptions of IPE increase 
by about 7.4%, although this increase is not statistically significant (p < .55). In contrast, 
however, EPE increases by over 31% after the Town Meeting; this result is statistically 
significant (p < .0059).  
 
Insert Table 14 about here 
 
The final set of analyses address the second part of the second subsidiary research 
question regarding the variables that contribute to perceptions of political efficacy. 
Specifically, OLS is used to regress IPE and EPE as a function of demographic variables 
(race, age, gender, employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-
economic status) and deliberative variables (quality of deliberation [QD] and perceived 
potential impact [IMPACT]). Obviously, data for QD and IMPACT are not available for 
participants at Time 1; therefore, data used in these regression analyses include only 
participants at Time 2. The model specification is: 
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where ∑Xk includes all demographic variables and  ∑Qk includes both deliberative 
variables. 
The results for these regression models are displayed in Table 15. In terms of 
deliberative variables, the quality of deliberation has no statistically significant impact on 
either IPE (p < .799) or EPE (p < .860). One possible reason for the lack of impact of QD 
on IPE and EPE may be a function of little variance in the measure. The range for QD is 
5.69, and the variance is .963. In contrast, the perceived potential impact of the Town 
Meeting has a statistically significant effect on IPE (p < .039); participants who perceive 
greater potential impact also have higher perceptions of internal political efficacy. 
Perceived potential impact has no significant effect on EPE (p < .853). In terms of 
demographic characteristics, when all else is held constant, only age (p < .029) has an 
impact on IPE; on average, older participants feel more internally efficacious than 
younger participants. In contrast, when all else is held constant, race (p < .013) and 
parental status (p < .014) have an impact on EPE. Minorities feel less externally 
efficacious than Caucasians, and parents feel more externally efficacious than non-
parents.  
 
Insert Table 15 about here 
 
Summary of the Results Comparing Participants at Time 1 and Time 2  
This section provides a summary of the results comparing participants at Time 1 
and Time 2. The analyses produced three important results.  First, the initial step in the 
analyses indicated that there are statistically significant increases in EPE, but not IPE, 
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among participants at Time 2. However, given previous research, there was a possibility 
of a selection on the observables problem; steps 2 and 3 indicated that only parental 
status covaries with EPE, suggesting little problems with selection on the observables. 
Nevertheless, additional models, including OLS regression models and PSM models, 
were conducted. The results from both of these analyses echo the results from the first set 
of analyses: EPE increases in a statistically significant way among participants after the 
Town Meeting, IPE does not. Given these results, hypothesis 2a, which suggested an 
increase in IPE after the Town Meeting, is rejected. Hypothesis 2b, which suggested an 
increase in EPE after the Town Meeting, is accepted.  
Second, the results from the final OLS regression models inform us about the 
effect of deliberative variables on perceptions of political efficacy. The quality of 
deliberation has no statistically significant impact on either IPE or EPE. Therefore, 
hypotheses 3a and 3b are rejected. In addition, the perceived potential impact of the 
Town Meeting has a statistically significant effect on IPE; participants who perceive 
greater potential impact have higher perceptions of internal political efficacy. Therefore, 
hypothesis 3c is accepted. Perceived potential impact has no significant effect on EPE; 
therefore, hypothesis 3d is rejected. 
Finally, in terms of demographic characteristics, when all else is held constant, 
only age has an impact on IPE with older participants feeling, on average, more internally 
efficacious than younger participants. In contrast, when all else is held constant, race and 
parental status have an impact on EPE, with minorities feeling, on average less externally 
efficacious than Caucasians, and parents feeling, on average, more externally efficacious 
than non-parents. 
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EXAMINING THE PERSISTENCE OF THE EFFICACY EFFECT 
This section of analyses and results addresses the final subsidiary research 
question: do the effects of participation on perceptions of political efficacy persist over 
time? To determine the persistence of the efficacy effect, three sets of comparisons are 
made. First, participants at Time 3 are compared to participants at Time 2 and Time 1. I 
hypothesized that participants at Time 3 will have higher perceptions of internal and 
external political efficacy than at Time 1, but lower perceptions of internal and external 
political efficacy than at Time 2 (H4a and H4b). The first step is testing these hypotheses 
is to compare participants at Times 2 and 3. Since participants’ responses at these times 
cannot be linked, this comparison follows the same methodological approach outlined 
above for the comparison of participants at Time 1 and Time 2. The next step is to 
compare IPE and EPE among participants at Times 1 and 3. As noted in the previous 
chapter, the research design allowed for the linking of subjects’ responses at Times 1 and 
3; however, due to poor response rates, only 17 participants at Time 3 can be linked to 
Time 1. This condition precludes the use of paired t-tests to check for IPE and EPE 
differences between participants at Time 1 and Time 3. Instead, the methodological 
approach used for the comparison of participants at Time 1 and Time 3 will follow the 
logic of all of the other comparisons of participants in different time periods.  
Second, participants at Time 3 are compared to non-participants at Time 3. The 
purpose of this comparison is to assess the Time 3 efficacy gap and compare it to the 
Time 1 efficacy gap. I hypothesized that the IPE and EPE gaps between participants and 
non-participants would be smaller at Time 3 than at Time 1 (H4c and H4d). Finally, to 
further examine the persistence of political efficacy, non-participants at Time 1 are 
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compared to non-participants at Time 3. The results from these three sets of analyses are 
triangulated to enable a better examination of the overall efficacy effect, as well as its 
persistence.  
 
Participants Over Time 
This first section compares participants at Times 1, 2, and 3 to determine the 
persistence of the efficacy effect. The logic of these comparisons follows that used in the 
comparison of participants at Time 1 and Time 2; however, for purposes of brevity and 
clarity, only steps 4 and 5 are conducted. In other words, only the OLS selection on the 
observables models and the PSM models are conducted. The differences between Time 2 
and Time 3 are examined first, followed by an examination of the differences between 
Time 1 and Time 3.   
 
Participants at Time 2 and Time 3 
The first step in this comparison uses OLS regression models, which can be 
considered selection on the observables models as they examine the impact on IPE and 
EPE of time and demographic characteristics. The model specification is: 
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where T is a binary variable representing time, with 0 = participant at Time 2 and 1 = 
participant at Time 3, and ∑Xk includes all demographic variables (race, age, gender, 
employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status).  
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 The results displayed in Table 16, indicate that when controlling for demographic 
characteristics, time has no significant effect on IPE (p < .675) or EPE (p < .291). In 
other words, 24 months after the Town Meeting, participants experience no statistically 
significant changes in either internal or external political efficacy. Clearly, however, 
these regression models are not well specified. The values for R2 (.017) and adjusted R2 
(-.007) indicate that the model explains very little of the variation in IPE. Likewise, the 
values for R2 (.045) and adjusted R2 (.022) indicate that the model explains very little of 
the variation in EPE. Moreover, it is likely that the OLS estimates of the IPE and EPE 
differences between participants at Time 2 and Time 3 are biased due to selection on the 
unobservables.  
 
Insert Table 16 about here 
 
To assess the possibility of selection on the unobservables, the second set of 
analyses employs propensity score matching to better estimate the effect of participation 
on political efficacy. The specification of the PSM models is:  
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where T is a binary variable representing time, with 0 = participants at Time 2 and 1 = 
participants at Time 3, ∑Xk = demographic variables (race, age, gender, employment 
status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status), and  ∑Vk = previous 
participatory activities (whether in the last year the subject attended a neighborhood or 
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town-hall meeting, a meeting involving school affairs, or contacted a local public official, 
and whether the subject voted in the November 2004 presidential election).  
Table 17 displays the results from the PSM models. Using these covariates, the 
PSM matched 115 pairs of participants with similar propensity scores. The one-to-one 
pair matching suggests that 24 months after the Town Meeting, participants experience 
no statistically significant changes in either IPE (p < .8108) or EPE (p < .6753).  
 
Insert Table 17 about here 
 
In summary, the results of both the OLS selection on the observables models and 
the PSM models indicate that internal and external political efficacy do not change in a 
significant way for participants between Time 2 and Time 3. Earlier results found a 
significant increase in IPE and EPE for participants between Time 1 and Time 2; the next 
step is to compare participants at Time 1 and Time 3 to assess the possibility of changes 
in political efficacy during this time period.  
 
Participants at Time 1 and Time 3  
The first step in this comparison uses OLS regression models, which can be 
considered selection on the observables models as they examine the impact on IPE and 
EPE of time and demographic characteristics. The model specification is: 
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where T is a binary variable representing time, with 0 = participant at Time 1 and 1 = 
participant at Time 3, and ∑Xk includes all demographic variables (race, age, gender, 
employment status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status).  
 The results displayed in Table 18, indicate that when controlling for demographic 
characteristics, time has a statistically significant effect on IPE (p < .008); however, time 
has no statistically significant effect on EPE (p < .121). In other words, 24 months after 
the Town Meeting, participants experience a statistically significant increase in internal 
political efficacy. Moreover, external political efficacy also appears to increase, but not in 
a statistically significant way. Clearly, however, these regression models are not well 
specified. The values for R2 (.121) and adjusted R2 (.090) indicate that the model explains 
very little of the variation in IPE. Likewise, the values for R2 (.053) and adjusted R2 
(.020) indicate that the model explains very little of the variation in EPE. Moreover, it is 
likely that the OLS estimates of the IPE and EPE differences between participants at 
Time 1 and Time 3 are biased due to selection on the unobservables.  
 
Insert Table 18 about here 
 
To assess the possibility of selection on the unobservables, the second set of 
analyses employs propensity score matching to better estimate the effect of participation 
on political efficacy. The specification of the PSM models is:  
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where T is a binary variable representing time, with 0 = participants at Time 1 and 1 = 
participants at Time 3, ∑Xk = demographic variables (race, age, gender, employment 
status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status), and  ∑Vk = previous 
participatory activities (whether in the last year the subject attended a neighborhood or 
town-hall meeting, a meeting involving school affairs, or contacted a local public official, 
and whether the subject voted in the November 2004 presidential election).  
Table 19 displays the results from the PSM models. Using these covariates, the 
PSM matched 115 pairs of participants with similar propensity scores. The one-to-one 
pair matching suggests that 24 months after the Town Meeting, participants experience a 
statistically significant change in EPE (p < .09), but no statistically significant change in 
IPE (p < .4792). Interestingly, these results are opposite of what was found in the OLS 
models above.   
As noted previously, it is probable that there is significant endogeneity in these 
models; therefore, the OLS estimates are likely to be biased upward. Moreover, unlike in 
Heckman models, there is no test for endogeneity in PSM models. Earlier analyses, 
namely the Heckman TEM comparisons of participants and non-participants, indicate 
that the OLS estimates are consistent for EPE but not for IPE. In other words, the 
Heckman models found that there was significant selection bias for IPE. Given this, it is 
reasonable to assume that the PSM results are more consistent than those from the OLS 
model. Thus, it appears that only EPE increases in a statistically significant way among 
participants at Time 1 and Time 3.  
 
Insert Table 19 about here 
 225
 
In summary, the results of the OLS selection on the observables models are expected to 
be biased; therefore, the results from the PSM models are used. The PSM results indicate 
that participants experience a statistically significant increase in external political efficacy 
between Time 1 and Time 3, but no significant increase in internal political efficacy. The 
next step in the comparison is to compare participants and non-participants at Time 3.  
 
Participants and Non-Participants at Time 3 
This section compares participants at Time 3 to non-participants at Time 3. The 
purpose of this comparison is to assess the Time 3 efficacy gap and compare it to the 
Time 1 efficacy gap. I hypothesized that the IPE and EPE gaps between participants and 
non-participants would be smaller at Time 3 than at Time 1 (H4c and H4d). This 
comparison follows the same logical order as the comparison of participants and non-
participants at Time 1; however, for purposes of clarity and brevity, steps 1 through 3 are 
skipped. Only the OLS selection on the observables models and the Heckman treatment 
effects models are employed.  
First, selection on the observables OLS regression models are used to examine the 
impact on IPE and EPE of participation and demographic characteristics. The models tell 
us how IPE and EPE differ between participants and non-participants while holding 
demographic variables constant. The model specification is: 
 Xd bP  a  EPE
Xd  bP a  IPE
k
k
e
e
+++=
+++=
∑
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where P is a binary variable representing participation, with 0 = non-participant and 1 = 
participant, and ∑Xk includes all demographic variables (race, age, gender, employment 
status, parental status, education level, and socio-economic status).  
 
Insert Table 20 about here 
  
 The results, displayed in Table 20, indicate that when controlling for demographic 
characteristics, there are no significant differences in IPE between participants and non-
participants at Time 3. In contrast, however, EPE is significantly lower among 
participants at Time 3 than non-participants at Time 3 (p < .085). As noted previous, it is 
likely that the OLS estimates of the IPE and EPE differences between participants and 
non-participants are biased due to selection on the unobservables. To assess this 
possibility, the second step employs treatment effect models (TEM).  
 The equations used in the following Heckman TEM models are identical to the 
equations used to compare participants and non-participants at Time 1. The model 
specification is: 
e
eg
 Xd  bP a EPE)(or  IPE:2Equation 
 VXd  bP  a  P   :1Equation 
k
kk
+++=
++++=
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where P is a binary variable representing participation, with 0 = non-participant and 1 = 
participant, ∑Xk = demographic variables (race, age, gender, employment status, parental 
status, education level, and socio-economic status), and  ∑Vk = previous participatory 
activities (whether in the last year the subject had attended a neighborhood or town-hall 
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meeting, a meeting involving school affairs, or contacted a local public official, and 
whether the subject voted in the November 2004 presidential election). 
 The results of the Heckman TEM are displayed in Table 21. Before we assess the 
coefficients, however, it is useful to first examine the Wald chi-square statistic, as well as 
rho and the LR test for both the IPE and EPE models. These values will determine 
whether the Heckman or OLS results provide better estimates of the IPE and EPE 
differences between participants and non-participants at Time 3.  
The chi-square statistic is small, but significant for IPE (19.24, p <.0136); it is 
also small and insignificant for EPE (11.50, p < .1751). Moreover, the LR tests indicate 
that we should not reject the null hypothesis that rho is zero for either IPE (1.18, p < 
.2775) or EPE (0.62, p < .4328). This means that in both the IPE and EPE models, the 
two equations are not related, and that there is no self-selection in the samples. These 
results indicate that the OLS estimates for the IPE and EPE differences in participants 
and non-participants from the first step are not biased. In other words, the OLS estimate 
of the IPE and EPE differences between participants and non-participants is better than 
the estimates generated by the Heckman TEM.   
 
Insert Table 21 about here 
 
Non-Participants at Time 1 and Time 3 
The final set of analyses compare non-participants at Time 1 and Time 3. Thirty-
six responses from non-participants at Time 1 and Time 3 can be linked; therefore, paired 
t-tests are conducted to determine whether there are IPE and EPE differences between 
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non-participants during this time period. The results, displayed in Table 22, indicate that 
between Time 1 and Time 3, there are no significant changes in non-participants’ 
perceptions of internal (p < .352) or external political efficacy (p < .840).  
 
Insert Table 22 about here 
 
Summary of Results Regarding the Persistence of the Efficacy Effect 
This section provides a summary of the results regarding the persistence of the 
efficacy effect over time. The analyses produced three important results. First, the results 
of both the OLS selection on the observables models and the PSM models indicate that 
IPE and EPE do not change in a significant way for participants between Time 2 and 
Time 3. Second, PSM results indicate that participants have significantly higher 
perceptions of EPE at Time 3 than at Time 1, but that there is no significant difference in 
IPE between Time 3 and Time 1. Given these results, hypothesis 4a is rejected: 
participants at Time 3 do not have higher perceptions of IPE than at Time 1. In contrast, 
hypothesis 4b is accepted: participants at Time 3 do have higher perceptions of EPE than 
at Time 1.  
Second, OLS regression results indicate that there are no significant differences in 
IPE between participants and non-participants at Time 3. Therefore, hypothesis 4c is 
accepted, the gap between participants and non-participants for internal political efficacy 
is smaller at Time 3 than at Time 1. In contrast, there are significant differences in EPE 
between participants and non-participants at Time 3. At Time 1, participants felt .253 less 
externally efficacious than non-participants. At Time 3, participants felt .367 less 
externally efficacious than non-participants. Given these results, hypothesis 4d is 
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rejected. In contrast to what was hypothesized, the gap between participants and non-
participants for EPE is larger at Time 3 than at Time 1.  
Finally, the results show that there are no significant changes in non-participants’ 
perceptions of IPE or EPE between Time 1 and Time 3. This is important because it 
demonstrates that the comparison group experienced no changes in political efficacy over 
time, and thereby adds strength to the findings regarding the effects of participation in the 
21st Century Town Meeting on perceptions of political efficacy.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented the results of the study, arranged in order of the subsidiary 
research questions. The first set of analyses compared participants to non-participants at 
Time 1 in terms of demographic variables and perceptions of internal and external 
political efficacy. The second section compared participants at Time 1 to participants at 
Time 2 with respect to demographic characteristics and perceptions of internal and 
external political efficacy. It also examined the impact of demographic and deliberative 
variables on perceptions of political efficacy. The third section examined the longevity of 
perceptions of political efficacy. It made three comparisons. First, participants at Time 3 
were compared to participants at both Time 2 and Time 1. Second, participants at Time 3 
were compared to non-participants at Time 3. Finally, non-participants at Time 1 were 
compared to non-participants at Time 3. Various statistical methods were used 
throughout the sections, including regression models, Heckman treatment effect models, 
and propensity score matching.  
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The results point to several major findings. First, before the Town Meeting, 
participants have significantly lower perceptions of both internal and external political 
efficacy than non-participants. This suggests that AmericaSpeaks is effective in engaging 
the less efficacious among the citizenry in the Town Meeting process. Second, after the 
Town Meeting, participants experience an increase in both internal and external political 
efficacy; however, only the increase in external political efficacy is statistically 
significant. These results suggest that the 21st Century Town Meeting can produce the 
efficacy effect, particularly with respect to external political efficacy. Moreover, the 
results indicate that the quality of deliberation has no impact on either internal or external 
political efficacy, and that the perceived potential impact of the Town Meeting is 
positively correlated with internal, but not external, political efficacy.   
Third, the results indicate that there are no significant changes in internal or 
external political efficacy among participants at Time 2 and Time 3. These results suggest 
that the efficacy effect persists over time. Moreover, there are no statistically significant 
changes in internal political efficacy among participants at Time 1 and Time 3, although 
the difference in external political efficacy is statistically significant. Finally, the strength 
of the efficacy effect is evidenced by other results. First, there are no significant changes 
in non-participants’ perceptions of IPE or EPE between Time 1 and Time 3. Second, 
unlike before the Town Meeting, there are no statistically significant differences in 
internal political efficacy between participants and non-participants at Time 3. However, 
there are significant differences in external political efficacy between participants and 
non-participants 24 months after the Town Meeting. Moreover, the efficacy gap is larger 
24 months after the Town Meeting than it was before the Town Meeting. Because the 
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comparison group experienced no changes in political efficacy over time, the strength of 
the findings regarding the effects of participation in the 21st Century Town Meeting on 
perceptions of political efficacy increases. A full discussion of these findings and their 
implications is provided in the next chapter. 
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Table 1: IPE and EPE among Participants and Non-Participants at Time 1 
 
Parameter IPE EPE 
 
B 
(St. Err.) Beta 
t 
(Sig.) 
B 
(St. Err.) Beta 
t 
(Sig.) 
Intercept .037 (.060) … 
.616 
(.538) 
.115 
(.059) … 
1.948 
(.052) 
Participation -.167 (.106) -.078 
-1.580 
(.115) 
-.342 
(.105) -.159 
-3.269 
(.001) 
F-test (Sig.) 2.498 (.115) 10.685 (.001) 
SEE .99937 .98852 
R2 .006 .025 
Adj. R2 .004 .023 
 
  
 
 233
Table 2: Mean Scores on IPE and EPE for Participants and Non-Participants  
at Time 1 
 
  Participants Non-Participants    
 F-test (sig) 
Mean  
(st. dev.) 
Mean  
(st. dev.) Difference 
T-Stat 
(p-value) df 
IPE 1.341 (.248) 
-.1304 
(.9773) 
.0367 
(1.0094) 
-.1671 
(-0.0121) 
-1.580 
(.115) 410 
EPE 19.229 (.000) 
-.2270 
(.8099) 
.1149 
(1.0613) 
-.3419 
(-0.2514) 
-.3.601 
(.000) 324.85 
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Table 3: Relationship of Demographics to IPE and EPE  
for Participants and Non-Participants at Time 1 
 
Parameter IPE EPE 
 
B 
(St. Err.) Beta 
t  
(Sig.) 
B 
(St. Err.) Beta 
t 
(Sig.) 
Intercept .275 (.202) … 
1.357 
(.176) 
.532 
(.200) … 
2.663 
(.008) 
Race .012 (.125) .006 
.098 
(.922) 
.076 
(.124) .037 
.616 
(.538) 
Age -.030 (.123) -.015 
-.247 
(.805) 
-.129  
(.122) -.065 
-1.062 
(.289) 
Gender .344 (.122) .157 
2.807 
(.005) 
-.302 
(.121) -.142 
-2.497 
(.013) 
Employment -.131 (.128) -.057 
-1.020 
(.308) 
.107 
(.126) .049 
.847 
(.398) 
Parent -.074 (.119) -.038 
-.622 
(.534) 
-.008 
(.118) -.004 
-.069 
(.945) 
Education -.364 (.132) -.167 
-2.755 
(.006) 
-.320 
(.131) -.152 
-2.453 
(.015) 
SES -.223 (.128) -.107 
-1.752 
(.081) 
-.238 
(.126) -.118 
-1.887 
(.060) 
F-test (Sig.) 4.988 (.000) 3.068 (.004) 
SEE .98524 .97316 
R2 .102 .256 
Adj. R2 .082 .065 
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Table 4: Summary Demographic Statistics for Participants and Non-Participants  
at Time 1 
 
 Participants 
n = 133 
Non-Participants 
n=282 
RACE   
White/Caucasian 74 (59.7%) 193 (70.2%) 
Minority 50 (40.3%) 82 (29.8%) 
  
AGE   
18-44 136 (49.5%) 69 (53.9%) 
45 and Older  139 (50.5%) 59 (46.1%) 
  
GENDER   
Male 27 (20.3%) 111 (39.4%) 
Female 106 (79.7%) 171 (60.6%) 
 
EMPLOYMENT    
Unemployed 35 (26.3%) 90 (31.9%) 
Employed 95 (71.4%) 189 (67.0%) 
 
PARENT   
No 57 (42.9%) 169 (59.9%) 
Yes 73 (54.9%) 106 (37.6%) 
 
EDUCATION   
No Higher Education 
Degree  30 (23.8%) 104 (37.3%) 
Associates, Bachelors, or 
Graduate/Professional 
Degree 
96 (76.2%) 175 (62.7%) 
  
SES   
Total Household Income of 
$49,999 or Less 39 (38.6%) 89 (40.8%) 
Total Household Income of 
$50,000 or More 62 (61.4%) 129 (59.2%) 
* Percentages represent the percent of respondents from the sample in the sub-    
category. 
* Totals may not equal 100% due to missing data. 
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Table 5: Demographic Differences among Participants and Non-Participants 
at Time 1 
 
Parameter Participation 
 B (St. Err.) Beta t (Sig.) 
Intercept -.009 (.094) … -.095 (.925) 
Race .067 (.058) .069 1.152 (.250) 
Age .068 (.057) .073 1.191 (.234) 
Gender .165 (.057) .166 2.904 (.004) 
Employment .026 (.060) .025 .435 (.664) 
Parent .119 (.055) .133 2.142 (.033) 
Education .109 (.061) .111 1.780 (.076) 
SES .022 (.059) .023 .369 (.712) 
F-test (Sig.) 2.831 (.007) 
SEE .458 
R2 .061 
Adj. R2 .039 
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Table 6: Regression Results for IPE and EPE  
among Participants and Non-Participants at Time 1 
 
Parameter IPE EPE 
 
B 
(St. Err.) Beta 
t 
(Sig.) 
B 
(St. Err.) Beta 
t 
(Sig.) 
Intercept .272 (.201) … 
1.354 
(.177) 
.530 
(.199) … 
2.666 
(.008) 
Participation -.262 (.122) -.119 
-2.151 
(.032) 
-.253 
(.121) -.119 
-2.095 
(.037) 
Race .030 (.125) .014 
.239 
(.811) 
.093 
(.123) .045 
.756 
(.451) 
Age -.013 (.123) -.006 
-.102 
(.919) 
-.112 
(.121) -.056 
-.923 
(.357) 
Gender .387 (.123) .177 
3.137 
(.002) 
-.260 
(.122) -.123 
-2.134 
(.034) 
Employment -.124 (.127) -.054 
-.973 
(.331) 
.114 
(.126) .052 
.904 
(.367) 
Parent -.043 (.119) -.022 
-.360 
(.719) 
.022 
(.118) .012 
.185 
(.853) 
Education -.336 (.132) -.154 
-2.540 
(.012) 
-.293 
(.131) -.139 
-2.242 
(.026) 
SES -.218 (.127) -.104 
-1.716 
(.087) 
-.232 
(.125) -.115 
-1.853 
(.065) 
F-test (Sig.) 4.994 (.000) 3.262 (.001) 
SEE .97947 .96783 
R2 .115 .079 
Adj. R2 .092 .055 
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Table 7: Heckman Treatment Effects Model for Participants and Non-Participants  
at Time 1 
 
 IPE 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
EPE 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Structural Model   
PARTICIPATION -1.1879 (.000) .2133 (.675) 
GENDER .5398 (.000)   -.3370 (.022) 
EMPLOYMENT -.0999 (.466) .1016 (.426) 
AGE .0507 (.703)     -.1439 (.258) 
PARENT .0668 (.609)    -.0335 (.801)   
RACE .0919 (.495)    .0619 (.631) 
EDUCATION -.2343 (.104)  -.3437 (.016) 
SES -.1974 (.148)    -.2424 (.056)   
CONSTANT .2640 (.222)    .5342 (.008) 
 
Selection Model   
GENDER .4848 (.009)   .5268 (.006)    
EMPLOYMENT -.0922 (.618) -.0739 (.704)   
AGE .0454 (.802)    .0517 (.786)    
PARENT .2030 (.250)    .2238 (.222)    
RACE .0712 (.701)    .0780 (.675)    
EDUCATION .0936 (.639)   .1831 (.414)    
SES -.1154 (.542)    -.1471 (.441)   
SCHOOL .8327 (.000)    .8549 (.000)   
OFFICIAL .8210 (.000)     .7960 (.000)    
TOWNHALL .0188 (.903)    -.0945 (.639) 
VOTE  .0978 (.715)    .0153 (.960)    
CONSTANT -1.8616 (.000) -1.8600 (.000)  
 
Log likelihood  -585.64741     -588.47635     
Wald Chi-Square 
(sig.) 52.40 (.000) 21.49 (.006) 
Rho .6365374    -.3437427    
LR test of 
independent 
equations  
14.45 (.0001) 1.26 (.2611) 
Sample Size 315 315 
 
 239
Table 8: IPE and EPE among Participants at Time 1 and Time 2 
 
Parameter IPE EPE 
 
B 
(St. Err.) Beta 
t 
(Sig.) 
B 
(St. Err.) Beta 
t 
(Sig.) 
Intercept -.136 (.085) … 
-1.598 
(.111) 
-.232 
(.082) … 
-2.827 
(.005) 
Time  .097 (.106) .047 
.912 
(.362) 
.208 
(.102) .105 
2.050 
(.041) 
F-test (Sig.) .833 (.362) 4.203 (.041) 
SEE .98479 .94553 
R2 .002 .011 
Adj. R2 .000 .008 
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Table 9: Mean Scores for IPE and EPE among Participants at Time 1 and Time 2 
 
 
  Time 1 Time 2    
 F-test (sig) 
Mean  
(st. dev.) 
Mean  
(st. dev.) 
Differenc
e 
T-Stat 
(p-value) df 
IPE .005 (.943) 
-.1364 
(.9714) 
-.0399 
(.9918) 
-.0965 
(-0.0204) 
-.912 
(.362) 380 
EPE 6.202 (.013) 
-.2318 
(.8049) 
-.0236 
(1.0125) 
-.2082 
(-0.2076) 
-2.196** 
(.029) 325.637 
 241
Table 10: Relationship of Demographics to IPE and EPE for Participants  
at Time 1 and Time 2 
 
Parameter IPE EPE 
 
B 
(St. Err.) Beta 
t 
(Sig.) 
B 
(St. Err.) Beta 
t 
(Sig.) 
Intercept -.448 (.225) … 
-1.988 
(.048) 
-.390 
(.212) … 
-1.840 
(.067) 
Race .155 (.115) .078 
1.347 
(.179) 
-.136 
(.108) -.073 
-1.259 
(.209) 
Age .282 (.118) .141 
2.390 
(.017) 
.083 
(.111) .044 
.753 
(.452) 
Gender .003 (.121) .002 
.028 
(.978) 
-.120 
(.114) -.058 
-1.051 
(.294) 
Employment .192 (.142) .075 
1.354 
(.177) 
.207 
(.133) .085 
1.556 
(.121) 
Parent .137 (.114) .070 
1.200 
(.231) 
.256 
(.108) .137 
2.374 
(.018) 
Education -.020 (.145) -.009 
-.140 
(.888) 
.148 
(.137) .068 
1.083 
(.280) 
SES -.167 (.125) -.081 
-1.340 
(.181) 
-.062 
(.117) -.032 
-.530 
(.596) 
F-test (Sig.) 1.496 (.168)  2.123 (.041) 
SEE .98896 .93025 
R2 .030 .042 
Adj. R2 .010 .022 
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Table 11: Summary of Demographic Statistics for Participants  
at Time 1 and Time 2 
 
 Participants 
Time 1 
Participants  
Time 2 
RACE n = 126 n = 240 
White/Caucasian 74 (58.7%) 106 (44.2%) 
Minority 52 (41.3%) 134 (55.8%)   
AGE n = 128 n = 235 
18-44 69 (53.9%) 127 (54%) 
45 and Older  59 (46.1%) 108 (46%)   
GENDER n = 133 n = 245 
Male 27 (20.3%) 82 (33.5%) 
Female 106 (79.7%) 163 (66.5%) 
 
EMPLOYMENT  n = 133 n = 246 
Unemployed 35 (26.3%) 36 (14.6%) 
Employed 95 (71.4%) 210 (85.4%) 
 
PARENT n = 133 n = 245 
No 57 (42.9%) 122 (49.8%) 
Yes 73 (54.9%) 123 (50.2%) 
 
EDUCATION n = 128 n = 241 
No Higher Education 
Degree  31 (24.2%) 65 (27%) 
Associates, Bachelors, or 
Graduate/Professional 
Degree 
97 (75.8%) 176 (73%) 
 
SES n = 133 n = 241 
Total Household Income of 
$49,999 or Less 84 (63.2%) 153 (63.5%) 
Total Household Income of 
$50,000 or More 49 (36.8%) 88 (36.5%) 
* Percentages represent the percent of respondents from the sample in the 
demographic sub-category. 
* Totals may not equal 100% due to missing data. 
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Table 12: Demographic Differences among Participants at Time 1 and Time 2 
 
Parameter Participation 
 B (St. Err.) Beta t (Sig.) 
Intercept .631 (.105) … 5.986 (.000) 
Race .173 (.054) .181 3.220 (.001) 
Age -.019 (.055) -.020 -.351 (.726) 
Gender -.186 (.057) -.176 -3.296 (.001) 
Employment .168 (.066) .136 2.542 (.011) 
Parent -.106 (.054) -.112 -1.981 (.048) 
Education -.029 (.068) -.026 -.433 (.665) 
SES .026 (.058) .026 .451 (.652) 
F-test (Sig.) 4.616 (.000) 
SEE .463 
R2 .087 
Adj. R2 .068 
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Table 13: Regression Results for IPE and EPE among Participants 
at Time 1 and Time 2 
 
Parameter IPE EPE 
 
B 
(St. Err.) Beta 
t 
(Sig.) 
B 
(St. Err.) Beta 
t 
(Sig.) 
Intercept -.496 (.237) … 
-2.095 
(.037) 
-.545 
(.221) … 
-2.460 
(.014) 
Time .077 (.116) .037 
.666 
(.506) 
.245 
(.108) .125 
2.267 
(.024) 
Race .142 (.117) .071 
1.212 
(.226) 
-.179 
(.109) -.095 
-1.638 
(.102) 
Age .283 (.118) .142 
2.400 
(.017) 
.088 
(.110) .047 
.800 
(.424) 
Gender .018 (.123) .008 
.145 
(.885) 
-.074 
(.115) -.036 
-.643 
(.521) 
Employment .179 (.143) .070 
1.249 
(.212) 
.166 
(.134) .068 
1.241 
(.215) 
Parent .146 (.115) .074 
1.263 
(.207) 
.282 
(.108) .151 
2.616 
(.009) 
Education -.018 (.146) -.008 
-.125 
(.901) 
.155 
(.136) .071 
1.143 
(.254) 
SES -.169 (.125) -.082 
-1.355 
(.176) 
-.069 
(.117) -.035 
-.589 
(.556) 
F-test (Sig.) 1.362 (.212) 2.523 (.011) 
SEE .98977 .92465 
R2 .031 .056 
Adj. R2 .008 .034 
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Table 14: Average Effects of Participation on IPE and EPE among Participants  
at Time 1 and Time 2  
 
 Pairs Time 1 Time 2 Effect Std. Err. T-Stat P-value 
IPE 93 -.0710  -.1452   .0742 .1245 0.60 0.55 
EPE 93 .0590   -.2522   .3112 .1105 2.82 .0059 
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Table 15: Impact of Deliberative and Demographic Variables on IPE and EPE  
for Participants at Time 2 
 
Parameter IPE EPE 
 
B 
(St. Err.) Beta 
t 
(Sig.) 
B 
(St. Err.) Beta 
t 
(Sig.) 
Intercept -.116 (.283) … 
-.408 
(.684) 
-.272 
(.280) … 
-.971 
(.332) 
Race .030 (.149) .015 
.204 
(.838) 
-.370 
(.147) -.184 
-2.514 
(.013) 
Age .335 (.153) .167 
2.194 
(.029) 
.152 
(.151) .076 
1.004 
(.316) 
Gender -.125 (.147) -.059 
-.848 
(.398) 
-.120 
(.146) -.057 
-.826 
(.410) 
Employment .051 (.204) .017 
.252 
(.801) 
.132 
(.202) .044 
.655 
(.513) 
Parent .119 (.142) .059 
.836 
(.404) 
.347 
(.141) .173 
2.466 
(.014) 
Education -.149 (.182) -.064 
-.818 
(.414) 
.278 
(.180) .119 
1.542 
(.125) 
SES -.056 (.155) -.027 
-.360 
(.719) 
-.116 
(.153) -.056 
-.756 
(.451) 
QD .020 (.078) .020 
.254 
(.799) 
-.014 
(.078) -.014 
-.177 
(.860) 
Impact .163 (.079) .165 
2.075 
(.039) 
.014 
(.078) .015 
.185 
(.853) 
F-test (Sig.) 1.809 (.068) 2.449 (.011) 
SEE .98471 .97398 
R2 .070 .093 
Adj. R2 .031 .055 
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Table 16: IPE and EPE among Participants at Time 2 and Time 3  
 
Parameter IPE EPE 
 
B 
(St. Err.) Beta 
t 
(Sig.) 
B 
(St. Err.) Beta 
t 
(Sig.) 
Intercept .099 (.237) … 
.420 
(.675) 
-.243 
(.230) … 
-1.058 
(.291) 
Time .041 (.125) .019 
.326 
(.744) 
-.083 
(.122) -.040 
-.685 
(.494) 
Race -.080 (.120) -.040 
-.662 
(.509) 
-.118 
(.117) -.060 
-1.009 
(.314) 
Age .170 (.130) .085 
1.309 
(.191) 
.143 
(.126) .072 
1.133 
(.258) 
Gender .020 (.120) .010 
.171 
(.865) 
-.225 
(.116) -.108 
-1.936 
(.054) 
Employment .000 (.157) .000 
-.001 
(.999) 
.176 
(.152) .064 
1.155 
(.249) 
Parent .013 (.120) .007 
.111 
(.911) 
.190 
(.116) .096 
1.632 
(.104) 
Education -.184 (.162) -.071 
-1.135 
(.257) 
.227 
(.157) .090 
1.449 
(.148) 
SES -.168 (.133) -.084 
-1.261 
(.208) 
-.155 
(.129) -.078 
-1.198 
(.232) 
F-test (Sig.) .714 (.679) 1.970 (.050) 
SEE 1.00791 .97650 
R2 .017 .045 
Adj. R2 -.007 .022 
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Table 17: Average Effects of Participation on IPE and EPE among Participants  
at Time 2 and Time 3  
 
 Pairs Time 2 Time 3 Effect Std. Err. T-Stat P-value 
IPE 115 -.0319 .0006 -.0325 .13283 -0.24 .8108 
EPE 115 -.1037 -.0513 -.0524 .1260 -0.42 .6753 
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Table 18: IPE and EPE among Participants at Time 1 and Time 3  
 
Parameter IPE EPE 
 
B 
(St. Err.) Beta 
t 
(Sig.) 
B 
(St. Err.) Beta 
t 
(Sig.) 
Intercept -.334 (.284) … 
-1.176 
(.241) 
-.244 
(.261) … 
-.933 
(.352) 
Time .370 (.137) .186 
2.697 
(.008) 
.196 
(.126) .111 
1.556 
(.121) 
Race .099 (.134) .048 
.738 
(.461) 
.241 
(.123) .132 
1.963 
(.051) 
Age -.184 (.145) -.091 
-1.265 
(.207) 
-.122 
(.133) -.069 
-.918 
(.360) 
Gender .493 (.146) .215 
3.387 
(.001) 
-.112 
(.134) -.055 
-.837 
(.403) 
Employment .197 (.146) .085 
1.345 
(.180) 
.222 
(.134) .108 
1.651 
(.100) 
Parent -.083 (.139) -.042 
-.599 
(.550) 
-.005 
(.127) -.003 
-.037 
(.971) 
Education -.183 (.192) -.068 
-.949 
(.344) 
-.133 
(.177) -.055 
-.751 
(.454) 
SES -.369 (.151) -.184 
-2.438 
(.016) 
-.054 
(.139) -.031 
-.390 
(.697) 
F-test (Sig.) 3.983 (.000) 1.625 (.119) 
SEE .95207 .87456 
R2 .121 .053 
Adj. R2 .090 .020 
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Table 19: Average Effects of Participation on IPE and EPE among Participants  
at Time 1 and Time 3  
 
 Pairs Time 1  Time 3 Effect Std. Err. T-Stat P-value 
IPE 115 -.0319 -.1262 .0944 .1322 .71 .4792 
EPE 115 -.1037 -.3012 .1976 .1158 1.71 .0900 
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Table 20: Regression Results for IPE and EPE among Participants and Non-
Participants  
at Time 3 
 
Parameter IPE EPE 
 
B 
(St. Err.) Beta 
t 
(Sig.) 
B 
(St. Err.) Beta 
t 
(Sig.) 
Intercept 
 
1.334 
(.707) … 
1.885 
(.061) 
.395 
(.698) … 
.566 
(.573) 
Participation .164 (.215) .065 
.764 
(.446) 
-.367 
(.212) -.152 
-1.733 
(.085) 
Race -.189 (.191) -.085 
-.991 
(.323) 
.274 
(.188) .128 
1.459 
(.147) 
Age -.133 (.112) -.120 
-1.181 
(.240) 
-.007 
(.111) -.007 
-.065 
(.948) 
Gender .257 (.175) .120 
1.470 
(.144) 
-.427 
(.172) -.209 
-2.480 
(.014) 
Employment -.271 (.211) -.108 
-1.287 
(.200) 
.059 
(.208) .025 
.284 
(.777) 
Parent -.186 (.191) -.090 
-.977 
(.330) 
-.023 
(.188) -.012 
-.125 
(.901) 
Education -.461 (.273) -.146 
-1.692 
(.093) 
.224 
(.269) .074 
.834 
(.406) 
SES -.405 (.214) -.174 
-1.891 
(.061) 
-.210 
(.211) -.094 
-.993 
(.323) 
F-test (Sig.) 2.490 (.015) 1.483 (.169) 
SEE .97478 .96174 
R2 .126 .079 
Adj. R2 .075 .026 
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Table 21: Heckman Treatment Effects Model for Participants and Non-Participants  
at Time 3 
 
 IPE 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
EPE 
Coefficient 
(p-value) 
Structural Model   
PARTICIPATION -.2076 (.622) -.7733 (.164)   
GENDER .2997 (.085)    -.4075 (.018)   
EMPLOYMENT -.2140 (.297)    .01514 (.940)   
AGE -.2749 (.213)   -.03663 (.867)  
PARENT -.1654 (.384)    -.0079 (.966)   
RACE -.0462 (.830)   .4390 (.058)    
EDUCATION -.3434 (.238)    .3669 (.231)    
SES -.3619 (.102)    -.1818 (.405)   
CONSTANT .9386 (.024)     .5499 (.220)           
Selection Model   
GENDER -.20758 (.536)   -.1628 (.641)   
EMPLOYMENT -.7284 (.087)    -.7311 (.096)   
AGE -.7430 (.068)  -.6446 (.120)   
PARENT -.6329 (.108)    -.6058 (.128)   
RACE 1.6033 (.004)   1.6365 (.004)   
EDUCATION .9618 (.084)    .9574 (.097)    
SES .3164 (.430)    .3380 (.404)    
SCHOOL 1.1701 (.004)    1.2136 (.003)   
OFFICIAL .0985 (.805)    .0213 (.958)    
TOWNHALL .9869 (.006)     .9410 (.021)    
VOTE  -.5647 (.539)    -.6619 (.480)   
CONSTANT .3245 (.743)    .3451 (.729)      
Log likelihood  -242.21564     240.07794     
Wald Chi-Square 
(sig.) 19.24 (.0136) 11.50 (.1751) 
Rho .3135109    .3001917   
LR test of 
independent 
equations  
1.18 (.2775) 0.62 (.4328) 
Sample Size 144 144 
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Table 22: Mean Scores on IPE and EPE for Non-Participants at Time 1 and Time 3 
 
 Time 1 Time 3    
 Mean  (st. dev.) 
Mean  
(st. dev.) 
Mean 
Difference 
(st. dev.) 
T-Stat 
(p-value) df 
IPE -.2253 (1.0814) 
-.0709 
(1.0019) 
-.1544 
(.9543) 
-.943  
(.352) 33 
EPE .0279 (1.1885) 
-.0115 
(1.0433) 
.0394 
(1.1311) 
.203  
(.840) 33 
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CHAPTER SIX  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades, the concept of deliberative democracy has seen a resurgence in 
popularity in the United States and in other Western nations. This increased interest is, in 
part, a function of claims about a democratic deficit and a citizenship deficit in the United 
States (e.g., Macedo et al., 2005; see also Elshtain, 1995; Frantzich, 2005; Putnam, 2000; 
Sandel, 1996; Skocpol and Fiorina, 1999). A democratic deficit refers to a situation 
where democratic organizations, institutions, and governments are seen as falling short of 
fulfilling the principles of democracy in their practices or operation (Chomsky, 2006; 
Durant, 1995). A citizenship deficit refers broadly to the erosion of civil society, and 
more specifically to an erosion of the skills and dispositions of citizenship among the 
general public (e.g., Macedo et. al, 2005). To many, deliberative democracy represents a 
potential remedy for these problems. 
As noted in Chapters 2 and 3, numerous scholars have boasted the intrinsic value 
of deliberative democracy, praising its potential to enhance the skills and dispositions of 
citizenship, and thereby reduce the citizenship deficit (e.g., Elster, 1998; Fung, 2003, 
2005; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 2004; Mansbridge, 1995; Pateman, 1970). In 
particular, advocates of deliberative democracy claim that deliberative processes can 
produce “better citizens” by increasing their political efficacy, sophistication, interest, 
participation, trust, respect, empathy, and sociotropism (Luskin and Fishkin, 2003; see 
also Benhabib, 1996; Cohen and Fung, 2004; Cohen and Rogers, 1995; Cooke, 2000; 
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Elster, 1998; Fearon, 1998; Fung, 2003, 2005; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 2004; 
Macedo, 1999; Manin, 1987). As yet, however, empirical research demonstrating the 
intrinsic benefits of deliberative democracy is lacking (Delli Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs, 
2004). This study attempts to fill a part of this research gap by focusing on the impacts of 
participation in a deliberative democracy process on perceptions of political efficacy. 
Political efficacy refers to the extent to which people feel they have an impact on, 
or exert some influence over, public affairs (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, 1954). More 
specifically, internal political efficacy reflects a person’s feelings of competence to 
understand and participate in the work of government, and external political efficacy 
reflects a person’s beliefs about the responsiveness of government to citizen demands 
(Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990). Although political efficacy is only one measure of the 
skills and dispositions of citizenship, it is a particularly important measure. Political 
efficacy is among the most frequently used measures of general political attitudes (e.g. 
Conway, 2000; Finkel, 1985) and is thought to be a key indicator of the overall health of 
democratic systems (Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990; Easton, 1965, 1975; Miller 1974). 
Moreover, recent decades have seen the steady and significant decline of political 
efficacy among Americans. This is problematic because political efficacy is a measure of 
citizenship that broadly signals regime support and legitimacy (Easton, 1965, 1975; 
Miller, 1974).  
In theory, deliberation should increase perceptions of political efficacy, as well as 
other skills and dispositions of citizenship (e.g., Luskin and Fishkin, 2003). In fact, 
political efficacy is the key citizenship characteristic that is to be developed by 
democratic participation (Mansbridge, 1995; Pateman, 1970). This potential “efficacy 
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effect” is often used as a rationale for engaging in deliberative processes and 
institutionalizing deliberative democracy in the regular practices of government. Again, 
however, relatively little research has explicitly explored the effects of deliberative 
democracy on perceptions of political efficacy.  
To better understand the relationship between deliberative democracy and 
political efficacy, this study examines the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting as 
convened by United Agenda for Children (UAC), a coalition of public, private, and non-
profit organizations who joined to ensure a positive future for the children and youth of 
Mecklenburg County, North Carolina (UAC, 2006). The AmericaSpeaks 21st Century 
Town Meeting is a deliberative democracy process that enables thousands of citizens to 
deliberate in small groups about important community issues. As discussed in Chapters 3 
and 4, the design characteristics of the Town Meeting make it an exceptional process to 
examine for the potential intrinsic benefits of deliberative democracy (e.g., Fung, 2003, 
2005; Williamson, 2004).   
The primary research question in this study is: What impact does participation in 
the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting have on participants’ sense of internal 
and external political efficacy? Three subsidiary research questions are explored, 
including:  
1) Do participants and non-participants differ in terms of political efficacy before 
participation in the Town Meeting?  
 
2) Do participants have a higher sense of political efficacy after participation in the 
Town Meeting? If so, what variables affect perceptions of political efficacy?  
 
3) If participants have a higher sense of political efficacy after participation in the 
Town Meeting, do those effects last over time?  
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As explained in Chapter 4, this study uses a quasi-experimental, longitudinal 
research design and data from surveys collected at three points in times from two non-
equivalent comparison groups, including participants (those who attended the UAC 21st 
Century Town Meeting) and non-participants (citizens of the greater Charlotte area who 
did not register for or attend the UAC Town Meeting). Participants were surveyed at 
three points in time: before the Town Meeting (Time 1), immediately after the Town 
Meeting (Time 2), and approximately 24 months after the Town Meeting (Time 3). Non-
participants were surveyed at two points in time: before the Town Meeting (Time 1) and 
approximately 24 months after the Town Meeting (Time 3).  
Chapter 5 addressed the research questions and their related hypotheses using an 
assortment of methodological approaches, including various regression models, Heckman 
treatment effect models, and propensity score matching models. The study has several 
major findings. First, before the Town Meeting, participants have significantly lower 
perceptions of both internal and external political efficacy than non-participants. Second, 
after the Town Meeting, participants experience an increase in both internal and external 
political efficacy; however, only the increase in external political efficacy is statistically 
significant. Moreover, the quality of deliberation is not correlated with either internal or 
external political efficacy. The perceived potential impact of the Town Meeting is 
positively correlated with internal, but not external, political efficacy.  
Third, the results indicate that there are no significant changes in internal or 
external political efficacy among participants between Time 2 and Time 3. These results 
suggest that the efficacy effect persists over time. Moreover, there are no statistically 
significant changes in internal political efficacy among participants at Time 1 and Time 
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3, although the increase in external political efficacy in these time periods is statistically 
significant.  
Finally, unlike before the Town Meeting, there are no statistically significant 
differences in internal political efficacy between participants and non-participants at 
Time 3; however, there are significant differences in external political efficacy between 
participants and non-participants 24 months after the Town Meeting, Moreover, there are 
no significant changes in non-participants’ perceptions of internal or external political 
efficacy between Time 1 and Time 3. In other words, the comparison group experienced 
no changes in political efficacy over time; therefore, changes in participants’ perceptions 
of efficacy can be more strongly attributed to participation in the 21st Century Town.  
This chapter reviews these and other results in more detail, offering substantive 
discussion about what the results mean. Following the discussion of results, several 
limitations to this study are noted, and directions for future research are provided. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 The results of the analyses are discussed below in reference to the three research 
questions that guided this study. As such, the discussion is divided into three sections. 
The first generally focuses on the differences between participants and non-participants. 
The second examines the impact of participation on perceptions of political efficacy, as 
well as the variables that affect perceptions of political efficacy. The third section 
explores the persistence of perceptions of political efficacy. Implications for both theory 
and practice are noted in each section.  
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Differences between Participants and Non-Participants 
The first question asks if participants and non-participants differ in terms of 
political efficacy before participation in the Town Meeting. In general, research shows 
that wealthy, educated individuals with professional careers tend to have higher 
perceptions of political efficacy (Abramson, 1983). Similarly, because most deliberative 
processes have elements of voluntary selection, those who participate are often not 
representative of the broader community; they tend to be wealthier, more educated, and 
professional (Fung, 2003). Given these potential differences, it was important to explore 
baseline differences in among participants and non-participants before the Town 
Meeting. The goal of the question was to better understand the composition of the 
engaged (and disengaged) citizenry. In other words, the question was designed to help 
better understand the efficacy and demographic characteristics of those who do (and do 
not) participate in deliberative processes.  
The comparison of participants and non-participants before the Town Meeting 
produced three important results. First, the analyses showed that when demographic 
variables are held constant, participants had significantly lower perceptions of internal 
and external political efficacy than non-participants. While the efficacy differences 
between participants and non-participants are not surprising, the direction of the 
differences is. As noted in Chapter 3, a significant body of survey research on political 
efficacy and participation reports that those with high levels of political efficacy get 
involved in politics, while those with low levels of political efficacy do not (Abramson 
and Aldrich, 1982; Austin and Pinkleton, 1995; Balch, 1974; Blais, 2000; Campbell, 
Gurin, and Miller, 1954; Clarke and Acock, 1989; Converse, 1972; Craig, 1979;  Craig 
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and Maggiotto, 1982; Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990; Finkel, 1985; Fraser, 1970; Good 
and Mayer, 1975; Hawkins, Marando, and Taylor, 1971; Horwitt, 1999; Langton and 
Karns, 1969; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei, 1991; Orum, 1989; White, 1968).  
The results of this study stand in contrast to the majority of efficacy research, and 
therefore, have important theoretical implications. Most notably, the results suggest a 
need to return to and reexamine the original hypothesis about political efficacy and 
participation. When scholars first began to study political efficacy and participation, they 
hypothesized that the less efficacious would be more likely to mobilize and participate in 
politics. The reasoning was that people who are efficacious do not have the need to 
participate, as they are more likely to feel confident that government officials will make 
decisions in their interest with or without their participation (Fraser, 1970; Gamson, 
1968; Paige, 1971). In terms of this study, the logic is that if people believe that 
government is responsive to their interests, then they have no need to make themselves 
heard in a deliberative, participatory forum. In contrast, those who feel that government is 
not responsive might have viewed the 21st Century Town Meeting as an opportunity to 
express their interests and exact responsibility and accountability from government 
officials. This is especially likely since the Town Meeting has explicit, and publicized, 
links to decision makers.   
Two possible explanations of these findings vis-à-vis the original efficacy 
hypothesis are worth noting. First, the majority of research regarding political efficacy 
and participation has examined traditional methods of political participation, such as 
voting, campaigning, and protesting. Maybe the deliberative nature of the 21st Century 
Town Meeting process, which is fundamentally different from the context and nature of 
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traditional political activities, attracted the less efficacious individuals among the citizens. 
Perhaps these individuals viewed the UAC Town Meeting as a non-traditional, innovative 
process, and believed that in such a forum they would have a better chance of making a 
difference. A second, and even more plausible, explanation is that the context and subject 
matter of the UAC Town Meeting (youth policy issues, including health, education, and 
safety) was important and controversial enough to motivate the less efficacious to 
participate. Thus, maybe political participation in such events is contingent on the subject 
matter of deliberation and on the context in which political participation is to take place. 
Whatever the explanation, it appears that in this case the AmericaSpeaks process was 
successful in engaging less efficacious citizens.  
A second interesting result from the comparison of participants and non-
participants concerns the relationship between demographic variables and political 
efficacy. Specifically, the results suggest that education and SES are negatively related to 
internal and external political efficacy; as education and SES increase, in this sample, 
political efficacy decreases. These results are perplexing and contradict a considerable 
amount of empirical research on demographics, participation, and political efficacy. 
Perhaps the results are a function of knowledge. With education and higher socio-
economic status comes more knowledge. The more one knows and understands the 
policy issue under debate, the more one realizes how difficult addressing the problem will 
be. Such understandings may reduce one’s perceptions about the political difference s/he 
can make in a deliberative forum, as well as reduce one’s expectations about 
responsiveness of government.    
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Finally, a word should be said about the demographic characteristics of 
participants and non-participants. A probit regression model indicates statistically 
significant demographic differences between non-participants and participants with 
respect to gender, parental status, and educational status. There were more females, 
parents, and individuals with higher education degrees among participants than non-
participants. These differences are not surprising given the context of the UAC Town 
Meeting. It is reasonable to expect women and parents to participate in an event focused 
on youth policy. Moreover, the UAC is a coalition of public, private, and third-sector 
organizations. Since the focus of this particular Town Meeting was on youth policy 
issues, it is not surprising that the process attracted women and parents. The difference in 
education levels between participants and non-participants is also interesting, but may be 
a function of the context of UAC Town Meeting. The major areas of policy discussion at 
the UAC Town Meeting were education, health, and safety; as such, personnel from all 
levels of the school system, as well as administrators and officials from a variety of 
community and government agencies were in attendance. Obviously, these participants 
will tend to be more educated than the citizenry at large. Nevertheless, it is interesting 
that participants and non-participants did not differ with respect to other demographic 
characteristics, including employment status, socio-economic status, age, and race. This 
result suggests that AmericaSpeaks’ efforts at targeted recruitment pay off; they are 
successful in engaging participants that are demographically representative of the 
community.  
In sum, the UAC Town Meeting process engaged a diverse cross-section of the 
community, and was successful in gaining the participation of the less efficacious citizens 
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in the community. These results, and particularly the results for political efficacy, have 
important implications for both theory and practice. From a theoretical standpoint, the 
results stand in contrast to wealth of research, and suggest that theorists need to return to 
the ideas about who participates in such processes and why. It is possible that 
participation is context-specific. Moreover, if the opposite result had been found, that 
participants had higher perceptions of political efficacy, it would have suggested that the 
21st Century Town Meeting was less effective than presumed in engaging all segments of 
the citizenry. This finding would have raised a question about why deliberative 
democracy efforts should be pursued if they are only further engaging the already 
efficacious among citizens. The results presented here may abate this concern.  
 
The Impact of Participation on Political Efficacy 
The second set of research questions get to the heart of the study: whether 
participation in a deliberative democracy process increases perceptions political efficacy, 
and what variables contribute to those perceptions. Advocates of deliberative democracy 
assert that deliberation should increase perceptions of political efficacy, and foster other 
skills and dispositions of citizenship (e.g., Luskin and Fishkin, 2003). The theory 
promulgated by many participatory and deliberative scholars is that such participation has 
an educative effect on individuals in that it increases self-confidence and skill-
development which can generate and foster political efficacy (e.g., Barber, 1984; 
Benhabib, 1996; Cohen and Rogers, 1995; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 2004; Hunold 
and Young, 1998; Luskin and Fishkin, 2003; Mason, 1982; Pateman, 1970; Thompson, 
1970). This potential “efficacy effect” is often used as a rationale for engaging in 
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deliberative processes and is a key feature in arguments to institutionalize deliberative 
democracy in the regular practices of government. Again, however, relatively little 
research has explicitly explored the effects of deliberative democracy on perceptions of 
political efficacy. To address the second set of research questions, participants at Time 1 
(before the Town Meeting) are compared to participants at Time 2 (immediately after the 
Town Meeting). The analyses involved in these comparisons produced several important 
results.  
First, there are statistically significant increases in subjects’ perceptions of 
external politically efficacy after participation. Internal political efficacy also increases 
after the Town Meeting, but not in a statistically significant way. These results suggest 
that the Town Meeting is at least partially successful in generating the efficacy effect 
among participants. While these results will be reassuring to some deliberative scholars, 
they do present a challenge to the theory behind deliberative and participatory 
democracy. As noted above, participatory and deliberative theorists suggest that 
deliberation will have educative effects on participants. In general, these educative effects 
are articulated in way that more closely resembles internal, rather than external political 
efficacy. For example, Pateman (1970: 46, emphasis added) asserts that “the acquisition 
of confidence is part, at least, of what theorists of the participatory society saw as the 
psychological benefits that would accrue during participation.” In other words, 
participatory and deliberative scholars tend to emphasize the effects of participation on 
internal political efficacy, or feelings about one’s competence and ability to participate 
effectively in government and politics. This assertion is only weakly borne out by the 
findings of this study.  
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Rather, the results here suggest that participation has a stronger impact on 
external political efficacy, or feelings about the responsiveness of government and its 
authorities. In this sense, the results tend to buttress the mobilization of support theory, 
rather than deliberative and participatory theory; participation increases the belief that 
governmental authorities are responsive to attempted citizen influence. Certainly, this 
reflects the  observation that effective participation requires the belief that participation 
matters, that government is listening and will be responsive (e.g., Mill, 1997). Indeed, 
external political efficacy has been linked to trust in political authorities (Balch, 1974), 
the concept of diffuse political support (Easton, 1965, 1975), and general support for the 
political system (Iyengar, 1980). Research has also shown that external efficacy is 
profoundly affected by political events (e.g., Clarke and Acock, 1989; Gurin and Brim, 
1984), it evolves and transforms in response to changes in the political landscape. It 
follows that external efficacy is likely to be reactive to interventions that are explicitly 
supported by (and have the explicit support of) key political decision makers, as is found 
in the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting.  
Whereas external efficacy is malleable, internal efficacy may be more stable. 
Internal efficacy is clearly a product of political socialization and all of its accompanying 
social, familial, educational, and other forces (Almond and Verba, 1963). Moreover, 
internal political efficacy is clearly connected to the concept of self-efficacy, as employed 
in social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1977, 1982). Self-efficacy reflects the belief that one 
can effectively manage situations and events that affect their lives. These feelings of self-
efficacy are developed over the course of one’s life in response to personal experiences, 
vicarious experiences, social persuasions, and physiological factors (Bandura, 1994). 
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Thus, while perceptions of internal political efficacy can change, it is not surprising that a 
one-time, eight-hour intervention did not change significantly the way people feel about 
their abilities to participate in politics. This then, may be the lynchpin on which the 
educative effects of participatory theory turns. It is not enough to have a singular 
deliberative experience; maybe deliberative events need to happen several times before 
internal efficacy will change in a statistically meaningful way.   
In short, the results of this study suggest that participation in the 21st Century 
Town Meeting has an immediate, statistically significant impact on external political 
efficacy. Moreover, internal political efficacy also increases, just not in a statistically 
significant way. We should be clear, however, that these results do not mean that 
deliberation has no effect on internal political efficacy for at least two reasons. First, and 
most obviously, this study involves one example of one deliberative democracy process; 
thus, we cannot generalize these results to all processes of deliberative democracy. In 
other words, we cannot surmise the failure of deliberative democracy to affect internal 
political efficacy from this study alone. Second, there is clearly measurement error in 
internal political efficacy, as evidence by its low reliability score in this and other studies. 
Such error is an historical artifact of the way in which political efficacy is assessed and 
measured.  
A second interesting result concerns the effect of deliberative variables on 
perceptions of political efficacy. Specifically, this study assessed the impacts of 
perception about the quality of deliberation and the potential impact of the Town Meeting 
on political efficacy. The quality of deliberation is thought to be an important 
characteristic in determining the impact of deliberative democracy on citizens (Cohen, 
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1989; Gastil, 1993, 2000, 2006; Habermas, 1989); however, the results of this study show 
that it is not significantly related to either internal or external political efficacy. This 
result is surprising and raises an important question: if the quality of deliberation is 
unimportant, then how can we speak of “deliberative” democracy? There are several 
possible explanations for this finding. First, there is relatively little variance in the 
measure used here, which could have an impact on its significance in the regression 
model. Second, scholars have not yet developed a survey instrument with which to 
measure the concept of the quality of deliberation. The research survey used in this study 
was designed with numerous questions that capture various ideas from the literature 
about the quality of deliberation. For example, the quality of deliberation index used here 
resembles the discourse quality index created by Steenbergen, Bächtiger, Spörndli, and 
Steiner (2003). Although the quality of deliberation index has high reliability, it is 
possible that the index does not capture the elements of deliberation that matter in the 
fostering of political efficacy. Third, it is possible that the quality of deliberation is an 
intervening variable; perhaps it does not directly influence political efficacy, but rather is 
important in the development of other skills and dispositions of citizenship. For example, 
it is reasonable to assert that deliberative quality would impact trust, empathy and/or 
political knowledge, and through the development of these characteristics, would assist in 
the development of efficacy. Finally, it is also possible that deliberative quality does not 
matter. Maybe it is simply the opportunity to participate that counts in fostering political 
efficacy.  
Similarly, the perceived potential impact of the Town Meeting has no effect on 
external political efficacy, although it is a statistically significant predictor of internal 
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political efficacy. Participants who perceive greater potential impact have higher 
perceptions of internal political efficacy. This result is a little bit surprising. One would 
think that greater perceived impact would be correlated with perceptions about 
governmental responsiveness. Instead, the results here suggest that the greater one 
perceives the potential impact to be, the more one feels confident about his or her 
political abilities. However, it is reasonable to assume that those who are internally 
efficacious will also believe that an event in which they participation will also have an 
impact. This result supports theorists’ assertion that empowered participatory forums 
(e.g., Fung and Wright, 2003) are needed in order for deliberation to produce citizenship 
benefits.  
Finally, it is important to briefly discuss the impact of demographic characteristics 
on political efficacy. When all else is held constant, only age has an impact on internal 
political efficacy, with older participants feeling, on average, more internally efficacious 
than younger participants. In contrast, when all else is held constant, race and parental 
status have an impact on external political efficacy, with minorities feeling, on average 
less externally efficacious than Caucasians, and parents feeling more externally 
efficacious than non-parents. These results are generally in accord with theory and other 
research on political efficacy and participation (see Chapter 3).  
 
The Persistence of the Efficacy Effect 
The final research question asks about the persistence of the efficacy effect: do 
increased perceptions of political efficacy last over time? This is among the first studies 
to assess the long-term impacts of deliberative participation on political efficacy in a 
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systematic, empirical manner. Just as it is important to know and understand how 
deliberation increases political efficacy, it is important to know whether the efficacy 
effect has longevity. The potential value of deliberative democracy as an antidote to the 
democratic and citizenship deficits increases to the extent that deliberative processes 
result in long-term and sustainable benefits.  
The results of this study show that among participants, internal and external 
political efficacy do not increase or decrease in a significant way 24 months after 
participation (i.e., between Time 2 and Time 3). Moreover, the results indicate that 
external political efficacy is significantly higher at Time 3 than at Time 1. Internal 
political efficacy also increases between these time periods, although not in a statistically 
significant manner. These results indicate that the increases in perceptions of external 
political efficacy persist over time after participation. 
Two additional results from this section are worth noting. First, there are no 
significant differences in internal political efficacy between participants and non-
participants at Time 3. Statistically significant differences in internal political efficacy 
between participants and non-participants did exist at Time 1; therefore, the results at 
Time 3 are evidence that participation does impact internal political efficacy, albeit not in 
a statistically significant manner. Significant differences in external political efficacy 
between participants and non-participants at Time 3 remain. Second, the results show that 
there are no significant differences in non-participants’ perceptions of internal or external 
political efficacy between Time 1 and Time 3. This is important because it demonstrates 
that the comparison group experienced no changes in political efficacy over time. When 
 270
viewed holistically, these results add strength to the findings regarding the effects of 
participation in the 21st Century Town Meeting on perceptions of political efficacy.  
A summary of the main results regarding the efficacy effect is in order. First, 
participants had lower perceptions of internal and external political efficacy than non-
participants before the Town Meeting. Second, immediately following the Town 
Meeting, participants experienced a statistically significant increase in external political 
efficacy; internal political efficacy did not change in a statistically significant way. Third, 
24 months after the Town Meeting, participants’ perceptions of internal and external 
political efficacy did not change in a statistically significant way from the levels reported 
immediately following the Town Meeting. However, external political efficacy, but not 
internal political efficacy, was significantly higher at Time 3 than at Time 1. Thus, the 
gains in perceptions of external political efficacy persisted for at least two years after the 
Town Meeting. Fourth, non-participants experienced no significant changes in political 
efficacy during the same time span. This suggests that history, or other external events, 
were not responsible for participant changes. All-in-all, it appears that the 21st Century 
Town Meeting is successful in generating a partial efficacy effect – participation in the 
Town Meeting significantly changes participants’ perceptions of external political 
efficacy. While participation also impacts perceptions of internal political efficacy, the 
differences are not statistically significant.   
 
LIMITATIONS  
At least three limitations to this study are worth noting. First, this study looks at 
one manifestation of a singular deliberative democracy process. This raises an issue about 
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the generalizability of the findings. Although the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town 
Meeting has many of the design features on would expect from an “ideal” deliberative 
process (Williamson, 2004), it is still very specialized and highly unique. The Town 
Meeting process involves lengthy and elaborate preparation, significant use of new 
technologies, and varying modes of deliberation. It is a highly managed process, from the 
development of a neutral statement of the issue (including issue definition), to intensive 
facilitation and deliberation, to the writing of outcomes and recommendations for 
decision makers. The process is intensive for participants, especially when compared to 
many other deliberative processes, involving at least 8 full hours of deliberation and 
discussion. When coupled with the design elements of the 21st Century Town Meeting, 
these features raise important questions about the generalizability of findings from this 
study. 
I believe, however, that the findings are generalizable to other manifestations of 
the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting. AmericaSpeaks conducts several Town 
Meetings a year. Although the Town Meetings occur in different communities and focus 
on different issues, the format of the Town Meeting process stays the same, increasing 
the likelihood of generalizability in these settings. Nevertheless, it is plausible that the 
effects of participation on political efficacy may change depending on the subject matter 
of deliberation. This will be a matter for future research.  
Although the findings are not generalizable across the spectrum of all deliberative 
democracy processes and applications, they may also hold in studies of deliberative 
democracy where the observed process shares similar procedural elements or structural 
characteristics with the 21st Century Town Meeting. Regardless of limited 
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generalizability, the research findings still inform the study of deliberative democracy 
and have theoretical and practical importance. The results give much needed indications 
about the impacts and outcomes of deliberative democracy processes, in this case, the 
AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting. Scholars can use this information to refine 
theory, enhance practice, and design better research studies.  
This suggests a second limitation, namely that the study uses rolling cross-
sectional data; therefore, individual respondents cannot be linked over time. The linking 
of respondents over time would be a feature in the ultimate deliberative democracy 
research design, as it would readily allow scholars to assess the individual level changes 
that accrue as a result of participation. Given that individual responses cannot be linked, 
we must be wary in asserting the overall impact of the process on perceptions of political 
efficacy. Having such individual-level data would greatly improve the type and strength 
of analyses that can be done.  
Finally, and on a similar note, it is important to recognize that the dependent 
variables for internal and external political efficacy have measurement error. This fact 
may raise questions about the strength of the results reported here.  Despite the 
measurement error, the effects of participation on external political efficacy were 
significant above the 90% confidence level.  
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
These limitations give rise to several interesting directions for future research. In 
regard to this particular dataset, I will undertake additional research to assess the impacts 
of participation in the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting on the other skills and 
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disposition of citizenship. I have data that captures various other aspects of citizenship, 
such as social capital, political trust, political engagement, and political interest and 
knowledge. In addition, the survey contains measures of other procedural characteristics, 
particularly with regard to distributive, procedural, and interactional justice. 
Incorporating these elements into future analyses will allow for a more robust assessment 
of the impacts of participation in the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting on the 
skills and dispositions of citizenship. 
My additional suggestions for future research are broader and applicable to a wide 
variety of scholars in the field. First, it will be useful for future research to examine 
multiple examples of a singular deliberative democracy process or engage in comparative 
studies of two or more deliberative democracy processes. The goal of such research 
designs would be at least threefold: 1) to better assess the impacts of participation in 
deliberative democracy processes on perceptions of political efficacy; 2) to assess impact 
of participation in deliberative democracy processes on other skills and dispositions of 
citizenship, such as political sophistication, interest, knowledge, trust, empathy, respect, 
and participation and engagement; and 3) to empirically examine the impact of particular 
deliberative design choices on these functional outcomes.  
The ultimate design would include the use of panel data, whereby subjects’ 
responses can be tracked over time. Such a design would rule out the possibility of 
confounding influences. Moreover, experimental work in this area can certainly be 
conducted and be useful (e.g., Morrell, 1998). Experiments would allow researchers to 
control and manipulate design choices, including the subject matter of deliberation, and 
in doing so, might enable the further development of theory with respect to design 
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choices and functional outcomes. Despite the potential value and contributions of 
experiments, a considerable amount of field research is also necessary. These events 
happen in real-world situations and are theorized to make real-world differences. If this 
argument is to be tested, then it follows that we must explore the design and impacts of 
such processes on real people, in real settings, who are dealing with real and important 
issues. The scope of deliberative processes is quite large; scholars will not run out of such 
research opportunities anytime in the near future. 
Second, it is imperative that scholars devise better measures of internal and 
external political efficacy. If political efficacy is the key characteristic to be developed by 
participation, then it necessary to have reliable, consistent measures for the concept. It is 
shocking that in the sixty-plus years since the first articulation of political efficacy, 
scholars still rely on inadequate measures. While some work in this area is progressing, 
particularly with respect to internal political efficacy (e.g., Morrell, 2003, 2005), a 
considerable amount of additional work is needed. On a related note, scholars also need 
to develop reliable and consistent measures of other indicators of citizenship skills and 
dispositions. For example, researchers need to develop measures for political empathy, 
trust, sophistication, respect, and sociotropism. Until these measures are developed and 
tested, the impacts of deliberative democracy on the skills and dispositions of citizenship 
cannot be fully understood and appraised. 
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the field of deliberative democracy needs 
to move beyond normative speculation about the intrinsic benefits of deliberative 
democracy to theoretical development and empirical assessment. Scholars need to better 
articulate the theory of deliberative democracy, and develop specific ideas about how 
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various deliberative features and practices contribute to outcomes. Until such theorizing 
and testing is complete, we cannot determine whether institutionalizing deliberative 
democracy in the regular practices of government is warranted. In working toward this 
goal, it will be important to integrate theory from related disciplines into the theory of 
deliberative democracy. Several well-developed areas of theory (and research and 
practice) could be useful to this endeavor. For example, conflict/dispute resolution theory 
sits in the penumbra of deliberative democracy. There is a wealth of scholarship in the 
area of conflict and dispute resolution that may enlighten us about the relationships 
among deliberative structures, participation, and outcomes. Similarly, the social 
psychology literature on organizational justice, including distributive, procedural, and 
interactional justice, may inform the relationship between deliberative designs and 
outcomes. Finally, self-efficacy and social cognition theory may inform our study and 
research of the intrinsic benefits of deliberative democracy processes on individuals and 
their skills and dispositions as citizens.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Deliberative democracy, also sometimes called discursive democracy, is the idea 
that public decisions should be made by discussion among free and equal citizens. One 
goal of deliberative democracy is to infuse government decision making with reasoned 
discussion among, and the collective judgment of, citizens (Chambers, 2003; 
Cunningham, 2002; Elster, 1998; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004). Deliberative 
democrats see public deliberation as the source of legitimate lawmaking, and view it in 
contrast to the traditional economics-based theory of democracy, which uses voting as the 
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central institution for identifying and aggregating preferences (Mansbridge, 1980; Young, 
2000).  
As noted throughout this dissertation, deliberative democracy has seen a 
resurgence in popularity and taken on new meaning in Western nations, and especially in 
the United States, in recent decades. One reason for this is that advocates believe 
deliberative democracy is an antidote to the ills of the democratic deficit and citizenship 
deficit in the United States and elsewhere (e.g., Macedo et al., 2005; see also Elshtain, 
1995; Frantzich, 2005; Putnam, 2000; Sandel, 1996; Skocpol and Fiorina, 1999). 
Advocates assert that deliberative democracy can ensure accountability and quality 
service delivery and produce improved policy outcomes while simultaneously reversing 
the trends of declining political participation and the erosion of civil society. The basic 
argument is that the nature and characteristics of deliberative democracy have both 
instrumental and intrinsic value. The instrumental value of deliberative democracy 
enables it to better deal with the problems of modern governance, while its intrinsic value 
enables it to produce better and more efficacious citizens.  
The focus of this study is on the intrinsic value of deliberative democracy – its 
potential to enhance the skills and dispositions of citizenship. Specifically, this study 
examines the impact of one deliberative process, the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town 
Meeting, on perceptions of internal and external political efficacy. Political efficacy is an 
important area of research for several reasons. First, internal and external political 
efficacy are among the most frequently used measures of general political attitudes and 
are highly correlated with political participation and mobilization (Conway, 2000; Finkel, 
1985). Second, internal and external political efficacy are thought to be key indicators of 
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the overall health of democratic systems (Craig, Niemi, and Silver, 1990). Third, recent 
decades have seen the steady decline of political efficacy among Americans. Finally, 
deliberation is thought to increase perceptions of political efficacy among participants 
(e.g., Luskin and Fishkin, 2003), and is in fact, the key citizenship characteristic that is to 
be developed by democratic participation (Mansbridge, 1995; Pateman, 1970). This 
potential “efficacy effect” is frequently touted as a rationale for engaging in deliberative 
processes and institutionalizing deliberative democracy in the regular practices of 
government.  
The findings here provide partial support for the idea that deliberative democracy 
can produce the efficacy effect. Specifically, external efficacy, which regards perceptions 
about the responsiveness of government to citizen demands, increased in a statistically 
significant way following participation in the UAC Town Meeting. Internal political 
efficacy, which regards perceptions of one’s competence to engage in politics and is the 
characteristic that most closely resembles theorists’ articulation of the educative effects 
of participation, also increased after participation, although not in a statistically 
significant way. These results provide some support for the claims that deliberative 
democracy produces the efficacy effect; however, the results also suggest a need for 
additional theorizing and testing. Other findings from this study may be more comforting 
to deliberative scholars. Most notably, the results suggest that the AmericaSpeaks 21st 
Century Town Meeting is effective in getting the participation of those who are less 
efficacious in the community. In addition, the process is able to gather participation from 
a diverse cross-section of the community. Finally, the process seems to produce gains in 
external political efficacy that persist over time.  
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Clearly, more research is needed, both in terms of theory development and 
rigorous empirical testing. The time is ripe for such research, especially as the 
deliberative democracy movement gains momentum. The prospective impact of 
deliberative democracy on public administration continues to grow as interest in the field 
increases and as more groups and organizations seek to implement and institutionalize 
such processes in the regular practice of governance. Until such additional research is 
conducted, however, we cannot adequately determine whether the claims and calls for 
institutionalization are warranted. 
Despite the need for additional research, it is clearly becoming increasingly 
important for the field of public administration to understand both the theory and 
practice(s) of deliberative democracy. Current research on deliberative democracy spans 
the fields of public management, public policy, planning, political science, sociology, 
communications, and related disciplines; public administration, with its multi-disciplinary 
nature and perspectives, is a logical and natural home for deliberative democracy 
research. Moreover, integrating citizens into policy and decision-making processes is a 
major challenge for governance in the 21st century (see generally, O’Leary, Bingham and 
Gerard, 2006; see also Collaborative Democracy Network, 2005, 2006). As is evident 
from the history of citizen participation practices in the United States (and elsewhere), the 
brunt of responsibility for the creation, development, implementation, and management 
of such efforts falls squarely on the shoulders of public administrators. To the extent that 
scholars and practitioners want to institutionalize deliberative democracy in the regular 
practices of government and governance, it is necessary that both public administrators 
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and scholars of public administration understand and care about deliberative democracy 
processes and practices.   
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APPENDIX 1: SURVEY INSTRUMENTS 
 
Non-Participant/Participant Telephone Survey  
(Time 1) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The first set of questions deals with media use. 
 
1.  How many days a week do you read a newspaper?   
 
____ DAYS   
 
_____ DO NOT READ A NEWSPAPER Æ GO TO QUESTION 3. 
 
2. How much attention do you pay to newspaper content dealing with: 
        VERY LITTLE                  VERY CLOSE        DON’T  
      ATTENTION                   ATTENTION          READ       
a. International affairs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 
b. National government and 
politics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 
c. Local government and 
politics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 
d. Editorials and letters to the 
editor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 
e. Youth issues in the 
Charlotte area 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 
 
3. How often do you watch: 
                ALL THE   DON’T   DON’T 
               RARELY                                  TIME      WATCH  KNOW  
a. Network evening news 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
b. Local evening news  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
c. News magazines  
(like 20/20 or PrimeTime 
Live) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
 
(If respondent says “0” for all responses above, skip to Q5) 
 
4. How much attention do you pay to the following content on TV? 
        VERY LITTLE               VERY CLOSE   DON’T  DON’T 
              ATTENTION              ATTENTION     WATCH    KNOW 
a. International affairs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
b. National government and 
politics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
c. Local government and 
politics  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
d. Editorials and letters to the 
editor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
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5. People rely on different sources for political information. How much do 
you rely on the each of the following sources? 
                   VERY           VERY       NOT    DON’T  
           LITTLE          MUCH      AT ALL  KNOW 
a. Newspapers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
b. Magazines (like Time, 
Newsweek, U.S. News and 
World Report) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
c. Network Television News 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
d. Local Television News  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
e. News Magazines (like 
“Nightline” or “20/20” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
f. Political Talk Radio 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
g. The Internet 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
h. Friends, Family, Neighbors, 
and Colleagues  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
 
The next set of questions deals with government and politics. 
6. In general, how interested are you in: 
              NOT AT ALL    EXTREMELY     DON’T  
          INTERESTED     INTERESTED    KNOW  
a. International Affairs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
b. National Government and 
Politics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
c. Local Government and 
Politics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
d. Youth Issues  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
e. Youth Issues in the 
Charlotte Area 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
7. Regardless of how interested you are, how much would you say you know 
about: 
             KNOW          KNOW       DON’T    
            NOTHING         A LOT       KNOW  
a. International Affairs  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
b. National Government and 
Politics  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
c. Local Government and 
Politics  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
d. Youth Issues  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
e. Youth Issues in the 
Charlotte Area 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
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8. In the past year, have you: 
a. Attended a neighborhood or town-hall meeting?  [1] YES [0] NO 
b. Attended a meeting involving school affairs? [1] YES [0] NO 
c. Written a letter to an editor? [1] YES [0] NO 
d. Called in to a local radio station? [1] YES [0] NO 
e. Circulated a petition?  [1] YES [0] NO 
f. Worked for a local political campaign?  [1] YES [0] NO 
g. Contacted a local public official? [1] YES [0] NO 
h. Called other people to raise funds for local organizations?  [1] YES [0] NO 
i. Volunteered for a local organization or cause? [1] YES [0] NO 
j. Contributed money to local organizations?  [1] YES [0] NO 
 
 
9. Did you vote in the November 2004 presidential election? 
[0] NO 
[1] YES 
 
10. How much of the time do you think you can trust local government to do 
what is right? 
[1] JUST ABOUT ALWAYS 
[2] MOST OF THE TIME 
[3] ONLY SOME OF THE TIME 
 
 
11. Which statement below comes closer to how you feel? 
[1] THE GOVERNMENT IS RUN BY A FEW BIG INTERESTS LOOKING OUT FOR 
THEMSELVES. 
 
[2] THE GOVERNMENT IS RUN FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL THE PEOPLE. 
 
 
 
12. Which statement below best describes how you feel about others? 
[1] MOST PEOPLE WOULD TRY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF YOU IF THEY GOT THE 
CHANCE. 
 
[2] MOST PEOPLE TRY TO BE FAIR. 
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13. To what extent do you agree with each statement below?  
 STRONGLY AGREE AGREE NEUTRAL  DISAGREE 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
DON’T 
KNOW   
a. Elected officials don't 
care what people like me 
think. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
b. People like me don't 
have any say about what 
the government does. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
c. It is important for people 
like me to have a voice 
in local government 
decisions. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
d. Sometimes politics and 
government seem so 
complicated that a 
person like me can't 
really understand what's 
going on. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
e. Voting is the only way 
people like me can have 
a say about how 
government runs things. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
f. Local government is 
responsive to citizen 
concerns. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
g. Elected officials are only 
interested in people’s 
votes. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
h. I consider myself well-
qualified to participate in 
politics. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
i. I often don’t feel sure of 
myself when talking 
about politics or 
government.  
1 2 3 4 5 99 
j. Citizens should have 
more opportunities to 
participate in local 
government decision-
making. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
k. Public policy decisions 
should be left to elected 
officials. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
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14. Now I am going to read a list of issues affecting youth in Mecklenburg 
County.  How interested are you in each of these issues?  
NOT AT ALL        EXTREMELY        DON’T 
INTERESTED         INTERESTED      KNOW 
a. Education 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
b. Public Safety 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
c. Family Support 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
d. Health Care  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
e. Substance Abuse 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
f. Community Activities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
g. Economic Security 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
h. Community Support 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
  
 
15. Regardless of your interest, how confident are you in your 
knowledge of each issue?   
   NOT               EXTREMELY     DON’T  
     CONFIDENT            CONFIDENT      KNOW 
a. Education 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
b. Public Safety 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
c. Family Support 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
d. Health Care  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
e. Substance Abuse 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
f. Community Activities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
g. Economic Security 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
h. Community Support 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
 
16. Are there any youth-related issues not listed above that you think are 
important? 
[0] NO [GO TO QUESTION 17] 
[1] YES [GO TO PART B] 
 
B. If yes, what are the issues? 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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17. In your opinion, how effective have local groups been in ensuring that 
all children in Mecklenburg County are healthy, safe and well-educated? 
  NOT             EXTREMELY    DON’T  
    EFFECTIVE            EFFECTIVE      KNOW 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
 
18. How much responsibility do you think each of the following entities has 
for improving the quality of life for young people: 
       NO                    A GREAT DEAL  DON’T 
 RESPONSIBILITY                                OF RESPONSIBILITY   KNOW 
Businesses 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Foundations and 
charities 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Individuals 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Local Government 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Not-for-profit 
organizations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Religious associations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Schools 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
 
 
19. Regardless of how much responsibility you feel each group has, how 
much power and influence do you think each group has to actually improve 
the quality of life for young people: 
 NO POWER                 A GREAT AMOUNT     DON’T 
 AND INFLUENCE              POWER & INFLUENCE    KNOW 
Businesses 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Foundations and 
charities 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Individuals 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Local Government 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Not-for-profit 
organizations 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Religious associations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Schools 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
 
[IF RANDOM DIAL PARTICIPANT, SKIP TO QUESTION 25]  
[IF REGISTRANT BUT NOT ATTENDING ASK ONLY QUESTIONS 20, 23, 24 c-i) 
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The next set of questions deals with the United Agenda for Children Town 
Meeting. 
 
20. How did you hear about the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting? 
[1] NEWSPAPER STORY 
[2] TELEVISION STORY 
[3] ON THE RADIO 
[4] NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENT 
[5] FROM SOMEONE ELSE 
[6] OTHER (PLEASE SPECIFY) ___________________________________ 
 
 
21. Do you think you will be comfortable expressing your opinions on the 
issues at the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting? 
[1] I do not expect to express myself at all. 
[2] I will express how I feel, and let it go after that. 
[3] I will express how I feel, and try to persuade others to accept my viewpoint. 
[4] I don’t know.  
 
 
22. If everyone else agrees on an issue, but you disagree, would you feel 
free to speak out? 
[0] NO 
[1] YES 
[2] DON’T KNOW 
 
 
23. How much impact do you think the United Agenda for Children Town 
Meeting will have on:  
NO                        GREAT      DON’T  
IMPACT            IMPACT     KNOW 
a. Yourself 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
b. The Charlotte Community 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
c. Policy Makers  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
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24. To what extent do you agree with each statement below? (Circle one) 
 
STRONGLY 
AGREE AGREE NEUTRAL  DISAGREE 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
DON’T 
KNOW   
a. I am prepared to participate 
effectively in the United 
Agenda for Children Town 
Meeting. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
b. My participation will not 
make a difference in the 
outcome of the United 
Agenda for Children Town 
Meeting. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
c. Other participants will 
consider my opinions. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
d. Decision makers will be 
responsive to the 
recommendations of 
participants during the United 
Agenda for Children Town 
Meeting. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
e. Decision makers and 
government representatives 
will not follow through with 
citizens’ recommendations. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
f. I was aware of this kind of 
process before I registered 
for the United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
g. The United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting will 
help decision makers and 
elected officials better 
understand the concerns of 
average citizens. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
h. The United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting will 
produce information that will 
improve future decision 
making. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
i. Local groups and 
organizations will work 
together to implement the 
recommendations from the 
United Agenda for Children 
Town Meeting. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
j. The United Agenda for 
Children will increase the 
capacity of local groups and 
organizations to work 
together. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
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k. It is important that 
participants in the United 
Agenda for Children Town 
Meeting do what they can to 
accomplish the 
recommendations. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
l. It is important that you 
personally to do what you 
can to accomplish the 
recommendations. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
 
The last set of questions deals with you. These questions are optional, but 
remember, all information is confidential and anonymous.  
 
 
25. What is your gender?    
 [0] MALE   [1] FEMALE 
 
 
26. Are you employed?  
 [0] NO    [1] YES 
 
(If respondent says “0” for Q26, skip to Q28)  
 
 
 
27. If you are employed, do you work for: 
[1] PRIVATE BUSINESS 
[2] GOVERNMENT  
[3] K-12 EDUCATION  
[4] NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION 
[5] OTHER 
 
 
 
28. Are you part of a group or business that is working already to achieve 
one or more of the United Agenda for Children goals? 
[0] NO    [1] YES 
 
(If respondent says “0” for Q28, skip to Q29) 
 
If yes, which group(s): 
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29. What is your age?   
[1] UNDER 18 
[2] 18-21 YEARS 
[3] 22-34 YEARS       
[4] 35-44 YEARS 
[5] 45-59 YEARS  
[6] OVER 60  
[7] REFUSED TO ANSWER 
 
 
30. Do you have children under the age of 18?  
[0] NO   [1] YES 
 
 
31. What is your race? 
[1] BLACK/AFRICAN AMERICAN  
[2] WHITE/CAUCASIAN 
[3] HISPANIC/LATINO 
[4] ASIAN/ASIAN-INDIAN 
[5] MULTI-ETHNIC/OTHER 
[6] UNKNOWN  
[7] REFUSED TO ANSWER 
 
 
32. What is your level of education? 
[1] SOME HIGH SCHOOL 
[2] HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE (INCLUDING EQUIVALENCY) 
[3] SOME COLLEGE, NO DEGREE 
[4] ASSOCIATE DEGREE 
[5] BACHELOR’S DEGREE 
[6] GRADUATE OR PROFESSIONAL DEGREE 
[7] REFUSED TO ANSWER 
 
 
33. What was your 2003 total household income before taxes?  
[1]  UNDER $10,000 
[2]  $10,000 TO $19,999 
[3]  $20,000 TO $29,999 
[4]  $30,000 TO $39,999 
[5]  $40,000 TO $49,999 
[6]  $50,000 TO $59,999 
[7]  $60,000 TO $69,999 
[8]  $70,000 TO $79,999 
[9]  $80,000 TO $89,999 
[10] $90,000 TO $99,999 
[11] $100,000 OR MORE 
[12] REFUSED TO ANSWER 
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Participant Survey (Time 2) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
You must be at least 18 years old to complete this survey. 
 
Please clearly circle, mark or write in your answers. 
The first set of questions deals with media use. 
1.  How many days a week do you read a newspaper?   
 
____ DAYS   
 
_____ DO NOT READ A NEWSPAPER Æ GO TO QUESTION 3. 
 
2. How much attention do you pay to newspaper content dealing with: 
        VERY LITTLE                  VERY CLOSE        DON’T  
      ATTENTION                   ATTENTION          READ       
a. International affairs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 
b. National government and 
politics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 
c. Local government and 
politics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 
d. Editorials and letters to the 
editor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 
e. Youth issues in the 
Charlotte area 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 
 
 
3. How often do you watch: 
                ALL THE   DON’T   DON’T 
               RARELY                                  TIME      WATCH  KNOW  
a. Network evening news 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
b. Local evening news  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
c. News magazines  
(like 20/20 or PrimeTime 
Live) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
 
 
4. How much attention do you pay to the following content on TV? 
        VERY LITTLE               VERY CLOSE   DON’T  DON’T 
              ATTENTION              ATTENTION     WATCH    KNOW 
a. International affairs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
b. National government and 
politics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
c. Local government and 
politics  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
d. Editorials and letters to the 
editor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
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5. People rely on different sources for political information. How much do 
you rely on the each of the following sources? 
                       VERY           VERY       NOT    DON’T  
           LITTLE          MUCH      AT ALL  KNOW 
a. Newspapers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
b. Magazines (like Time, 
Newsweek, U.S. News and 
World Report) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
c. Network Television News 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
d. Local Television News  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
e. News Magazines (like 
“Nightline” or “20/20” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
f. Political Talk Radio 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
g. The Internet 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
h. Friends, Family, Neighbors, 
and Colleagues  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
 
The next set of questions deals with government and politics. 
6. In general, how interested are you in: 
              NOT AT ALL    EXTREMELY     DON’T  
          INTERESTED     INTERESTED    KNOW  
a. International Affairs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
b. National Government and 
Politics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
c. Local Government and 
Politics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
d. Youth Issues  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
e. Youth Issues in the 
Charlotte Area 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
7. Regardless of how interested you are, how much would you say you know 
about: 
             KNOW          KNOW       DON’T    
            NOTHING         A LOT       KNOW  
a. International Affairs  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
b. National Government and 
Politics  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
c. Local Government and 
Politics  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
d. Youth Issues  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
e. Youth Issues in the 
Charlotte Area 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
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8. In the past year, have you: 
a. Attended a neighborhood or town-hall meeting?  [1] YES [0] NO 
b. Attended a meeting involving school affairs? [1] YES [0] NO 
c. Written a letter to an editor? [1] YES [0] NO 
d. Called in to a local radio station? [1] YES [0] NO 
e. Circulated a petition?  [1] YES [0] NO 
f. Worked for a local political campaign?  [1] YES [0] NO 
g. Contacted a local public official? [1] YES [0] NO 
h. Called other people to raise funds for local organizations?  [1] YES [0] NO 
i. Volunteered for a local organization or cause? [1] YES [0] NO 
j. Contributed money to local organizations?  [1] YES [0] NO 
 
9. Did you vote in the November 2004 presidential election? 
[0] NO 
[1] YES 
 
10. How much of the time do you think you can trust local government to do 
what is right? 
[1] JUST ABOUT ALWAYS 
[2] MOST OF THE TIME 
[3] ONLY SOME OF THE TIME 
 
11. Which statement below comes closer to how you feel? 
[1] THE GOVERNMENT IS RUN BY A FEW BIG INTERESTS LOOKING OUT FOR 
THEMSELVES. 
 
[2] THE GOVERNMENT IS RUN FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL THE PEOPLE. 
 
12. Which statement below best describes how you feel about others? 
[1] MOST PEOPLE WOULD TRY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF YOU IF THEY GOT THE 
CHANCE. 
 
[2] MOST PEOPLE TRY TO BE FAIR. 
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13. To what extent do you agree with each statement below?  
 STRONGLY AGREE AGREE NEUTRAL  DISAGREE 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
DON’T 
KNOW  
a. Elected officials don't 
care what people like 
me think. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
b. People like me don't 
have any say about 
what the government 
does. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
c. It is important for 
people like me to have 
a voice in local 
government decisions. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
d. Sometimes politics and 
government seem so 
complicated that a 
person like me can't 
really understand 
what's going on. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
e. Voting is the only way 
people like me can 
have a say about how 
government runs 
things. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
f. Every citizen’s voice 
counts in the political 
process. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
g. Local government is 
responsive to citizen 
concerns. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
h. Elected officials are 
only interested in 
people’s votes. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
i. If elected officials are 
not interested hearing 
what the people think, 
there is no way to 
make them listen. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
j. I consider myself well-
qualified to participate 
in politics. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
k. I often don’t feel sure 
of myself when talking 
about politics or 
government.  
1 2 3 4 5 99 
l. I feel competent to 
speak with government 
officials about local 
issues. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
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m. Citizens should have 
more opportunities to 
participate in local 
government decision-
making. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
n. Public policy decisions 
should be left to 
elected officials. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
 
 
The next few questions deal with the United Agenda for Children Town 
Meeting. 
 
14. How did you hear about the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting? 
[1] NEWSPAPER STORY 
[2] TELEVISION STORY 
[3] ON THE RADIO 
[4] NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENT 
[5] FROM SOMEONE ELSE 
[6] OTHER (PLEASE SPECIFY) ___________________________________ 
 
15. What were your expectations in attending the United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting? 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Below is a list of issues affecting youth that might have come up at the 
United Agenda for Children Town Meeting. How interested are you in 
each of these issues?  
           NOT AT ALL         EXTREMELY      DON’T  
          INTERESTED           INTERESTED      KNOW  
a. Education 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
b. Public Safety 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
c. Family Support 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
d. Health Care  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
e. Substance Abuse 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
f. Community Activities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
g. Economic Security 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
h. Community Support 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
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17. Regardless of your interest, how confident are you that you understand 
each of these issues?   
 NOT                      EXTREMELY      DON’T  
                                                          CONFIDENT            CONFIDENT     KNOW  
a. Education 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
b. Public Safety 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
c. Family Support 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
d. Health Care  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
e. Substance Abuse 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
f. Community Activities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
g. Economic Security 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
h. Community Support 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
 
18. Were there any issues not discussed at the United Agenda for Children 
Town Meeting that you think should have been discussed? 
[0] NO 
[1] YES 
If yes, what are the issues?         
            
            
             
19. Do you think you will talk with others about these issues after the 
United Agenda for Children Town Meeting? 
[1] I WON’T TALK ABOUT THESE ISSUES AT ALL. 
[2] I WILL TALK A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THESE ISSUES.  
[3] I WILL TALK A LOT ABOUT THESE ISSUES. 
 
 
20. Were you comfortable expressing your opinions on the issues? 
[1] NO, I DID NOT EXPRESS MYSELF AT ALL. 
[2] YES, I EXPRESSED HOW I FELT, AND LET IT GO AFTER THAT. 
[3] YES, I EXPRESSED HOW I FELT, AND TRIED TO PERSUADE OTHERS TO ACCEPT 
MY VIEWS. 
 
21. If everyone else agreed on an issue, but you disagreed, did you feel free 
to speak out at the Town Meeting? 
 
[0] NO 
[1] YES 
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22. Thinking about community leaders in the room, list some of those that 
you know were present at the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.  
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
23. In your opinion, how effective have local groups been in ensuring that 
all children in Mecklenburg County are healthy, safe and well-educated? 
             NOT                             EXTREMELY          DON’T  
                        EFFECTIVE                              EFFECTIVE           KNOW 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
 
 
 
24. In your opinion, what are the barriers to ensuring that all children in 
Mecklenburg County are healthy, safe and well-educated?  
            
             
 
 
25. How much responsibility do you think each of the following entities has 
for improving the quality of life for young people? 
   NO          A LOT OF  DON’T 
       RESPONSIBILITY      RESPONSIBILITY     KNOW  
Businesses 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Foundations and Charities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Individuals 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Local Government 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Not-for-Profit Organizations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Religious Associations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Schools 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
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26. Regardless of how much responsibility you feel each group has, how 
much power and influence do you think each group has to actually 
improve the quality of life for young people? 
      NO POWER          ALOT OF POWER    DON’T  
      AND INFLUENCE          AND INFLUENCE    KNOW  
Businesses 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Foundations and Charities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Individuals 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Local Government 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Not-for-Profit Organizations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Religious Associations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Schools 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
 
27. How much impact do you think the United Agenda for Children 
Town Meeting will have on:  
 NO            GREAT    DON’T  
 IMPACT            IMPACT     KNOW  
Yourself 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Mecklenburg County  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Policy Makers  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
 
28. Did you stay for the entire day? 
[1] YES 
[2] NO 
 
29. To what extent do you agree with each statement below?  
 STRONGLY AGREE AGREE NEUTRAL  DISAGREE 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
DON’T 
KNOW 
a. I was prepared to 
participate effectively 
in the United Agenda 
for Children Town 
Meeting. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
b. Others were prepared 
to participate 
effectively in the United 
Agenda for Children 
Town Meeting. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
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c. My participation did not 
make a difference in 
the outcome of the 
United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
d. Other participants 
considered my 
opinions. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
e. Decision makers were 
responsive to the 
recommendations of 
participants during the 
United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
f. Decision makers and 
government 
representatives will not 
follow through with 
citizens’ 
recommendations. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
g. I was aware of this 
kind of process before I 
registered for the 
United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
h. The United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting 
helped decision makers 
and elected officials 
better understand the 
concerns of average 
citizens. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
i. The United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting 
produced information 
that will improve future 
decision making. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
j. Decision makers and 
elected officials will use 
information from the 
United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting 
to make decisions. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
k. I have a better 
understanding of 
community issues after 
participating in the 
United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
 334
l. The United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting 
increased my 
knowledge about other 
citizens’ issues and 
concerns. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
m. This process is 
appropriate for dealing 
with local policy issues. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
n. This process is 
appropriate for dealing 
with national policy 
issues. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
o. Local groups and 
organizations will work 
together to implement 
the recommendations 
from the United 
Agenda for Children 
Town Meeting. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
p. The United Agenda for 
Children will increase 
the capacity of local 
groups and 
organizations to work 
together. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
q. It is important that 
participants in the 
United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting 
do what they can to 
accomplish the 
recommendations. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
r. It is important that you 
personally to do what 
you can to accomplish 
the recommendations. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
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The following set of questions deals with THE DISCUSSIONS at the United 
Agenda for Children Town Meeting. 
 
30. To what extent do you agree with each statement below?  
 STRONGLY AGREE AGREE NEUTRAL  DISAGREE 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
DON’T 
KNOW 
a. There was a diverse group 
of people at the United 
Agenda for Children Town 
Meeting. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
b. Participants represented a 
cross-section of the 
community. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
c. Participants worked toward 
consensus agreements on 
the issues. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
d. A few people did all of the 
talking. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
e. A variety of policy 
alternatives were explored. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
f. Participants suggested 
creative alternatives to the 
problems. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
g. The costs and 
consequences of each 
alternative were 
evaluated. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
h. My opinions were fairly 
reflected in the information 
shared with everyone 
during the Summit. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
i. I had an adequate 
opportunity to express my 
opinions. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
j. The discussions identified 
shared values in the 
community. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
k. The discussions made me 
reconsider my opinions 
about the issue(s). 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
l. The discussions changed 
my opinion about the 
issue(s). 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
m. I encountered viewpoints 
that differed from my own. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
n. The viewpoints of other 
participants were worth 
considering. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
o. The discussions helped me 
think more critically about 
the issue(s).  
1 2 3 4 5 99 
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p. The discussions helped me 
consider other sides of the 
issues.  
1 2 3 4 5 99 
q. The discussions helped me 
develop stronger 
communication skills. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
 
The following questions deal with THE PROCESS of the United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting. 
 
31. To what extent do you agree with each statement below?  
 
 STRONGLY AGREE AGREE NEUTRAL  DISAGREE 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
DON’T 
KNOW 
a. The recommendations 
produced in the United 
Agenda for Children Town 
Meeting promote the 
common interests of the 
community. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
b. The United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting 
increased my trust in 
government. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
c. The recommendations 
produced at the United 
Agenda for Children Town 
Meeting are better than if 
they had been left to the 
experts. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
d. The recommendations 
produced at the United 
Agenda for Children Town 
Meeting are better because 
citizens participated in 
creating them. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
e. I am satisfied with the 
recommendations produced 
in the United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
f. The United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting 
process was adequately 
explained to me. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
g. I would participate in this 
kind of process again. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
h. The United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting 
process was fair. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
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i. I was treated with respect 
at the United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting.  
1 2 3 4 5 99 
j. My facilitator was neutral. 1 2 3 4 5 99 
k. This kind of process could 
be valuable for making 
other kinds of community 
decisions. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
l. This type of process should 
become a regular part of 
how government works in 
this community. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
m. Taxpayer dollars should be 
used to fund more 
processes like this. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
 
The last set of questions deals with you. These questions are optional, but 
remember, all information is confidential and anonymous. 
 
32. What is your gender?    
[0] MALE    
[1] FEMALE 
 
33. Are you employed?  
[0] NO  
[1] YES 
 
34. If you are employed, do you work for: 
[1] PRIVATE BUSINESS 
[2] GOVERNMENT  
[3] K-12 EDUCATION  
[4] NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION 
[5] OTHER 
 
 
35. Are you part of a group or business that is working already to achieve one 
or more of the United Agenda for Children goals? 
[0] NO    
[1] YES 
 
If yes, which group(s): 
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36. What is your age?   
[1] UNDER 18 
[2] 18-21 YEARS 
[3] 22-34 YEARS       
[4] 35-44 YEARS 
[5] 45-59 YEARS  
[6] OVER 60  
 
 
 
37. Do you have children under the age of 18?  
[0] NO   
[1] YES 
 
 
 
38. What is your race? 
[1] BLACK/AFRICAN AMERICAN  
[2] WHITE/CAUCASIAN 
[3] HISPANIC/LATINO 
[4] ASIAN/ASIAN-INDIAN 
[5] MULTI-ETHNIC/OTHER 
[6] UNKNOWN  
 
 
39. What is your level of education? 
[1] SOME HIGH SCHOOL 
[2] HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE (INCLUDING EQUIVALENCY) 
[3] SOME COLLEGE, NO DEGREE 
[4] ASSOCIATE DEGREE 
[5] BACHELOR’S DEGREE 
[6] GRADUATE OR PROFESSIONAL DEGREE 
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40. What was your 2003 total household income before taxes? 
[1]  UNDER $10,000 
[2]  $10,000 TO $19,999 
[3]  $20,000 TO $29,999 
[4]  $30,000 TO $39,999 
[5]  $40,000 TO $49,999 
[6]  $50,000 TO $59,999 
[7]  $60,000 TO $69,999 
[8]  $70,000 TO $79,999 
[9]  $80,000 TO $89,999 
[10] $90,000 TO $99,999 
[11] $100,000 OR MORE 
 
Thank you for your time. 
Please return this survey to your table facilitator. If you have left the United Agenda 
for Children Town Meeting, please mail your survey to: 
 
Tina Nabatchi  
The Indiana Conflict Resolution Institute  
SPEA 324, 1315 East 10th Street 
Indiana University,  
Bloomington, IN 47405 
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Participant Survey  
(Time 3) 
 
You must be at least 18 years old to complete this survey. 
 
Please clearly circle, mark or write in your answers. 
The first set of questions deals with media use. 
 
1.  How many days a week do you read a newspaper?   
 
____ DAYS   
 
_____ DO NOT READ A NEWSPAPER Æ GO TO QUESTION 3. 
 
2. How much attention do you pay to newspaper content dealing with: 
        VERY LITTLE                  VERY CLOSE        DON’T  
      ATTENTION                   ATTENTION          READ       
a. International affairs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 
b. National government and 
politics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 
c. Local government and 
politics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 
d. Editorials and letters to the 
editor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 
e. Youth issues in the 
Charlotte area 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 
 
3. How often do you watch: 
                ALL THE   DON’T   DON’T 
               RARELY                                  TIME      WATCH  KNOW  
a. Network evening news 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
b. Local evening news  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
c. News magazines  
(like 20/20 or PrimeTime 
Live) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
 
4. How much attention do you pay to the following content on TV? 
        VERY LITTLE               VERY CLOSE   DON’T  DON’T 
              ATTENTION              ATTENTION     WATCH    KNOW 
a. International affairs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
b. National government and 
politics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
c. Local government and 
politics  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
d. Editorials and letters to the 
editor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
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5. People rely on different sources for political information. How much do 
you rely on the each of the following sources? 
                       VERY           VERY       NOT    DON’T  
           LITTLE          MUCH      AT ALL  KNOW 
a. Newspapers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
b. Magazines (like Time, 
Newsweek, U.S. News and 
World Report) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
c. Network Television News 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
d. Local Television News  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
e. News Magazines (like 
“Nightline” or “20/20” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
f. Political Talk Radio 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
g. The Internet 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
h. Friends, Family, Neighbors, 
and Colleagues  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
 
The next set of questions deals with government and politics. 
6. In general, how interested are you in: 
            NOT AT ALL    EXTREMELY     DON’T  
          INTERESTED     INTERESTED    KNOW  
a. International Affairs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
b. National Government and 
Politics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
c. Local Government and 
Politics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
d. Youth Issues  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
e. Youth Issues in the 
Charlotte Area 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
 
7. Regardless of how interested you are, how much would you say you know 
about: 
             KNOW          KNOW       DON’T    
            NOTHING         A LOT       KNOW  
a. International Affairs  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
b. National Government and 
Politics  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
c. Local Government and 
Politics  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
d. Youth Issues  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
e. Youth Issues in the 
Charlotte Area 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
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8. In the past year, have you: 
a. Attended a neighborhood or town-hall meeting?  [1] YES [0] NO 
b. Attended a meeting involving school affairs? [1] YES [0] NO 
c. Written a letter to an editor? [1] YES [0] NO 
d. Called in to a local radio station? [1] YES [0] NO 
e. Circulated a petition?  [1] YES [0] NO 
f. Worked for a local political campaign?  [1] YES [0] NO 
g. Contacted a local public official? [1] YES [0] NO 
h. Called other people to raise funds for local organizations?  [1] YES [0] NO 
i. Volunteered for a local organization or cause? [1] YES [0] NO 
j. Contributed money to local organizations?  [1] YES [0] NO 
 
 
9. Did you vote in the November 2004 presidential election? 
[0] NO 
[1] YES 
 
 
10. How much of the time do you think you can trust local government to do 
what is right? 
[1] JUST ABOUT ALWAYS 
[2] MOST OF THE TIME 
[3] ONLY SOME OF THE TIME 
 
11. Which statement below comes closer to how you feel? 
[1] THE GOVERNMENT IS RUN BY A FEW BIG INTERESTS LOOKING OUT FOR 
THEMSELVES. 
 
[2] THE GOVERNMENT IS RUN FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL THE PEOPLE. 
 
 
12. Which statement below best describes how you feel about others? 
[1] MOST PEOPLE WOULD TRY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF YOU IF THEY GOT THE 
CHANCE. 
 
[2] MOST PEOPLE TRY TO BE FAIR. 
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13. To what extent do you agree with each statement below?  
 STRONGLY AGREE AGREE NEUTRAL  DISAGREE 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
DON’T 
KNOW  
a. Elected officials don't 
care what people like 
me think. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
b. People like me don't 
have any say about 
what the government 
does. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
c. It is important for 
people like me to have 
a voice in local 
government decisions. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
d. Sometimes politics and 
government seem so 
complicated that a 
person like me can't 
really understand 
what's going on. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
e. Voting is the only way 
people like me can 
have a say about how 
government runs 
things. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
f. Every citizen’s voice 
counts in the political 
process. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
g. Local government is 
responsive to citizen 
concerns. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
h. Elected officials are 
only interested in 
people’s votes. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
i. If elected officials are 
not interested hearing 
what the people think, 
there is no way to 
make them listen. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
j. I consider myself well-
qualified to participate 
in politics. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
k. I often don’t feel sure 
of myself when talking 
about politics or 
government.  
1 2 3 4 5 99 
l. I feel competent to 
speak with government 
officials about local 
issues. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
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m. Citizens should have 
more opportunities to 
participate in local 
government decision-
making. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
n. Public policy decisions 
should be left to 
elected officials. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
 
The next few questions deal with the United Agenda for Children Town 
Meeting. 
 
14. How did you hear about the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting? 
[1] NEWSPAPER STORY 
[2] TELEVISION STORY 
[3] ON THE RADIO 
[4] NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENT 
[5] FROM SOMEONE ELSE 
[6] OTHER (PLEASE SPECIFY) ___________________________________ 
 
 
15. What were your expectations in attending the United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting? 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Below is a list of issues affecting youth that might have come up at the 
United Agenda for Children Town Meeting. How interested are you in 
each of these issues?  
           NOT AT ALL         EXTREMELY      DON’T  
          INTERESTED           INTERESTED      KNOW  
a. Education 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
b. Public Safety 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
c. Family Support 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
d. Health Care  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
e. Substance Abuse 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
f. Community Activities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
g. Economic Security 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
h. Community Support 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
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17. Regardless of your interest, how confident are you that you understand 
each of these issues?   
 NOT                      EXTREMELY      DON’T  
                                                          CONFIDENT            CONFIDENT     KNOW  
a. Education 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
b. Public Safety 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
c. Family Support 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
d. Health Care  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
e. Substance Abuse 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
f. Community Activities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
g. Economic Security 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
h. Community Support 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
 
18. Were there any issues not discussed at the United Agenda for Children 
Town Meeting that you think should have been discussed? 
[0] NO 
[1] YES 
If yes, what are the issues?         
            
            
             
19. Do you think you will talk with others about these issues after the 
United Agenda for Children Town Meeting? 
[1] I WON’T TALK ABOUT THESE ISSUES AT ALL. 
[2] I WILL TALK A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THESE ISSUES.  
[3] I WILL TALK A LOT ABOUT THESE ISSUES. 
 
 
20. Were you comfortable expressing your opinions on the issues? 
[1] NO, I DID NOT EXPRESS MYSELF AT ALL. 
[2] YES, I EXPRESSED HOW I FELT, AND LET IT GO AFTER THAT. 
[3] YES, I EXPRESSED HOW I FELT, AND TRIED TO PERSUADE OTHERS TO ACCEPT 
MY VIEWS. 
 
21. If everyone else agreed on an issue, but you disagreed, did you feel free 
to speak out at the Town Meeting? 
 
[0] NO 
[1] YES 
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22. Thinking about community leaders in the room, list some of those that 
you know were present at the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting.  
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
23. In your opinion, how effective have local groups been in ensuring that 
all children in Mecklenburg County are healthy, safe and well-educated? 
             NOT                             EXTREMELY          DON’T  
                        EFFECTIVE                              EFFECTIVE           KNOW 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
 
24. In your opinion, what are the barriers to ensuring that all children in 
Mecklenburg County are healthy, safe and well-educated?  
            
             
25. How much responsibility do you think each of the following entities has 
for improving the quality of life for young people? 
   NO          A LOT OF  DON’T 
       RESPONSIBILITY      RESPONSIBILITY     KNOW  
Businesses 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Foundations and Charities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Individuals 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Local Government 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Not-for-Profit Organizations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Religious Associations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Schools 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
 
26. Regardless of how much responsibility you feel each group has, how 
much power and influence do you think each group has to actually 
improve the quality of life for young people? 
      NO POWER          ALOT OF POWER    DON’T  
      AND INFLUENCE          AND INFLUENCE    KNOW  
Businesses 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Foundations and Charities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Individuals 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Local Government 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Not-for-Profit Organizations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Religious Associations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Schools 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
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27. How much impact do you think the United Agenda for Children 
Town Meeting had on:  
 NO            GREAT    DON’T  
 IMPACT            IMPACT     KNOW  
Yourself 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Mecklenburg County  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Policy Makers  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
 
28. Did you attend the United Agenda for Children Town Meeting? 
[1] YES 
[2] NO 
 
29. To what extent do you agree with each statement below?  
 STRONGLY AGREE AGREE NEUTRAL  DISAGREE 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
DON’T 
KNOW 
a. I was prepared to 
participate effectively in 
the United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
b. Others were prepared to 
participate effectively in 
the United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
c. My participation did not 
make a difference in the 
outcome of the United 
Agenda for Children Town 
Meeting. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
d. Other participants 
considered my opinions. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
e. Decision makers were 
responsive to the 
recommendations of 
participants during the 
United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
f. Decision makers and 
government 
representatives have not 
followed through with 
citizens’ 
recommendations. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
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g. I was aware of this kind 
of process before I 
registered for the United 
Agenda for Children Town 
Meeting. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
h. The United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting 
helped decision makers 
and elected officials 
better understand the 
concerns of average 
citizens. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
i. The United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting 
produced information that 
has improved decision 
making. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
j. Decision makers and 
elected officials have 
used information from 
the United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting to 
make decisions. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
k. I have a better 
understanding of 
community issues after 
participating in the United 
Agenda for Children Town 
Meeting. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
l. The United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting 
increased my knowledge 
about other citizens’ 
issues and concerns. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
m. This process is 
appropriate for dealing 
with local policy issues. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
n. This process is 
appropriate for dealing 
with national policy 
issues. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
o. Local groups and 
organizations have 
worked together to 
implement the 
recommendations from 
the United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
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p. The United Agenda for 
Children has increased 
the capacity of local 
groups and organizations 
to work together. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
q. It is important that 
participants in the United 
Agenda for Children Town 
Meeting do what they can 
to accomplish the 
recommendations. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
r. It is important that you 
personally to do what you 
can to accomplish the 
recommendations. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
 
 
The following set of questions deals with THE DISCUSSIONS at the United 
Agenda for Children Town Meeting. 
 
30. To what extent do you agree with each statement below?  
 STRONGLY AGREE AGREE NEUTRAL  DISAGREE 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
DON’T 
KNOW 
a. There was a diverse 
group of people at the 
United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
b. Participants represented 
a cross-section of the 
community. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
c. Participants worked 
toward consensus 
agreements on the 
issues. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
d. A few people did all of 
the talking. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
e. A variety of policy 
alternatives were 
explored. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
f. Participants suggested 
creative alternatives to 
the problems. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
g. The costs and 
consequences of each 
alternative were 
evaluated. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
h. My opinions were fairly 
reflected in the 
information shared with 
everyone during the 
Meeting. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
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i. I had an adequate 
opportunity to express 
my opinions. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
j. The discussions identified 
shared values in the 
community. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
k. The discussions made me 
reconsider my opinions 
about the issue(s). 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
l. The discussions changed 
my opinion about the 
issue(s). 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
m. I encountered viewpoints 
that differed from my 
own. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
n. The viewpoints of other 
participants were worth 
considering. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
o. The discussions helped 
me think more critically 
about the issue(s).  
1 2 3 4 5 99 
p. The discussions helped 
me consider other sides 
of the issues.  
1 2 3 4 5 99 
q. The discussions helped 
me develop stronger 
communication skills. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
 
The following questions deal with THE PROCESS of the United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting. 
 
31. To what extent do you agree with each statement below?  
 
 STRONGLY AGREE AGREE NEUTRAL  DISAGREE 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
DON’T 
KNOW 
a. The recommendations 
produced in the United 
Agenda for Children Town 
Meeting promote the 
common interests of the 
community. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
b. The United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting 
increased my trust in 
government. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
c. The recommendations 
produced at the United 
Agenda for Children Town 
Meeting are better than if 
they had been left to the 
experts. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
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d. The recommendations 
produced at the United 
Agenda for Children Town 
Meeting are better 
because citizens 
participated in creating 
them. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
e. I am satisfied with the 
recommendations 
produced in the United 
Agenda for Children Town 
Meeting. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
f. The United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting 
process was adequately 
explained to me. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
g. I would participate in this 
kind of process again. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
h. The United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting 
process was fair. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
i. I was treated with respect 
at the United Agenda for 
Children Town Meeting.  
1 2 3 4 5 99 
j. My facilitator was neutral. 1 2 3 4 5 99 
k. This kind of process could 
be valuable for making 
other kinds of community 
decisions. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
l. This type of process 
should become a regular 
part of how government 
works in this community. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
m. Taxpayer dollars should be 
used to fund more 
processes like this. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
 
The last set of questions deals with you. These questions are optional, but 
remember, all information is confidential and anonymous. 
 
 
32. What is your gender?    
[0] MALE    
[1] FEMALE 
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33. Are you employed?  
[0] NO  
[1] YES 
 
 
34. If you are employed, do you work for: 
[1] PRIVATE BUSINESS 
[2] GOVERNMENT  
[3] K-12 EDUCATION  
[4] NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION 
[5] OTHER 
 
 
35. Are you part of a group or business that is working already to achieve 
one or more of the United Agenda for Children goals? 
[0] NO    
[1] YES 
 
If yes, which group(s): 
 
36. What is your age?   
[1] UNDER 18 
[2] 18-21 YEARS 
[3] 22-34 YEARS       
[4] 35-44 YEARS 
[5] 45-59 YEARS  
[6] OVER 60  
 
 
37. Do you have children under the age of 18?  
[0] NO   
[1] YES 
 
 
38. What is your race? 
[1] BLACK/AFRICAN AMERICAN  
[2] WHITE/CAUCASIAN 
[3] HISPANIC/LATINO 
[4] ASIAN/ASIAN-INDIAN 
[5] MULTI-ETHNIC/OTHER 
[6] UNKNOWN  
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39. What is your level of education? 
[1] SOME HIGH SCHOOL 
[2] HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE (INCLUDING EQUIVALENCY) 
[3] SOME COLLEGE, NO DEGREE 
[4] ASSOCIATE DEGREE 
[5] BACHELOR’S DEGREE 
[6] GRADUATE OR PROFESSIONAL DEGREE 
 
 
40. What was your 2003 total household income before taxes? 
[1]  UNDER $10,000 
[2]  $10,000 TO $19,999 
[3]  $20,000 TO $29,999 
[4]  $30,000 TO $39,999 
[5]  $40,000 TO $49,999 
[6]  $50,000 TO $59,999 
[7]  $60,000 TO $69,999 
[8]  $70,000 TO $79,999 
[9]  $80,000 TO $89,999 
[10] $90,000 TO $99,999 
[11] $100,000 OR MORE 
 
 
Thank you for your time. 
Please return your completed survey in the enclosed stamped envelope and mail to: 
 
Tina Nabatchi  
The Indiana Conflict Resolution Institute  
SPEA 322, 1315 East 10th Street 
Indiana University,  
Bloomington, IN 47405 
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Non-Participant Survey (Time 3)  
You must be at least 18 years old to complete this survey. 
 
Please clearly circle, mark or write in your answers. 
Did you attend the December 2004 United Agenda for Children Town 
Meeting? 
[1]  YES    [2]  NO  
 
 
The first set of questions deals with media use. 
 
1.  How many days a week do you read a newspaper?   
____ DAYS   
_____ DO NOT READ A NEWSPAPER Æ GO TO QUESTION 3. 
 
2. How much attention do you pay to newspaper content dealing with: 
        VERY LITTLE                  VERY CLOSE        DON’T  
      ATTENTION                   ATTENTION          READ       
a. International affairs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 
b. National government and 
politics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 
c. Local government and 
politics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 
d. Editorials and letters to the 
editor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 
e. Youth issues in the 
Charlotte area 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 
 
3. How often do you watch: 
                ALL THE   DON’T   DON’T 
               RARELY                                  TIME      WATCH  KNOW  
a. Network evening news 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
b. Local evening news  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
c. News magazines  
(like 20/20 or PrimeTime 
Live) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
 
4. How much attention do you pay to the following content on TV? 
        VERY LITTLE               VERY CLOSE   DON’T  DON’T 
              ATTENTION              ATTENTION     WATCH    KNOW 
a. International affairs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
b. National government and 
politics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
c. Local government and 
politics  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
d. Editorials and letters to the 
editor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 99 
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5. People rely on different sources for political information. How much do 
you rely on the each of the following sources? 
                   VERY          VERY       NOT    DON’T  
           LITTLE          MUCH      AT ALL  KNOW 
a. Newspapers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
b. Magazines (like Time, 
Newsweek, U.S. News and 
World Report) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
c. Network Television News 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
d. Local Television News  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
e. News Magazines (like 
“Nightline” or “20/20” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
f. Political Talk Radio 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
g. The Internet 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
h. Friends, Family, Neighbors, 
and Colleagues  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  0 99 
 
The next set of questions deals with government and politics. 
6. In general, how interested are you in: 
              NOT AT ALL    EXTREMELY     DON’T  
          INTERESTED     INTERESTED    KNOW  
a. International Affairs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
b. National Government and 
Politics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
c. Local Government and 
Politics 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
d. Youth Issues  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
e. Youth Issues in the 
Charlotte Area 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
7. Regardless of how interested you are, how much would you say you know 
about: 
             KNOW          KNOW       DON’T    
            NOTHING         A LOT       KNOW  
a. International Affairs  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
b. National Government and 
Politics  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
c. Local Government and 
Politics  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
d. Youth Issues  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
e. Youth Issues in the 
Charlotte Area 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
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8. In the past year, have you: 
a. Attended a neighborhood or town-hall meeting?  [1] YES [0] NO 
b. Attended a meeting involving school affairs? [1] YES [0] NO 
c. Written a letter to an editor? [1] YES [0] NO 
d. Called in to a local radio station? [1] YES [0] NO 
e. Circulated a petition?  [1] YES [0] NO 
f. Worked for a local political campaign?  [1] YES [0] NO 
g. Contacted a local public official? [1] YES [0] NO 
h. Called other people to raise funds for local organizations?  [1] YES [0] NO 
i. Volunteered for a local organization or cause? [1] YES [0] NO 
j. Contributed money to local organizations?  [1] YES [0] NO 
 
 
9. Did you vote in the November 2004 presidential election? 
[0] NO 
[1] YES 
 
 
10. How much of the time do you think you can trust local government to do 
what is right? 
[1] JUST ABOUT ALWAYS 
[2] MOST OF THE TIME 
[3] ONLY SOME OF THE TIME 
 
11. Which statement below comes closer to how you feel? 
[1] THE GOVERNMENT IS RUN BY A FEW BIG INTERESTS LOOKING OUT FOR 
THEMSELVES. 
 
[2] THE GOVERNMENT IS RUN FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL THE PEOPLE. 
 
 
12. Which statement below best describes how you feel about others? 
[1] MOST PEOPLE WOULD TRY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF YOU IF THEY GOT THE 
CHANCE. 
 
[2] MOST PEOPLE TRY TO BE FAIR. 
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13. To what extent do you agree with each statement below?  
 STRONGLY AGREE AGREE NEUTRAL  DISAGREE 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
DON’T 
KNOW   
a. Elected officials don't 
care what people like 
me think. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
b. People like me don't 
have any say about 
what the government 
does. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
c. It is important for 
people like me to have 
a voice in local 
government decisions. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
d. Sometimes politics and 
government seem so 
complicated that a 
person like me can't 
really understand 
what's going on. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
e. Voting is the only way 
people like me can 
have a say about how 
government runs 
things. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
f. Local government is 
responsive to citizen 
concerns. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
g. Elected officials are 
only interested in 
people’s votes. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
h. I consider myself well-
qualified to participate 
in politics. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
i. I often don’t feel sure 
of myself when talking 
about politics or 
government.  
1 2 3 4 5 99 
j. Citizens should have 
more opportunities to 
participate in local 
government decision-
making. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
k. Public policy decisions 
should be left to 
elected officials. 
1 2 3 4 5 99 
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14. The follow is a list of issues affecting youth in Mecklenburg County.  
How interested are you in each of these issues?  
NOT AT ALL        EXTREMELY        DON’T 
INTERESTED         INTERESTED      KNOW 
a. Education 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
b. Public Safety 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
c. Family Support 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
d. Health Care  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
e. Substance Abuse 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
f. Community Activities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
g. Economic Security 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
h. Community Support 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
 
15. Regardless of your interest, how confident are you in your knowledge of 
each issue?   
   NOT               EXTREMELY     DON’T  
     CONFIDENT            CONFIDENT      KNOW 
a. Education 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
b. Public Safety 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
c. Family Support 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
d. Health Care  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
e. Substance Abuse 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
f. Community Activities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
g. Economic Security 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
h. Community Support 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
 
16. Are there any youth-related issues not listed above that you think are 
important? 
[0] NO [GO TO QUESTION 17] 
[1] YES [GO TO PART B] 
B. If yes, what are the issues? 
___________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. In your opinion, how effective have local groups been in ensuring that 
all children in Mecklenburg County are healthy, safe and well-educated? 
  NOT             EXTREMELY    DON’T  
    EFFECTIVE            EFFECTIVE      KNOW 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
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18. How much responsibility do you think each of the following entities has 
for improving the quality of life for young people: 
   NO     A GREAT DEAL  DON’T 
  RESPONSIBILITY            OF RESPONSIBILITY   KNOW 
Businesses 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Foundations and charities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Individuals 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Local Government 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Not-for-profit organizations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Religious associations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Schools 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
 
 
19. Regardless of how much responsibility you feel each group has, how 
much power and influence do you think each group has to actually improve 
the quality of life for young people: 
  NO POWER   GREAT AMOUNT      DON’T 
  AND INFLUENCE             POWER & INFLUENCE     KNOW 
Businesses 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Foundations and charities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Individuals 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Local Government 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Not-for-profit organizations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Religious associations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
Schools 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  99 
 
The last set of questions deals with you. These questions are optional, but 
remember, all information is confidential.  
 
25. What is your gender?    
 [0] MALE   [1] FEMALE 
 
26. Are you employed?  
 [0] NO    [1] YES 
 
(If respondent says “0” for Q26, skip to Q28)  
  
27. If you are employed, do you work for: 
[1] PRIVATE BUSINESS 
[2] GOVERNMENT  
[3] K-12 EDUCATION  
[4] NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION 
[5] OTHER 
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28. Are you part of a group or business that is working already to achieve 
one or more of the United Agenda for Children goals? 
[0] NO    [1] YES 
 
29. What is your age?   
[1] UNDER 18 
[2] 18-21 YEARS 
[3] 22-34 YEARS       
[4] 35-44 YEARS 
[5] 45-59 YEARS  
[6] OVER 60  
 
30. Do you have children under the age of 18?  
[0] NO   [1] YES 
 
31. What is your race? 
[1] BLACK/AFRICAN AMERICAN  
[2] WHITE/CAUCASIAN 
[3] HISPANIC/LATINO 
[4] ASIAN/ASIAN-INDIAN 
[5] MULTI-ETHNIC/OTHER 
[6] UNKNOWN  
 
32. What is your level of education? 
[1] SOME HIGH SCHOOL 
[2] HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE (INCLUDING EQUIVALENCY) 
[3] SOME COLLEGE, NO DEGREE 
[4] ASSOCIATE DEGREE 
[5] BACHELOR’S DEGREE 
[6] GRADUATE OR PROFESSIONAL DEGREE 
 
33. What was your 2003 total household income before taxes?  
[1]  UNDER $10,000 
[2]  $10,000 TO $19,999 
[3]  $20,000 TO $29,999 
[4]  $30,000 TO $39,999 
[5]  $40,000 TO $49,999 
[6]  $50,000 TO $59,999 
[7]  $60,000 TO $69,999 
[8]  $70,000 TO $79,999 
[9]  $80,000 TO $89,999 
[10] $90,000 TO $99,999 
[11] $100,000 OR MORE 
 
Thank you for your time. 
Please return your completed survey in the enclosed stamped envelope and mail to: 
Tina Nabatchi  
The Indiana Conflict Resolution Institute  
SPEA 322, 1315 East 10th Street 
Indiana University,  
Bloomington, IN 47405
TINA NABATCHI             
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs 
Syracuse University  
Syracuse, New York 13244 
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DISSERTATION 
Deliberative Democracy: The Effects of Participation on Perceptions of Political Efficacy 
Committee: James Perry (chair), Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Evan Ringquist, John 
Applegate, Rosemary O’Leary 
  My dissertation examines the role of deliberative democracy in policy making and 
analysis. Deliberative democracy is the idea that public decisions should be made 
with the reasoned discussion and collective judgment of citizens. Proponents of 
deliberative democracy assert that it has many benefits, including the 
enhancement of citizenship. My dissertation empirically examines one aspect of 
this claim. Specifically, it investigates the “efficacy effect,” the idea that 
participation in a deliberative process increases citizens’ perceptions of political 
efficacy. The study is applied to the AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting, a 
process that enables large groups of citizens (100‐5000+) to deliberate about public 
issues and make recommendations to policy makers and government officials. The 
study uses a quasi‐experimental pre‐post‐post test design with a treatment and 
comparison group. The dissertation assesses: 1) differences between the groups 
prior to the Town Meeting, 2) the effects of participation on perceptions of political 
efficacy and the variables related to those perceptions, and 3) whether the efficacy 
effect is sustained by participants over time.  
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and Implications for Organizational Structure. In: A. Farazmand & J. Pinkowski 
(eds.), The Handbook of Globalization and Public Administration, 799‐820. New York, NY: 
Marcel Dekker Inc. 
C. Ventriss & T. Nabatchi (2006). Subnational Governments and Globalization: The 
Changing Face of Federalism. In: A. Farazmand & J. Pinkowski (eds.), The Handbook of 
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Dekker Inc. 
T. Nabatchi & L. B. Bingham (2004). Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes. In: J. 
Rabin (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Public Policy [online].  New 
York, NY: Marcel Dekker, Inc.   
 T. Nabatchi & L. B. Bingham (2004). Ombuds and Ombuds Programs. In: J. Rabin (ed.), 
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Marcel Dekker, Inc.  [online]. 
R. O’Leary, T. Nabatchi, & L. B. Bingham (2004). Environmental Conflict Resolution. In: 
B. Durant, D. Fiorino, & R. O’Leary (eds.), Building Common Purpose:  Challenges, 
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K. Emerson, T. Nabatchi, R. O’Leary, & J. Stephens (2003). The Challenges of 
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T. Nabatchi (2003). The United States Postal Service. In: D. Schultz (ed.), The Encyclopedia 
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MANUSCRIPTS IN REVIEW 
T. Nabatchi, L. B. Bingham, J. M. Senger, & M. S. Jackman. Improving Efficiency and 
Effectiveness in Resolving Public Disputes: An Empirical Comparison of 
Litigation and Alternative Dispute Resolution. In review at The Journal of Dispute 
Resolution.   
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T. Nabatchi. Game Theory and Dispute System Design: Making Mediation a Dominant 
Strategy in the United States Postal Service. Target journal yet to be identified. 
T. Nabatchi, L. B. Bingham, & D. Good. The Determinants of Outcomes in 
Transformative Mediation. Target journal is Academy of Management Journal. 
T. Nabatchi, Y. Moon, & L. B. Bingham. Transformative Mediation: The Practice of 
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B. Nesbit, T. Nabatchi, & L. B. Bingham. Disputants’ Sense of Interactional Justice: 
Comparing How Employees and Supervisors Interact in Mediation. Target journal to 
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Indiana University, 2005 
Outstanding Empirical Paper Award, International Association for Conflict 
Management, 17th Annual Conference, Pittsburgh, PA, June 2004. 
For: B. Nesbit, T. Nabatchi, & L. B. Bingham. “Disputants’ Perceptions of Interactional 
Justice: Comparing How Employees & Supervisors Interact in Mediation.” 
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T. Nabatchi & L. Napoli (2006). Restorative Justice: An Evaluation. Report to the Indiana 
Department of Corrections, South Bend Juvenile Facility. On‐file with the authors. 
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T. Nabatchi & D. Schontz (2001). The Use of ADR in Federal Agencies: A Report to the U.S. 
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T. Nabatchi. “Teaching the Concept of Neutrality in Conflict Resolution Education.” 
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L. B. Bingham, R. O’Leary, & T. Nabatchi. “The New Governance: Practices and 
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L. B. Bingham, R. O’Leary, & T. Nabatchi. “The New Governance: Practices and 
Processes for Stakeholder and Citizen Participation in the Work of Government.” 
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Conference, Portland, Oregon, March 2004. 
T. Nabatchi & L. B. Bingham. “The Frontiers of Employment Dispute Resolution: 
Research on the USPS.” Paper and research presented at the American Society for 
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T. Nabatchi. “Expanding our Models of Justice in Dispute Resolution: A Field Test of the 
Contribution of Interactional Justice.” Paper presented at the International Conflict 
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Bingham, et. al. “Mediation at Work: The Report of the National REDRESS™ Evaluation 
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Association of Conflict Resolution (ACR), Toronto, Canada, October 2001. 
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Young Researchers Conference, Bloomington, Indiana, March 2001. 
 
INVITED COLLOQUIA AND WORKSHOPS  
T. Nabatchi. “Conflict Prevention and Victim‐Offender Mediation.” Workshop 
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Indiana, October 2004. 
L. B. Bingham, R. O’Leary, & T. Nabatchi. “The New Governance: Practices and 
Processes for Stakeholder and Citizen Participation in the Work of Government.” 
Paper presented at Dispute Resolution Colloquium, Indiana University School of 
Law, Indianapolis, Indiana, October 2004. 
L. B. Bingham, R. O’Leary, & T. Nabatchi. “The New Governance: Practices and 
Processes for Stakeholder and Citizen Participation in the Work of Government.” 
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T. Nabatchi & L. B. Bingham (2002). “Expanding our Models of Justice in Dispute 
Resolution: A Field Test of the Contribution of Interactional Justice.” Contract 
Research Presentation to the United States Postal Service National Meeting of Area 
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TEACHING EXPERIENCE  
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V263: Public Management (Fall 2005) 
V435: Negotiation and Alternative Dispute Resolution (Spring 2003‐Spring 2004) 
V453: Ethical Dilemmas in Public Affairs (Fall 2002) 
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• Law and Public Affairs (graduate course). Professor Lisa B. Bingham. 
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• Introduction to Public Management. Instructor G. Leah Davis. March 2004; 
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“An Introduction to Alternative Dispute Resolution.”  
• Negotiation and Alternative Dispute Resolution. Professor: Nan Stager.  
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• Environmental Management. Instructor: Sean Svendsen. April 2004. 
• Negotiation and Alternative Dispute Resolution. Instructor: Lisa Marie 
Napoli. March 2002. 
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• Introduction to Public Management. Instructor: Mete Yildez. February 2004. 
• Managing Behavior in Organizations. Instructor: Adam Lederer, February 
2002. 
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United Way of Chittenden County, Burlington, VT      (Jan. 1998 – July 1999) 
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